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 I argue that for most patients a good death involves more than contemporary 
medicine can or should be expected to provide and that virtues can secure goods not 
provided by medicine.  Currently, medical care at the end of life focuses on addressing 
pain and suffering, supporting independent functioning and autonomy, providing 
aggressive care near death when desired, and preserving overall quality of life, among 
other aims.  When bioethicists have discussed a good death, they have argued primarily 
for the provision of such services and for respect of patients’ autonomy.  However, I 
argue that such circumstances are not sufficient by themselves to ensure a good death and 
a patient’s use of autonomy will be “guided” by her conception of a good death.  In many 
cases, a good death requires—as a necessary if not sufficient condition—virtues as well. 
At least four different conceptions of a good death, I argue, exist within American 
society.  These conceptions imply goods that go beyond what proper medical care 
currently does or should provide.  Next, I discuss the challenges that dying patients face 
in our contemporary medical and social context.  What types of challenges—and how one 
faces them—will be determined partly by one’s conception of a good death, though 
certain challenges seem more universal.  I argue that the challenges associated with the 
loss of independence and increasing dependence on others and the nature of pain and 
suffering at the end of life are among our most prominent concerns. 
After discussing virtues in general and the place of emotions within them, I use 
this account to show how virtues can enable a person to die well, given a particular 
patient’s conception of a good death.  Embodying virtues such as patience, gratitude, 
generosity, and practical wisdom can help patients become the kinds of people who can 
meet some of the challenges of dying.  I conclude by giving a fuller depiction of one 
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 Isaac Asimov has said that, “Life is pleasant.  Death is peaceful.  It’s the transition 
that’s troublesome.”1  This dissertation is about “the transition.”  Dying well is a 
perennial challenge, and our own time and place is no exception.  Indeed, I will suggest 
later that, in some ways, dying well may be more challenging in our contemporary 
medical and social context than it has been in others.  Many Americans can call on 
personal experiences with the deaths of loved ones to confirm that dying today is often a 
disquieting experience.  This is true both for the patient herself and for those attending to 
her.  Dying well in our society requires that the patient be able to meet some profound 
challenges.  Virtues, I believe, are one way patients might pursue good deaths.  My thesis 
in this dissertation is that virtues—good character traits—can enable patients to meet the 
challenges of dying in our social and medical context and to achieve good deaths.   
This topic and its aims are idiosyncratic in a number of ways.  For one, 
bioethicists have more often talked about matters of public policy or the ethics of health 
care worker conduct than they have about patients’ responsibilities.2  When bioethicists 
consider how to improve the quality of our end of life experiences, they often look at 
                                                 
1 This quote may be found at <http://www.quotationspage.com/quotes/Isaac_Asimov/> accessed on June 
22, 2006.  I have not been able to find any other information about where this quote may be found in 
Asimov’s writings. 
2 Important exceptions to this claim are Alasdair MacIntyre, “Patients as Agents,” in Stuart F. Spicker and 
H. Tristam Engelhardt, eds., Philosophical Medical Ethics: Its Nature and Significance (Dordrecht, 
Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1977), 197-212; Karen Lebacqz, “The Virtuous Patient,” in Earl 
E. Shelp, ed., Virtue and Medicine: Explorations in the Character of Medicine (Dordrecht, Holland: D. 
Reidel Publishing Company, 1985), 275-88; Stanley Hauerwas and Charles Pinches, “Practicing Patience: 
How Christians Should Be Sick,” Christian Bioethics 2:2 (1996): 202-21; and Christopher P. Vogt, 
Patience, Compassion, Hope and the Christian Art of Dying Well (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 2004).   
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what medicine and related health care fields can provide.3  Ancient philosophers, for 
example the Stoics, would not have placed such hope in the medical profession.4  Rather, 
the ancients sought, by acquiring virtues, to become the kind of people who could 
manage well such life events as dying.5  This dissertation is an effort to recover that kind 
of approach, but little has been said about virtues for the end of life and so this 
dissertation is idiosyncratic in that way also.6  My conviction is that those who embody 
certain virtues could manage the challenges of dying in a better manner than those 
without them tend to do.  My aim here is to clarify what virtues might be relevant and 
how they can be relevant to dying well. 
My interest in this kind of approach to dying well was reinforced when, as a 
teaching device, I began asking undergraduate students in bioethics classes how they 
wanted to die.  Their answers do not differ from those I have come to expect from just 
about anyone to whom I ask that question.  Many people today say they would like to die 
quickly, painlessly, in their sleep or suddenly, and without any incapacity prior to death.  
Given how unrealistic these desires are, I began to think about how we might respond to 
the challenges that our expression of these desires implicitly acknowledges.7  I believe we 
                                                 
3 For an important recent example of this, see Bruce Jennings, Gregory E. Kaebnick, and Thomas H. 
Murray, eds., Improving End of Life Care: Why Has It Been So Difficult? Hastings Center Report Special 
Report 35:6 (2005). 
4 Charles E. Cosans, “Facing Death Like a Stoic: Epictetus on Suicide in the Case of Illness,” in Mark G. 
Kuczewski and Ronald Polansky, eds., Bioethics: Ancient Themes in Contemporary Issues (Cambridge, 
MA: Bradford Books/The MIT Press, 2000), 229-49, 242. 
5 On this, see Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
6 Sara Ruddick has written about virtues for the elderly in “Virtues and Age,” in Margaret Urban Walker, 
ed., Mother Time: Women, Aging, and Ethics (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 45-60, but she 
does not deal explicitly with dying. 
7 Joanne Lynn has written in many places about how unrealistic these desires are in our contemporary 
setting.  For one recent account, see Joanne Lynn, “Living Long in Fragile Health: The New Demographics 
Shape End of Life Care,” in Jennings, Kaebnick, and Murray, eds., Improving End of Life Care (cited 
above): S14-S18. 
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say we want to die quickly, painlessly, suddenly, and without incapacity because so many 
of us know someone who has died slowly, with pain, over a prolonged period of time that 
may extend to several years, and with an ever increasing set of incapacities.  Just as 
ancient philosophers believed that virtues could dispose a person to deal well with the 
various challenges of living, I argue here that virtues could dispose contemporary patients 
to deal well—or at least better than otherwise—with the various challenges of dying. 
Distinguishing Death and Dying 
Before laying out a sketch of my argument, I should make a few qualifications.  
Dying and death are separate, though obviously related, phenomena.  This distinction is 
important to my argument here.  Death, if understood as the moment of the cessation of 
life, happens in an instant.  Thus, we talk about the “time of death” and give a specific 
time.  Dying takes place over a period of time.  When dying starts is very hard to say, 
even for doctors.  Retrospectively, we can define dying as the period of time immediately 
preceding death, but even in this definition, “immediately” is unclear.  Patients can carry 
terminal diagnoses for five or more years.  Because dying tends to be a period in which 
the challenges I’ve alluded to above increase in number and intensify, I’m inclined to 
think that we can leave the definition of dying loose and say that the relevance of virtues 
to dying increases as the number and intensity of the challenges increases.  My aim is to 
say how virtues can help us to manage with the challenges that arise within the period of 
time we can call “dying.”  I leave the exact period of dying somewhat vague, but I don’t 
believe this will affect anything in my argument.  Indeed, it may be that the virtues that 
enable one to die well also enable one to live well with various challenges at other times 
of life.  This is certainly what the ancient philosophers believed was true of virtues in 
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general, and I have not invented new virtues for dying so much as I have recast familiar 
ones.  I don’t make any arguments that the virtues that can help us to die well will also 
help us to live well, although I certainly suspect this is true. 
The convention in bioethics, medicine, and in general has been to talk about good 
deaths, as in, “How can medicine help patients to achieve good deaths?”  However, I 
have distinguished between dying and death and claimed that virtues are relevant to the 
former.  Because of the convention in place, and because “good deaths” is a more 
felicitous phrase than “good dyings,” I will sometimes talk about good deaths, where I 
mean good “dyings.”  For instance, in Chapter Two I talk about different conceptions of a 
good death, however, the aim there is to talk about different conceptions of what would 
constitute dying well. 
The distinction between death and dying explains why Epicurus’s paradox 
concerning death does not apply here.   Epicurus asks how any individual’s death can be 
bad for him.8  He claims that something is bad only if it is a bad experience, but the dead 
do not, he believes, experience anything bad about being dead because there is no one to 
experience anything.  Thus, he says, although we often think of death as bad, it really 
isn’t bad because when “you” are dead, there isn’t any “you” anymore.  Religious 
objections about an afterlife aside, Epicurus’s paradox only addresses the badness of 
death.  It does not deal with the badness, or challenges, of dying.  Indeed, given his belief 
that only bad experiences are bad, Epicurus would seem to be in a position to 
acknowledge that dying is indeed bad, even if death itself isn’t. 
                                                 
8 See Epicurus, “Letter to Menoeceus,” in Letters, Principle Doctrines and Vatican Sayings, trans. by G. 
Russell (New York: Macmillan, 1964). 
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Frances Kamm has discussed how good character might alleviate the badness of 
death, although, like Epicurus, she does not address how her claims are relevant to dying.  
She says,  
the goods of fine character and wisdom … are supposed to make long 
life and the enjoyment of other goods better.  In dying, a person who 
would have continued to have these goods of character and wisdom 
loses a better life ….  Yet the good person in losing life loses something 
that he needs less than another person does since he has already 
achieved something that is important in life.9 
 
Kamm argues that having achieved the end purpose of attaining good character, one 
cannot be harmed by the fact that death cuts off the opportunity for future moral 
development.  Thus, she says, good character makes death less bad.  My argument, in 
contrast, looks at how good character—in the form of virtues—helps one to manage the 
challenges of the dying process and not death itself.  In contrast to Kamm, my argument 
requires that terminal patients actually exercise their virtues rather than just possess them 
as an achievement of their moral development.  So Kamm and I have different aims for 
our discussion of the relevance of virtues and good character to the end of life; she 
addresses death, and I address dying. 
Other Qualifications 
 Kamm’s claim would, I think, apply to anyone who had good character and is 
now dead.  However, the virtues are not relevant to all instances of dying.   For the 
virtues to benefit the patient who is dying, she must be conscious.  Any condition that 
renders a terminal patient unconscious or severely compromises her mental competency 
would be a condition in which the virtues are no longer relevant to pursuing a good death.  
                                                 
9 F.M. Kamm, Morality, Mortality, Volume I (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 61. 
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Likewise, those who die suddenly—whether of cardiac arrest, aneurysm, or accident of 
some kind—would not usually have any opportunity to exercise virtues.  Terminally ill 
children sometimes amaze us with their responses to their condition.  How much 
opportunity a child has to develop virtues that could enable him to manage the challenges 
of dying depends on his age, experiences and upbringing, as well as a number of other 
factors.  I suspect that children facing dying must deal with a number of challenges that 
elderly terminal patients do not (and vice versa).  I don’t take on the special case of 
children here.  In this dissertation, I focus on what I take to be a paradigmatic case of 
dying: an elderly person, someone who has spend considerably more of her life not dying 
than being terminally ill, and someone who is dying over time and is typically 
accumulating a steadily increasing number of dependencies and incapacities.  When I talk 
about the challenges of dying and of virtues that could enable a patient to meet such 
challenges, I am thinking of this paradigmatic patient.  In our time and place, this is the 
most common experience of dying.10 
 In ethics, much talk centers on moral agents.  In medicine and bioethics, the 
terminally ill are often referred to as patients.  I will use these two terms interchangeably, 
although it sounds odd to talk of patients who are moral agents as well.  My argument 
embraces this odd juxtaposition.  Medical patients, who—the term implies—must 
patiently wait on medicine or the body’s own resources for healing, can also be active 
moral agents in that they can embody virtues that can enable them to die well.  However, 
I don’t want to overstate my dual usage here.  One virtue that I argue that medical 
                                                 
10 Joanne Lynn claims that at least 65% of all deaths follow the trajectory I am assuming as paradigmatic 
(see “Living Long in Fragile Health,” S16). 
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patients can actively embody in order to die well is patience.  Patients are not always 
patient, but I argue that, on at least one conception of a good death, they would do well to 
be.  Nevertheless, throughout this dissertation, I will speak of moral agents and of 
medical patients using the terms interchangeably. 
The Overall Argument 
 I begin, in Chapter Two, by looking at different conceptions of a good death.11  I 
claim that virtues can enable a patient to die well, but it turns out that there is more than 
one conception of what it is to die well.  I explore a few of what I take to be the leading 
conceptions, so that I can later look at how virtues might facilitate achieving each of 
them.  In particular, I discuss Avoiding Death, Growth in Dying, Simply Dying, and a 
few different Christian Conceptions of a good death.  The latter are meant to be 
representative of what I take to be a variety of different religious approaches to a good 
death.  I don’t argue that the four conceptions I consider are the only ones.  There may 
well be others.  However, I look at these because I believe that they are among the more 
prominent.  Two key claims set up this chapter.  First, I distinguish between 
circumstantial and personal features of dying.  Most attention, I point out, has been 
focused on the circumstantial factors, but these are neither necessary nor sufficient to 
ensure a good death.  Rather, dying well will depend, in many cases, on a patient’s 
personal engagement with death and dying.   
A second key claim concerns control in dying.  Much of the contemporary debate 
over end of life issues revolves around who gets control and what, if any, limits there are 
                                                 
11 Conceptions of a good death are probably related to conceptions of a well-lived life, although I do not 
argue for any specific connections. 
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on such control.12  But I argue that for terminal patients who have some measure of 
control over their dying, the important question is “To what end should such control be 
put?”  That is, how should a patient use his control in order to die well?  I argue that a 
patient’s conception of a good death informs how she will use control in dying.  Patients 
would do well to be aware of how they conceive of a good death, and health care workers 
would also be wise to be sensitive to different conceptions of a good death among their 
patients. 
After looking at conceptions of a good death, I explore the variety of different 
challenges patients might face in dying in our medical and social context.  Of course not 
all patients will face all of the challenges I present there, and whether and how one faces 
some of these challenges may depend in large part of one’s conception of a good death.  
The loss of independence and a corresponding increase in dependence on other persons 
and technologies and pain and suffering at the end of life are the two main themes I 
discuss in the chapter of the challenges of dying.  I explore only a few of the many ways 
that these and other challenges at the end of life are interwoven with one another.  In 
some sense, it is artificial to list challenges individually, but I discuss them one at a time 
in order to give an adequate account of each.  This discussion makes up Chapter Three. 
Chapter Four discusses one conception of virtues and focuses, in particular, on the 
relationship between virtues and emotion-dispositions in this conception.  My aim in this 
chapter is to be broad and inclusive in two ways.  One, I don’t argue that my conception 
of virtues is superior to all other conceptions.  Rather, I have tried to conceive of virtues 
                                                 
12 For an example of such debate, see Dan W. Brock, “Voluntary Active Euthanasia,” Hastings Center 
Report 22:2 (1992): 10-22 and Daniel Callahan, “When Self-Determination Runs Amok,” Hastings Center 
Report 22:2 (1992): 52-55. 
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in a way that allows for compatibility with a broad variety of different particular 
conceptions.  A particular way that I pursue this aim is by claiming that virtues can be 
constituent elements either in a conception of the kind of person one believes tends to 
live well and/or in a conception of the kind of person one admires.  That is, I distinguish 
between good or admirable persons and good lives.  The two concepts are often related.  
Indeed, on a strain of our use of words, one could say that any person who becomes like a 
moral exemplar she admires is living well.  Living well, on this usage, would mean living 
as the kind of person I aspire to be.  However, I do not offer an account of why someone 
might admire, or want to become like, a moral exemplar.  Generally, I suggest this is 
because the moral agent believes the person she admires tends to live well, but this is not 
always the case. 
The second way that I aim to be broad and inclusive is that I conceive of virtues 
in a way that allows them to be constituent elements in a broad variety of different 
conceptions of a well-lived life.  I don’t argue for or assume any particular conception of 
a well-lived human life.  Rather, I assume that my conception of virtues will be adaptable 
to a variety of different conceptions of a well-lived life, as well as to a variety of 
conceptions of a good death. 
In this chapter, I also offer two arguments for how the emotion-dispositions which 
are a part of many virtues enable the virtuous agent to benefit from embodying virtues.  
These arguments concern the agent’s motivation for good actions, unity of self and 
character, and the place of emotions in practical wisdom.  Emotions, conceived as 
perceptions informed by concerns, shape how moral agents perceive and understand the 
world.  They are an important part of a patient’s personal engagement with his dying.  In 
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Chapter Four I try to explain how the virtuous benefit from their virtues, particularly 
from their emotion-dispositions. 
Chapter Five consists of a look at particular virtues, as well as some classes of 
virtues, that are relevant to dying.  I begin by looking at virtues that I believe could be 
relevant to a broad variety of conceptions of a good death.  Here I discuss courage, 
gratitude, humility, and practical wisdom as examples of broadly relevant virtues.  In 
discussing them, I also note how members of different conceptions of a good death will 
specify and practice these virtues in unique ways.  Thus, there are different conceptions 
of the virtue of courage, for instance.  Then I look at each of the conceptions of a good 
death considered in Chapter Two and discuss virtues that may be particularly relevant to 
each conception.  I also offer some narratives—some fiction, some nonfiction—to 
illustrate someone embodying the virtues under discussion. 
Chapter Six looks in greater depth at one Christian conception of a good death.  In 
particular, I try to show how a Christian conception of the virtues of hope, patience, 
gratitude, humility, peacefulness, and practical wisdom could enable Christians to “live” 
the narrative that gives the Christian moral tradition its identity.  That narrative is drawn 
from the main themes of the Christian Scriptures.  To “live” this narrative is to perceive 
oneself and one’s place in the larger world, including one’s relationship to God, in terms 
of the overall trajectory of this narrative.  The narrative begins with creation and fall and 
looks ahead to the culmination of God’s redemption of the created order.  One Christian 
conception of a good death will have patients seeking to see themselves and their deaths 
in terms of the larger perspective of this narrative.  I try to show how the virtues in 
question can facilitate this task. 
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Conclusion 
 I do not argue that virtues are the only way to pursue a good death.  However, 
they are certainly one of the ways we may do so.  And, it seems that they represent an 
under-explored means of pursuing a good death.  There has been little consideration 
among bioethicists of how virtues might help us to die well.  And there has been, so far as 
I can see, little intention on the part of those contemplating their future deaths to seek out 
virtues as a means to meet the challenges many claim they are eager to avoid.  In my 
informal “How would you like to die?” surveys in bioethics classes, I haven’t had anyone 




























 In this dissertation I argue that virtues can help a person to die well.  However, 
before such a claim can be established we need some understanding of what it means to 
die well.  It turns out, I believe, that there is not one univocal conception of a good death.  
So, in this chapter I survey a variety of different conceptions of a good death.  Before 
looking at the conceptions themselves, I make a distinction between the circumstantial 
and personal aspects of a good death.  This distinction serves to clarify what I am aiming 
to discuss when I identify different conceptions of a good death.  In short, a good death is 
more than having the right kinds of circumstances surround one’s dying.  Another issue 
that often arises in discussions of the end of life is control over one’s dying.  One might 
say that whatever else a good death entails, it surely includes control.  While I am 
sympathetic to this line of thought, I argue that whatever control we manage to have at 
the end of our lives must, for us, serve some other purpose.  That is, we want control 
because we believe this will enable us to die well.  But then, what does it mean to die 
well?  The conceptions of a good death that I discuss in this chapter are an attempt to 
answer that question. 
Good Deaths and Bioethics 
 Despite—and sometimes because of—advances in medical technology, death 
remains a challenge.  Most people who think about it foresee a variety of pitfalls that 
could prevent them from dying well.  Thus, a good death remains elusive.  The dying 
period is growing ever longer—facilitated by medical technology’s ability to help us live 
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longer with various terminal illnesses, and often with a diminished quality of life—so we 
have more time to die well, or badly.  Health care practitioners will have an interest in 
facilitating good deaths as part of their profession, but all of us ought to have a personal 
interest here because we will all die. 
 What defines a good death?  This is a fundamental question for bioethics, but 
many aspects of it remain unexplored.13  Whatever a good death amounts to, many will 
agree that it need not be the same for everyone.  Is it different for everyone?  If so, 
perhaps we have nothing to learn from one another about dying well.  But that seems 
implausible.  Of course, many will say that they want to have some measure of control, or 
autonomy, in their dying.  The SUPPORT study helped us realize (or confirmed 
empirically, for some) that many requests for particular kinds of care at the end of life 
were being ignored.14  So, bioethicists have responded by defending dying patients’ rights 
to act autonomously and to have their autonomy respected.15  But bioethicists have said 
relatively little about how or for what purpose dying patients ought to exercise their right 
to autonomy in dying.  An endorsement of autonomy need not amount to refusal to say 
anything about what might constitute a good death for a given patient, just as doctors 
giving medical advice do not violate the autonomy of their patients.  Indeed, this might 
even enhance autonomy.  While autonomy has some value by itself, the right of 
autonomy in dying must surely be in the interest of something more than the intrinsic 
                                                 
13 This is not to say that the topic has been ignored.  Rather, I will argue that, while bioethics has been 
concerned with the circumstantial aspects of dying, it has paid considerably less attention to the personal 
aspects. 
14 The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, “A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for Seriously Ill 
Hospitalized Patients,” Journal of the American Medical Association 274:20 (1995): 1591-98. 
15 Two of the more prominent bioethicists making arguments for autonomy at the end of life are Margaret 
Pabst Battin, The Least Worst Death: Essays in Bioethics on the End of Life (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1994) and Dan Brock, Life and Death (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
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value of freedom.  And there has been little discussion in the bioethics community of 
what constitute good uses of autonomy.16  Thus, bioethicists concerned to help patients to 
die well will see value in helping patients (and caregivers) to clarify their own 
conceptions of a good death. 
In this chapter I present four relatively substantial visions of what a good death 
might look like.  In doing this, I am attempting to say what many patients might do, or 
want to do, with the freedom bioethicists have been so keen to secure for the dying.  If 
there are four—or more—defensible, yet substantially different conceptions of a good 
death, then the concept of a “good death” is systematically ambiguous.  Instead of talking 
about “a—or the—good death” as if the term has a univocal, universally-shared meaning, 
caregivers and bioethicists should learn to attend to which conception of a good death a 
given patient holds.  Only then can care for this patient be fully appropriate.  And patients 
should pay attention to and reflect on their own conceptions of what it would mean to die 
well.  Attending to this will empower them against a medical establishment that might try 
to impose a conception of a good death and will enable them to prepare to pursue their 
own vision of a good death.  Embodying virtues, as I argue in later chapters, is one way a 
patient could prepare to die well given her conception of a good death. 
What sorts of ends or purposes should autonomous patients pursue in their dying?  
This question can be taken in at least two different directions.  One direction—my 
                                                 
16 Among bioethicists, Daniel Callahan has probably been the most attentive to this question.  The 
Troubled Dream of Life: In Search of a Peaceful Death (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 
2000) is his most comprehensive contribution.  The question of what a good death might look like has been 
taken up by bioethicists in a number of other places.  See, for instance, Bioethics Forum 13:3 (1997) for a 
series of articles by various bioethicists, including Callahan, David C. Thomasma, Richard C. McCormick, 
Ellen McGee, Elise Ayers, Joan Harrold, and Joanne Lynn.  Also relevant here is Richard O’Neil’s, “On 
Defining ‘A Good Death,’” International Journal of Applied Philosophy 1 (1983): 9-17. 
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primary aim in this chapter—is to suggest that this is a question the patient ought to pose 
to herself.  An unreflective exercise of choice can be as destructive of one’s deeper or 
abiding interests as paternalism.  So, in one sense, I mean for patients to reflect on what 
might constitute worthwhile uses of their ability to act autonomously.  A second direction 
to take the question would be to ask whether there are normative features of a good death 
that transcend individual preferences.  For instance, the concept of a virtuous ideal 
observer might give us some hypotheses about what these features would include: given 
full information about various facts concerning life, dying, and death and given moral 
and intellectual virtues that enable their possessor to embody wisdom about how to 
respond to these facts, what sorts of purposes ought patients pursue with their autonomy?  
In this second direction, the question is being posed from some perspective other than 
that of individual patients.  I will not focus on the second, normative approach in this 
dissertation.  Nevertheless, we do well to recognize that patients’ visions of a good death 
seem to coalesce into some familiar conceptions transcending the various circumstances 
individuals face and the individual ideals they articulate.  I explore these below. 
Circumstantial and Personal Features of Dying 
 When bioethicists address the question of a good death, they commonly focus on 
a set of what I will call circumstantial conditions surrounding dying.  These are 
conditions that health care professionals might address to facilitate a good death.  So, for 
instance, Elise Ayers, Joan Harrold, and Joanne Lynn argue for the need to reorganize the 
social support and care systems that can “ensure” that people die well and for the “need 
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to develop objective criteria to measure how well health systems deliver care.”17  Their 
criteria include addressing physical pain and emotional suffering, supporting independent 
functioning and autonomy, assisting with advanced care planning, providing aggressive 
care near death where patients desire it, maintaining patient and family member 
satisfaction, preserving a good overall quality of life, relieving family burdens, providing 
an appropriate expectation about survival time, providing continuity of skilled care, and 
offering bereavement services for survivors.18  This is a fine set of concerns; few would 
deny the benefit that could come from such social support and health care.  Following in 
this vein, David Thomasma argues that health care workers have duties to provide many 
of the items listed above in order to “ensure” a good death for patients.19  In attempting to 
define a good death, Richard O’Neil identifies four components, the first three of which 
are good timing for one’s death (neither premature or overdue), a good dying process in 
which the patient is able to maintain control and a loss of dignity is prevented, and a 
proper respect for the moral aspects of the patient’s dying, which includes most 
prominently a respect for self-determination.20  If we conceive of a good death as simply 
skillful handling of the circumstances of dying, then a good death is something that 
health care professionals can deliver to largely passive patients. 
                                                 
17 Elise Ayers, Joan Harrold, Joanne Lynn, “A Good Death: Improving Care Inch-by-Inch,” Bioethics 
Forum 13:3 (1997): 38-40, 39.  Strikingly, Ayers, et al, state repeatedly in their essay that attention to such 
measures will “ensure” a good death.  Below, I will quote another bioethicist in the same journal volume 
saying something similar.  What strikes me in both cases is that such measures do not necessarily ensure a 
good death, unless one defines a good death strictly in terms of such measures (which is implausible, as I 
will argue below). 
18 Ibid, 39-40. 
19 David C. Thomasma, “Ensuring a Good Death,” Bioethics Forum 13:3 (1997): 7-17, 10-14. 
20 Richard O’Neil, “On Defining ‘A Good Death,’” 12-14.  O’Neil’s fourth component of a good death is 
what he calls one’s “deathstyle” by which he means one’s ability “not [to] exhibit any important defects of 
character related to the dying process” (15).  This fourth component amounts to a counterexample to my 
claim here that most focus in bioethics has been on circumstantial factors, although arguably O’Neil 
doesn’t give it the focus it deserves. 
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But a good death includes more than preventing pain, maintaining independent 
functioning, and preserving a “good” quality of life to the end.  One could have those 
things, as well as the others listed above and still not die well.  Daniel Callahan observes 
that there “may not be, and need not be, any correlation between a ‘bad’ external death 
and one that is perceived by oneself and others as a ‘good’ death internally.”21  Callahan 
uses ‘internal’ here to refer to “what one makes of one’s dying, that is, how a person 
interprets dying as a part of life....”22  A better term may be ‘personal.’  What I call the 
personal aspect of dying, how an individual interprets and responds to dying, is 
something nobody else can go through with the patient.  Others can attend to the patient, 
but nobody can die with the patient.  It is a highly personal activity, in at least that sense, 
which can also make it seem lonely to some.  Of course, two people could die at the same 
time, but each person experiences her own death from a first-person perspective that 
cannot be shared by anyone else.  My dying is fundamentally mine in the sense that only I 
can experience from a first-person perspective.   And, where Callahan refers to the 
external aspects of dying, I believe the term ‘circumstantial’ might serve better, while 
avoiding questions about what such things as pain are external to. 
I hasten to emphasize that doctors and health care systems have not been wrong to 
seek to provide good circumstances for the dying.  As I have noted above, we would be 
foolish to deny the benefit we could gain in our dying from having such circumstantial 
factors attended to by health care workers.  Indeed, it seems that under all four 
conceptions of a good death that I discuss below, at least some of the circumstantial 
                                                 
21 Daniel Callahan, “What Makes a Death Good?,” Bioethics Forum 13:3 (1997): 3-4, 4. 
22 Ibid. 
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factors would have a place in facilitating a good death.  And health care workers certainly 
ought to focus a good part of their attention and efforts here.  But competent care by 
health care workers at the end of life is not enough, by itself, to ensure a good death, 
despite the suggestions by Ayers, Harrold, and Lynn, and Thomasma to the contrary.23  
As Alasdair MacIntyre says, dying patients, if they want a good death, will have to take 
some responsibility for themselves.24 
Having all the circumstantial factors mentioned above in place does not guarantee 
a good death, and lacking all or most of them does not completely eliminate one’s 
opportunity to die well.  The circumstantial, or external, factors are neither necessary nor 
sufficient to assure a good death.  Rather, Callahan claims, “whether we die a good or 
bad death depends greatly upon the kind of person we are, or can become.”25  As he 
points out, a number of people in Nazi death camps seem to have died good and 
admirable deaths, despite horrible circumstances.26  Depending on one’s perspective on 
the cause for which they died, martyrs and those who sacrifice their lives for others might 
be examples to add to Callahan’s.  An increasing number today are having the desirable 
circumstantial features provided, but it is far from clear that this assures contemporary 
                                                 
23 Ayers, Harrold, and Lynn claim that “To ensure a good death, we must provide adequate, appropriate, 
and effective care to the person dying” (38) and “To ensure someone has a good death, we must begin 
measuring the quality of care provided during the end of his or her life” (39).  Despite the suggestion here 
that proper care will, or is necessary to, ensure a good death, I suspect Ayers and her colleagues are less 
sanguine than they sound in these statements about health care’s ability to ensure a good death.  They begin 
their article by acknowledging that a good death could be many things to different people, while observing 
that, despite differences, many share certain characteristics of a good death (38). 
24 See Alasdair MacIntyre, “Patients as Agents,” in Stuart F. Spicker and H. Tristam Engelhardt, Jr., eds., 
Philosophical Medical Ethics: Its Nature and Significance (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing 
Company, 1977), 197-212.  There MacIntyre claims that the problems of medical ethics are ultimately 
those of patients, not of health care workers (197). 
25 Callahan, “What Makes a Death Good?,” 4. 
26 For a variety of examples of good deaths under bad conditions, see Victor E. Frankl, Man’s Search for 
Meaning (New York: Washington Square Press, 1984).  Frankl is a psychologist and therapist who has 
drawn on his own and his comrades’ experiences in Nazi death camps to reflect on what enables people to 
survive and even thrive, in some sense, under harsh conditions. 
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patients of good deaths.27  All of this suggests that a good death might have as much or 
more to do with the attitudes, emotions, character traits, and other features of one’s 
personality as expressed in dying, as it does with the presence or absence of any of the 
circumstantial factors.   
Although contemporary health care has progressed in the provision of 
circumstantial features, we would still be wise to attend to the personal side of dying 
because the circumstantial features are so contingent.  One can hardly be assured of 
having a pain and incapacity-free death, despite the best efforts of health care providers.  
Further, as I argue above, the circumstantial features by themselves do not ensure that a 
patient dies well.  A conception of a good death will need to say more than how one 
hopes the circumstantial features will pan out.  Our judgments about good deaths ought 
also to touch on the personal aspect of dying.  How one conceives of a good death will 
reflect something about one’s character, insofar as one’s character is indicated in part by 
one’s interpretive schemes.  With these thoughts in mind, let us look at some conceptions 
of what it means to die well. 
Control in Dying? 
Talk of a good death cannot get very far in contemporary society without 
considering the possibility of physician-assisted death (PAD) as a means to a good death.  
For those willing to consider PAD as a means to dying well, what is it that they want in a 
good death?  Above all, the concern here seems to be for control in dying.  Those in 
question might also want to avoid pain, and a prolonged decline into any state of 
                                                 
27 One indication that it is not can be found in the title of a recent report on dying: Bruce Jennings, Gregory 
E. Kaebnick, and Thomas H. Murray, eds., Improving End of Life Care: Why Has It Been So Difficult? 
Hastings Center Report Special Report 35:6 (2005). 
 20
incapacity, with a special concern about incapacity that compromises cognitive function, 
and they want to be able to avoid getting caught in the throes of what Callahan calls 
“technological brinkmanship,” in which they opt for one treatment too many and find 
themselves seriously incapacitated—and perhaps even legally incompetent—and very 
dependent on others and on medical technology.28  Another concern seems to be to avoid 
a “postmature” death.  For example, a postmature death might be one in which one’s 
body outlives the “person” it formerly served.   
What makes a death I control good?  This may be a way of coping with a fear of 
the unknown.  We don’t know what—if anything—follows death; we also don’t know 
what the implications are further down the road for the treatments we opt for today.  
Many have watched such treatments prolong dying and lower the quality of a loved one’s 
remaining life; Callahan names the risks we take in accepting these treatments 
“technological brinkmanship.”29  Beyond assuaging our fears of the unknown in dying, 
maybe control serves a purpose of helping us psychologically to minimize the blow of 
mortality.  We know that neither we nor medical technology can overcome death, but we 
can at least go on our own terms if we have control over the timing and conditions of our 
death.  Perhaps control simply serves the purpose of making sure that one can avoid any 
of the undesirable ends or conditions mentioned above.  We judge such control to be 
good because it helps us to avoid what we identify as bad in dying, assuming we can 
exercise our control in such a way as to successfully avoid the undesirable aspects of 
dying.  
                                                 
28 Callahan, The Troubled Dream of Life, 40-42. 
29 Ibid. 
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But our judgments about what is bad in dying would have to be relative to some 
conception of a good death.  Not everyone agrees about what makes a death good.  Some 
will opt for more pain in order to maintain lucidity with family and friends near the end 
and others will opt for pain medication even if it renders them unconscious.  Both want 
control in dying, but the control serves the higher purpose of helping them to achieve 
some aspect of their conception of a good death.  An additional consideration suggests 
we ought to look beyond control to particular conceptions as well.  For many, a good 
death will be partially defined by having the capacity and freedom (moral, political, or 
otherwise) to exercise the kind of control in question.  But as we have noted above, some 
historical examples might make us doubtful that someone cannot die well in a situation 
where he lacks control over the circumstances of his dying.  Of course, I am not saying 
that lacking control is desirable or that a death couldn’t be made better, in many cases, by 
having some control over one’s circumstances.  Nevertheless, we cannot reduce our 
conception of a good death to having control over one’s dying.  Generally, control at the 
end of life serves the pursuit of some larger conception of a good death.  I want to 
examine some of those particular conceptions of a good death now. 
Avoiding Death  
One conception of a good death is a death I don’t have to think about.  Many 
people express a wish to die in their sleep, or suddenly (from a heart attack or stroke).  
We may debate the prevalence of this conception, but more than one commentator has 
echoed Laurie Zoloth’s claim that we live in a culture obsessed with a flight from mortal 
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limits.30  Ernest Becker’s The Denial of Death may well be the classic treatment of this 
phenomenon.31  What exactly do we deny or avoid?  Some may simply wish to avoid the 
thought of death, the thought that they will die and that many of their commitments are 
therefore of finite and temporal value (at least to themselves).  Perhaps some wish to 
avoid a prolonged awareness that they will die.  In the extreme, knowing that you are on a 
plane that is about to be intentionally crashed can be psychologically devastating.  On a 
more common level—though nobody’s death is common or typical to her—some may 
wish to avoid prolonged awareness of their impending death, even if they can’t be as 
certain about its proximity.   
One may also wish to avoid or deny the thought of his decline, his dying process.  
Perhaps we do so out of fear of the pain or loss of capabilities involved, or perhaps, in 
doing so, we reveal a fear of the unknown: who knows what will happen to me when I 
am dying?  The recent interest in life extension technology suggests a third possibility.  
We may hope to put off the thought of death and the experience of dying as long as 
possible.  This makes Benjamin Franklin’s comment that the day will come when “all 
diseases may be prevented or cured, not excepting even that of old age, and our lives 
lengthened at pleasure even beyond the antediluvian standard” look not as quaint and 
naive as some will hope it should be.32  Sometimes even contemporary bioethicists 
                                                 
30 Laurie Zoloth, “Care of the Dying in America,” in Carl Elliot and Tod Chambers, eds., Prozac as a Way 
of Life (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 101-26, 102. 
31 Ernest Becker, The Denial of Death (New York: Free Press, 1973). 
32 Franklin is quoted in Daniel Callahan, “Promises, Promises: Is embryonic stem-cell research sound 
public policy?” Commonweal 132:1 (2005): 12-14, 12.  The essay is adapted from Callahan’s recent book 
The Research Imperative (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003). 
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express their endorsement of the idea of “the conquest of death.”33  To harbor the hope 
that death can be conquered or put off is to justify, on this account of a good death, my 
putting off the thought that I will die.  Thus, a good death becomes one in which I 
successfully maintain the perspective that death can be put off. 
I have mentioned at least three kinds of hopes here.  Some want to avoid the 
thought of death and believe a good death would be one that catches them by surprise.  
Others want to avoid a prolonged dying experience, based on fears about what this might 
entail for them.  So, they also think of a good death as being sudden or having a pace they 
can control perhaps.  And others might use hopefulness about the prospects of life 
extension as a way to comfort themselves with the thought that death remains far off (and 
maybe getting further off all the time).  In all cases, though, the proponents of this 
conception aim to avoid, in some fashion and usually for as long as possible, death and 
what surrounds it.  For adherents of this conception, a good death need not be reflected 
on for long, or maybe even at all. 
We ought to distinguish between physical pain and emotional or mental distress.34  
I have implied this when I discussed avoiding the thought of death or the thought of a 
difficult dying experience above.  The most pressing issue need not be the physical pain.  
A conception of a good death could entail accepting a certain amount of pain, or, more 
likely, it could seek as much pain relief as possible.  Additionally, different conceptions 
                                                 
33 O’Neil, “On Defining ‘A Good Death,’” 11.  The complete quote is: “If the conquest of death is possible 
and worth seeking, we should reject the concept of a natural death but not the concept of a good death.”  
O’Neil endorses the rejection of the concept of a natural death. 
34 Some might think of this contrast in terms of pain and suffering.  However, I will use a different way of 
making that distinction in Chapter Three drawing on Eric Cassell.  Cassell distinguishes pain and suffering 
in The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).  
See especially his Chapter Three, “The Nature of Suffering,” pp. 29-45.  In that chapter Cassell argues that 
suffering involves a patient’s perception that her self is threatened with destruction (32). 
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of death will have different postures towards the variety of emotional distress that might 
accompany death.  Having an ideal in mind in conceiving of a good death and realizing 
that this ideal cannot be fulfilled can cause emotional distress.  This type of emotional 
distress is likely to be acute for those embracing the ideal of avoiding death if they find 
themselves in circumstances in which the realization of their death becomes unavoidable.  
Nevertheless, a considerable number of people appear to believe a good death would be a 
death they hope they can avoid thinking about during their lifetime.35 
Gerald McKenny offers an account of why people might adopt this conception of 
a good death.  In his book To Relieve the Human Condition, he argues that since the time 
of Bacon and Descartes, we have increasingly viewed science and technology as having a 
role—even a moral imperative—of eliminating suffering and expanding choice, of 
relieving us of the whims of fortune and the binds of necessity.36  But suffering comes in 
many forms—often with tradeoffs—and contemporary bioethicists generally spend 
comparatively little time helping us to see which forms of suffering we ought or ought 
not accept.  We might accept a form of suffering or a limitation if it were an acceptable 
part of our ground project.37  By ‘ground project,’ I mean one’s perspective formed by 
                                                 
35 This is confirmed for me each time I pose the question, “How do you want to die?” to students in a 
bioethics class. 
36 Gerald P. McKenny, To Relieve the Human Condition: Bioethics, Technology, and the Body (Albany, 
NY: SUNY Press, 1997), 2. 
37 Ibid, 1.  McKenny follows Plato ( Republic, Book III) who raised prescient questions about the proper 
limits of our engagement with medicine.  For Plato the answer was in discerning how our engagement with 
medicine might serve or hinder our moral projects.  Something like this perspective can be found in Dan 
Brock’s comment that, “health and life extension are ultimately of value in the service of the broader 
overall well-being of the patient.  They are of value in so far as they facilitate the patient’s pursuit of his or 
her overall plan of life; the aims, goals and values important to the particular patient” ( Life and Death, 
149). 
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one’s view of what constitutes a good or worthwhile human life.38  This might encompass 
many different, lesser projects.39  But bioethicists have often focused on securing our 
right to choose.  Most have said very little, if anything, about how our ground projects 
might lead us to accept certain forms of suffering. 
 This leaves many today with a strong sense of entitlement to choose and perhaps a 
sense of expectation that technology ought to be ever expanding their choices.  But thus 
far, technology has not overcome mortality, so the thought of it and the decline that 
precedes it continue to lurk near our consciousness.  Many have postulated that illness 
intimates death.  How does this help us to explain those who seek to deny death and 
conceive a good death to be one that, if it must come, sneaks up on them?  Perhaps this is 
a person who does not know how the suffering that may be involved in dying could fit 
into her ground project.  Bacon’s and Descartes’s visions have been carried out to such a 
degree that many do think that science and technology can relieve them of their various 
burdens.  This is not to say that contemporary individuals would self-consciously endorse 
such a proposition.  Rather, we are socialized in Western society, particularly America, in 
such a way that we come to hold this as a tacit belief.  We grow up with cars and central 
heating and air conditioning and come to the unconscious conclusion that distance or 
                                                 
38 Bernard Williams uses the term ‘ground projects’ in his essay “Persons, Character, and Morality,” in 
Moral Luck (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981), 1-19, 13.  There he defines a ground project 
as “a nexus of projects which largely give meaning to life” (13).  In his book, McKenny uses the term 
‘moral project’ to refer to what I am calling a ground project.  I believe Williams and McKenny use the 
terms in nearly equivalent ways, but I prefer to speak of ground projects as way to avoid confusion about 
the domain of the moral.  Christine Korsgaard, in The Sources of Normativity (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), discusses a similar idea: a “practical identity” is a description of oneself which 
makes life worth living and actions worth doing (101). 
39 A ground project might also include a conception of a good death.  How are the two related?  Ground 
projects might ultimately be idiosyncratic to individuals.  But individuals will likely share at least some 
aspects of their ground project with others.  These more general features make up conceptions of a good 
death, among other shared commitments and convictions. 
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climate ought never to impede us.  Carl Elliot gives the name “therapeutic worldview” to 
that ideology which “sees every human predicament as a problem to be fixed.”40  Beyond 
overt predicaments, the existence of enhancement technologies suggests to many that 
they can and ought to be “better than well” if they are not satisfied with “normal.”41  So, 
some have formed outlooks based on ground projects in which most suffering and limits 
have no conceivable place, because they are not acceptable means to anything else; the 
outlook has no ends for which these could be appropriate means.  This includes the 
suffering that can accompany dying and also the inherent limitations of mortality.   
On the surface it may appear that the pain and suffering that immediately 
precedes death cannot serve any logical purpose because many suppose death is the end 
of one’s existence.  But even if such suffering has little instrumental purpose, it might at 
least be expressive or indicative of one’s values and convictions.  One example, 
previously cited, might be choosing increased physical pain with mental clarity in order 
to remain capable of conversation, as opposed to taking pain medications that leave one 
comfortable but incoherent.  Maybe the capacity for conversation serves little or no 
instrumental purpose—the important conversations have already taken place—but 
remaining coherent reflects a certain type of regard for those attending to one’s death.  In 
that case, how a patient responds to the pain serves some expressive purpose.   
Of course, just about everyone believes that technology can and ought to relieve 
some suffering.  Which suffering we will seek relief for will be indicative of the place of 
                                                 
40 Carl Elliot, “Pursued by Happiness and Beaten Senseless: Prozac and the American Dream,” in Carl 
Elliot and Tod Chambers, eds., Prozac as a Way of Life, 127-40, 136. 
41  For a discussion of enhancement technologies and their effect of American perceptions of self and 
fulfillment, see Carl Elliot, Better Than Well: American Medicine Meets the American Dream (New York: 
W.W. Norton Co., 2003). 
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suffering and its relief in our ground projects.  How might those who accept the 
conception of a good death discussed here think about the question of what suffering fits 
with their ground project?  The answer remains somewhat unclear because, as I have 
suggested, those in this position generally seek to avoid the thought of dying and death.  
The same people appear unlikely to conceive of suffering associated with death to have 
any meaningful place in their ground projects.  For them, technology ought to ameliorate 
just about any suffering brought on by dying, if I am right to link McKenny’s claims 
about technology with those who seek to “deny death.”  Saying that no suffering at the 
end of life fits with the outlook informed by one’s ground project suggests that no 
amount or kind of suffering—including any suffering involved in facing one’s death—
can be conceived as having a legitimate place in one’s conception of a good death.  Thus, 
it is better to die in sleep or suddenly than to face a crisis for which one’s ground project 
has few resources. 
 I have suggested that there may be a number of reasons why someone would want 
to “deny death.”  That is, different people may have different aspects of death and dying 
they would seek to avoid.  What unites these views is their common belief that some 
prominent thought or experience associated with dying ought to be avoided. 
Growth in Dying 
 Within the hospice movement, many have adopted the notion that a good death 
would be one in which the patient grows in significant ways.  The idea probably has its 
origins in the work of Elizabeth Kubler-Ross, especially in her book Death: The Final 
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Stage of Growth.42  More recently, Ira Byock has made the connection between dying and 
growth explicit.43  In this conception, a good death would be one in which the patient 
becomes open to learning (and does learn) new things about himself and others, eager to 
reconcile with others, and able to attain a new, richer, and deeper outlook on life and 
life’s purpose.  These persons may want to leave, as a parting gift to survivors, the way 
they conduct themselves in the dying period.  They may want to leave a lasting and 
positive impression in the face of sorrow.  Perhaps the prospect of the stark finality of 
death and the finite amount of time left motivates those accepting this view to learn and 
grow.  Byock says that we as a culture must move away from denying death “toward an 
understanding of dying as a part of full, even healthy, living ….”44  Death simplifies 
one’s life and clears away many superficial concerns.  Growth involves accommodating 
oneself to this truth.  Becoming the sort of person who can do so enables one to die well. 
 One might suppose that this way of thinking of a good death calls into question 
the value of one’s perspectives, attitudes, or actions at earlier times in life.  Growth, here, 
can be good because it is growth out of or beyond some lesser state.  For those who 
embody this view, dying affords us an opportunity to grow out of less mature 
superficialities and is, at least partially, good for that reason.  But not all who embrace 
growth in dying will see such growth as a necessary corrective to earlier deficiencies.  
The growth that makes dying good may be that which is developmentally appropriate to 
that particular stage of life.  Those who hope to grow in their dying may claim that the 
                                                 
42 Elizabeth Kubler-Ross, Death: The Final Stage of Growth (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1975). 
43 See, for instance, his “Growth: The Essence of Hospice,” The American Journal of Hospice Care 3:6 
(1986): 16-21 and Dying Well: The Prospect for Growth at the End of Life (New York: Riverhead Books, 
1997). 
44 Byock, Dying Well, 246. 
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experience of dying, which cannot really be anticipated or approximated at any other 
times of our lives, makes us open in new ways to lessons or truths that we might 
otherwise walk past.  The various stages of life offer different opportunities to grow and 
so death can be good if we seize it as another period in which to grow.45   
What does the growth in question aim at?  Perhaps growth in dying can be seen 
by those with this view as a way to redeem an otherwise tragic period of one’s life.  That 
one can grow in this time could indicate that the circumstances have not won out or 
beaten down the patient.  The circumstances have not rendered the patient a passive 
victim.  Of course, not all taking this view would think their prior lives have been so 
tragic that they are in need of redemption through growth.  As noted above, some may 
see growth as an appropriate response to a new stage of life.  Still others might find 
growth to be the one intrinsically valuable activity that enables them to deal with the 
potential sense of meaninglessness about death.  Regardless of the aim of the growth, a 
good death on this account would be one in which one becomes the kind of person who 
can grow in dying and does so.  Dying presents an opportunity to bring the narrative of 
one’s life to a fitting conclusion, to tie together loose ends, and perhaps even to weave 
some new strands into the story of one’s life.   
Simply Dying 
 In contrast to the ambitions for growth in the above conception, some envision a 
good death in relatively simple and unassuming terms.  Those attracted to this conception 
will view their deaths as simply the period at the end of the sentences or paragraphs that 
have composed their lives.  Death need not be a time to do anything spectacular; rather, it 
                                                 
45 Ellen McGee, “Hospice Narratives of Good Dying,” Bioethics Forum 13:3 (1997): 36-40, 36. 
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is simply an opportunity to end the sentence.  Montaigne reflected this sort of perspective 
when he commented that, “I want a man to act, and to prolong the functions of life as 
long as he can; and I want death to find me planting cabbages, but careless of death, and 
still more of my unfinished garden.”46  A good death will be simple, peaceful, and 
without a lot of fanfare.  Perhaps those inclined to this way of thinking will be attracted to 
the view that the “sentence” is what it is as a whole and one’s death will not significantly 
alter what has been written and one’s dying is no time to try to start to write a new 
sentence.  They view death as neither a monster nor a grand new opportunity.  It is 
simply the end of my time.  Within this view, one might reasonably hope not to be 
removed from the various spheres of society before death comes; one might hope to be 
permitted to live while dying, and “living” often means “living with” others.  Retaining a 
place within both the larger human community and its more particular, local incarnations 
might be a goal under such a conception.  Daniel Callahan describes his ideal—a 
peaceful death—in these, among other, terms: “I would like my death to matter to others, 
… [to be] a rupturing of human community....” and, “I do not want to be abandoned, 
psychologically ejected from the community, because of my impending death.”47  This is 
because until death comes, one can still pursue—though perhaps only to some more 
restricted degree—life.  Even if one’s decline takes several years, as we have come to 
expect in our society, those adopting the ideal envisioned here hope to remain a part of 
their communities and to continue to engage in at least some life activities until death 
comes.  One needn’t grow to do so, or to die well.  Rather, one can still contribute to the 
                                                 
46 Montaigne, quoted in John O’Neill, “Essaying Illness,” in Victor Kestenbaum, ed., The Humanity of the 
Ill: Phenomenological Perspectives (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1982), 125-41, 135. 
47 Daniel Callahan, The Troubled Dream of Life, 195-6. 
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lives of others by one’s continued presence within the community.  The mere presence of 
those dying continues to enrich family members, friends, colleagues, and others just as it 
has previously.48  Of course, one might aspire to simply die even if removed from one’s 
community, such as by being placed in a nursing home.  In this case, one would have to 
imagine other ways of conceiving of what it means to live until one must die. 
Sometimes those advocating for good palliative care at the end of life sound as if 
they are endorsing the view I have labeled simply dying.49  Perhaps this conception of a 
good death attempts to repudiate the idea of a good death.  Death is what it is and is 
unavoidable.  At best we can clear away any obstacles that would make one’s progress 
toward death uncomfortable, undignified, or otherwise harmful.  When those obstacles 
have been cleared, we can die in relative ease and simplicity.  Whereas the notion of 
growth in dying might hold out hope that someone could rewrite their history and perhaps 
put a new slant on some of the less polished aspects of their lives, the notion of simply 
dying seems to suggest that one’s life will indeed speak for itself.  If there is a task 
unique to this conception, perhaps it is for its adherents to reaffirm those values that have 
come to shape their lives.  And, one will probably die in a manner reflective of how one 
has lived, which might well be true in any case. 
For those who adopt simply dying as a conception of a good death, death might 
simply be seen as the conclusion to what they hope has been a good life.  To adopt such a 
                                                 
48 On both the ability of the dying to continue to contribute to the lives of others and their need to remain a 
part of the human community until death, see John Lachs, “Dying Old as a Social Problem,” in Glenn 
McGee, ed., Pragmatic Bioethics, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2003): 207-217, especially 
214-17. 
49 This is evident throughout, for instance, Kathleen Foley and Herbert Hendin’s, The Case Against 
Assisted Suicide: For the Right to End-of-Life Care (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2002). 
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perspective one need not deny mistakes made throughout one’s life.  Although taking 
such a perspective might mean that one has sought to admit to, apologize for, and deal 
with such mistakes as they arose as opposed to waiting until one’s death is imminent to 
address them.  This could also distinguish simply dying from growth in dying. 
Part of understanding a good death as simply dying might be the conviction that it 
is proper for a good life to end.  One might conceive of this more locally, as a means of 
giving way to the next generation within one’s family or community.  In fact, this 
conception of a good death might thrive particularly where there are strong bonds of 
community and tradition.  MacIntyre comments that,  
[t]he concept of a tradition is the concept of a relationship extending 
through generations in which each generation finds the significance of its 
activity a part of a history which transcends it. No generation can usurp 
the place of another, and therefore for each there is a time to die.  Death 
is not to be fended off, it is at a certain point to be welcomed and 
embraced.50 
 
One might also conceive of this on a more global scale, as a means of not 
consuming more than one’s share of resources.  For whatever reasons, the person 
occupying this perspective simply sees a good death as one in which any potential new 
harms or threats that arise as result of dying are cleared away or dealt with as best they 
can be.  Perhaps this allows them to carry on with whatever life tasks they are involved in 
until very near the end of life.  Within this perspective, there might be room for those 
with greater or lesser tolerance for various harms or threats, depending on what their 
various ground projects could accommodate.51  But simply dying is different from 
avoiding death because, for the former, the thought of death can be embraced; but even if 
                                                 
50 MacIntyre, “Patients as Agents,” 203. 
51 See my discussion of these issues under the topic of Avoiding Death above. 
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embraced, it need not be made into more than the conclusion to one’s life.  As noted 
above, I think Daniel Callahan’s notion of a “peaceful death” comes very close to what I 
have described here as simply dying.52 
Christian Conceptions of Dying Well 
 Religious ideas often come up in discussions about what it would mean to die 
well.  Rather than survey the very diverse conceptions of a good death expressed by 
various religions, I will limit myself to discussion of a variety of different conceptions of 
a good death that can be loosely gathered under the notion of a good “Christian” death.  
Two things seem clear in trying to do this.  One, we can identify a number of different 
Christian accounts of a good death.  Two, people will disagree over the boundaries of 
acceptably “Christian” conceptions of a good death.  I will not try to identify a single, 
orthodox view here.  Nevertheless, in what follows, I will try to articulate some 
conceptions of a good death that can be at least loosely gathered under the term 
“Christian.” 
Christian convictions suggest that death has two aspects.53  On the one hand, 
death can be viewed a sign of sin, of fallenness and rebellion against God.  The suffering 
we often face in dying and the separation from loved ones that results from death reflect 
this.  On the other hand, death can be viewed as a doorway to a new quality of 
relationship with God.  It becomes a path that leads one to be able to experience God with 
a kind of immediacy we don’t have in life as we know it now.  Some understandings of a 
                                                 
52 See his The Troubled Dream of Life: In Search of a Peaceful Death, 187-219 for a discussion of a 
peaceful death and issues related to it. 
53 Something like this is suggested by Stephen G. Post (who is himself citing church historian E. Brooks 
Holifield) in his essay titled, “American Culture and Good Death” in Inquiries in Bioethics (Washington, 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1993), 79-93, 91. 
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good death for Christians will take into account these two aspects.  However, not all 
place equal emphasis on both. 
Sometimes Christians will focus on how the suffering that often attends to death 
weighs down our lives.  They might be tempted to think they ought to meet the 
challenges of death in ways that imitate the responses of their non-Christian 
contemporaries and which are in tension with other elements of the Christian tradition.54  
Such thinking might lead to the conclusion that death is an evil which we must overcome.  
A focus that places more emphasis on the negative aspect of dying characterizes this 
conception of a good death. 
On the other hand, Christians might be tempted to think of death as being of no 
consequence for them.  If one focuses primarily on the afterlife and the benefits one 
expects there, one might conceive a good death as one in which that focus trumps any 
particular difficulties faced at the end of life.55  Such a view does not appear to take into 
account the distinction between death and dying.  At an extreme, a nearly exclusive focus 
on the positive aspects of death might lead to something like a Christian version of the 
denial of death discussed above.  One needn’t worry about death because all that matters 
is what lies beyond it.   
                                                 
54 Something like this is reflected in calls by Christians to embrace the “right to die.”  See, for instance, 
Robert N. Wennberg, Terminal Choices: Euthanasia, Suicide, and the Right to Die (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1989).  I do not mean by this to suggest that Wennberg is only attentive 
to what I am calling the negative side of dying.  Other Christians might object to the type of rights talk 
expressed by Wennberg by pointing out that Christians ought to believe that their lives are not their own, 
that they don’t have a right to do with them as they please.  For more on this, see Chapter Six. 
55 This view is exemplified in Dallas Willard, The Divine Conspiracy: Rediscovering Our Hidden Life in 
God (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1998), 84-5.  He says,  “Paul bluntly states, as we have just 
seen, that Jesus abolished death—simply did away with it.  Nothing like what is usually understood as 
death will happen to those who have entered his life” (84).  Willard focuses on the positive aspect of death 
in the Christian account but downplays the negative aspect.  What he says may apply to death but less well 
to dying. 
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Another possibility consistent with focusing on the positive aspect of death is that 
Christians might adopt a version of simply dying as a conception of a good death.  Such 
Christians might view death as just a period at the end of the sentence and believe a new 
sentence begins in the afterlife with God.  Before the afterlife, one need only be faithful 
and patient and keep on with life.   
From early in the history of Christianity, many adherents have understood that 
“life should never be clung to in desperation.”56  It is not a second god besides God, and 
one commits idolatry if she clings to it too desperately.57  An implication of this is that 
some conceive of a good death as one that happens strictly on God’s timing.  I don’t 
decide when I’ll die; God does.  I cannot put off or hasten my death, and a good death 
will be one which occurs when God says that it is time.  This may lead to a kind of 
theological determinism in which one believes the hour of death is set and unalterable.  
(A documentary I once watched portrayed Confederate General “Stonewall” Jackson as 
believing this, which may have accounted for his bravery in battle.)  A Christian could 
believe life ought not be clung to in desperation but still pray to avoid a sudden death, as 
medieval Christians did and some contemporary Episcopalians do.58  At the personal 
level, the patient hopes to be the kind of person who can meet God with a clear 
conscience and repentant heart.  A good death would be one in which she has had time to 
                                                 
56 Darrel W. Amundsen and Gary B. Ferngren, “Virtue and Medicine from Early Christianity Through the 
Sixteenth Century,” in Earl E. Shelp, ed., Virtue and Medicine (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Riedel Publishing 
Company, 1985): 23-61, 48. 
57 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/4, G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, eds. (Edinburgh, Scotland: T&T 
Clark, Ltd., 1961), 342. 
58 The 1979 Book of Common Prayer (New York: The Seabury Press, 1979) contains the following prayer: 
“from dying suddenly and unprepared, Good Lord deliver us” (149). 
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make peace with God and others, and some contemporary Christians believe it is 
appropriate to pray for such circumstances.59 
In addition to believing that life ought not to be clung to in desperation, the 
Christian tradition has, generally, also condemned suicide.  This contrasts with the other 
conceptions of a good death, none of which conclusively rules out suicide.  Suicide 
suggests despair of God’s ability to act redemptively in one’s circumstances and implies 
one’s need to take the course of life into one’s own hands.60  The despair or the 
difficulties that lead one to despair become more determinative of one’s perspective than 
convictions about God’s ability to act redemptively.  Often Christians also see suicide as 
a violation of the sanctity of life.  For some, the sanctity-of-life claim leads to a 
conception of a good death in which the patient does all she can to fight death until God 
brings her home.  On this conception, the sanctity of life means that a good death would 
be one in which the Christian pursues all forms of treatment until there is nothing more to 
do.  A good death is a courageous fight.  Doing otherwise means opting out of life too 
soon. 
In an attempt to balance the ideas that life ought neither be clung to in desperation 
nor despaired of in suicide, 20th century theologian Karl Barth uses the biblical theme of 
                                                 
59 See Christopher P. Vogt, Patience, Compassion, Hope and the Christian Art of Dying Well (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), especially Chapter Two on the ars moriendi (the art of 
dying) tradition that grew up in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe, for a discussion of the historical 
roots of Christians’ conviction that they should prepare themselves to die in proper communion with God. 
60 Nigel Biggar, Aiming to Kill: The Ethics of Suicide and Euthanasia (London: Darton, Longman, and 
Tood, Ltd., 2004), 11-13.  Biggar cites both biblical sources and their interpretation by such early church 
fathers as Augustine to establish the claim that suicide is beyond the pale.  Concerning God’s acting 
redemptively, we should not assume that this means God will heal Christians of all their diseases or remove 
them from the trials they face.  Rather, the claim seems to be that God will be with them and provide the 
personal resources necessary to meet challenges and trials. 
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Sabbath rest to suggest how Christians might conceive of a good death.61  The biblical 
narrative portrays God as creating the world and then resting from his labor (Genesis 1-
2).  Biblical scripture uses the notion of Sabbath rest as a metaphor throughout to refer to 
God’s calling followers to find fulfillment for their lives, to “enter into God’s rest” 
(Hebrews 5).  Entering into God’s rest means becoming the kind of person who can be at 
home in God’s presence.  For instance, in  Aquinas the virtue of charity marks the kind of 
person who is capable of friendship with God.62  This might be most vivid when viewed 
in contrast.  A person not at home in God’s presence will despair of God’s ability or 
intention to act on her behalf.  This tends toward an unbalanced focus on the negative 
aspects of death, with anxiety over death itself displacing confidence in God’s presence 
and providence.  It will manifest a lack of trust in and gratitude to God.  Restlessness 
might also be characterized by preoccupation with oneself and with providing for one’s 
own needs.  By contrast, the restful are free to turn their attention to others, to attending 
to and being with others.  Such generosity reflects a sense of contentment that Christians 
will claim can arise from resting in God—in both living and dying.  Christians tend to 
doubt that this attitude of rest can be achieved by individual efforts.  Rather, for Barth, 
Christians ought to joyfully, gratefully (and, paradoxically, actively) receive the rest from 
their efforts that God offers.63   
                                                 
61 Barth, Church Dogmatics III/4, 49-50. 
62 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, IIa IIae, q. 23, discussed in Eberhard Schockenhoff, “The 
Theological Virtue of Charity (IIa IIae, qq. 23-46),” in Stephen J. Pope, ed., The Ethics of Aquinas 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 244-258, 246. 
63 Barth, Church Dogmatics III/4, 378.  On the paradoxical claim that humans are called to actively 
participate in an economy wholly initiated by God, see John Webster, Barth’s Moral Theology (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1998). 
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The theological metaphysics that Barth assumes lends itself to understanding a 
restful death as having a transcendent component.  A restful death looks toward a kind of 
completion that can be found only when Christians enter into God’s presence in the 
afterlife.  But another conception of good death as restful death might be immanent.  This 
conception could see the main point of Christian convictions as enabling one to find 
meaning and die well in this life only.  The rest that is to be achieved is rest in the here 
and now.  Perhaps the theological metaphysics becomes more symbol than reality on this 
view, but for the “immanentist” it might have the same effect in producing rest. 
There is a parallel between the Christian accounts of a good death discussed here 
and the ideal discussed under “growth in dying.”  But for the Christian accounts, a good 
death involves a particular kind of growth, with a specific trajectory and aims.  These are 
informed by the metaphysical or symbolic claims (that there is a God, that we can only be 
fulfilled by being in right relationship to God, etc.) which are a constitutive part of the 
Christian tradition. 
Conclusion 
 I have looked at four conceptions of a good death.  If it is true that there are at 
least four different accounts of a good death, we should not speak of ‘a good death,’ as if 
there is only one, universally shared conception.  Rather, we would do well to try to 
understand what the concept of a good death means for the particular person whose case 
concerns us.  For health care workers, such an endeavor will heighten their sensitivity to 
the particular concerns, needs, and ideals of a given patient.  For bioethicists, this means 
that we will want to join in or stimulate conversation concerning what it means to die 
well.  This conversation should go beyond discussion of the circumstantial aspects of 
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one’s dying.  We would do well to include discussion of the personal aspects of dying as 
well. 
 Good deaths involve more than favorable medical circumstances, though the latter 
have been more of the focus of bioethical discussions thus far.  Considering the personal 
aspects of good deaths both enriches the conversation and adds to the responsibilities of 
patients.  This is not a responsibility primarily to others.  Rather, it is a self-regarding 
responsibility.  But this responsibility seems to go beyond adopting and pursuing self-
created ends.  Good deaths seem not to be as unique as individuals, though nothing I have 
said implies that an individual couldn’t hold a unique conception.  In depicting different 
conceptions of a good death, I suggest that such conceptions generally cluster into a 
number of widely accepted accounts.  Perhaps not even all of these accounts are good 
from some wider perspective. 
 This raises the question of whether there can be such a thing as wisdom about 
dying well.  Perhaps conceptions of good deaths are not just subjective but take shape 
against a relatively more objective background.  If wisdom is a kind of practical 
knowledge of how to get on relatively well in life, then maybe dying well involves an 
appreciation of that background context.  For the purposes of this chapter I have sought to 
catalogue prominent conceptions of a good death without placing judgment on them.  If 
we take into account a background context, we may conclude that not all of the 
conceptions discussed here are wise.  Some accounts of a good death may fare better than 
others when we take into account the various challenges we face in our contemporary 
medical context.  I look at those challenges in the next chapter before revisiting, in two 
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later chapters, the question of what it might mean to become the sort of person who can 




























 Dying presents many challenges.  Some of these challenges transcend time and 
place, while others are unique to particular social contexts.  Sometimes particular social 
contexts exacerbate some challenge or other of dying.  Because most desire good deaths 
they will want to know the challenges of dying and how they may respond to them.  In 
this chapter I look at the most prominent of the challenges of dying in our social and 
medical context with the aim of explaining how they make our attempts to die well so 
difficult.  I have already argued that we cannot think in terms of one univocal 
understanding of a good death.  Rather, many conceptions of a good death exist.  Thus, 
we need not assume that all of the challenges discussed below have equal relevance for 
all conceptions of a good death.  More likely, each conception of a good death will have a 
somewhat different perspective on the significance of the variety of challenges I discuss 
below.  Therefore, the list of challenges discussed below is linked by the logician’s 
inclusive ‘or.’  Not all of these challenges will be equally relevant to all.  Nevertheless, at 
least some of these challenges are prominent features of dying in our contemporary 
medical context that have to be addressed by any conception of a good death.  These 
challenges shape the perceptions of dying held by almost all of us, regardless of our 
understanding of what it means to die well. 
 The challenges surveyed here overlap in many ways.  Loss of independence and a 
corresponding increase in dependence on others can lead to suffering.  Pain alters one’s 
relationship to one’s body by breaking the immediacy we normally experience in the 
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relationship between body and self.  But, other forms of suffering or bodily decline, even 
if not accompanied by pain, can also alter the body-self relation in similar ways.  A 
recurrent theme in this chapter is that how medical care is administered and what medical 
care is considered appropriate and optimal can also be a source of challenges in dying.  
On a loose use of the term ‘suffering,’ we might say that all of the challenges a patient 
might face at the end of life can cause suffering, although I will consider suffering as one 
particular kind of challenge.  These overlaps suggest that I have broken down the topics 
for discussion under the heading of “the challenges of dying” in somewhat artificial 
ways.  I’m not sure that any way of breaking down the topics would be completely 
satisfactory.  However, I have tried to organize my discussion of the challenges of dying 
around two main themes, with a number of sub-themes and additional themes thrown in 
as well.  The two main themes I will discuss concern, first, a loss of independence and a 
corresponding increase in dependence on others and, second, pain and suffering at the 
end of life.  But each of these headings contains some discussion that could fit under the 
other theme.  Overall, my aim is to provide an account of what it is about dying that 
challenges us in our contemporary medical context. 
Distinguishing Death from Dying 
 Before beginning to discuss particular challenges, I want to recall the distinction 
between dying and death.  Whereas death is an event that happens at one particular time, 
dying is a process that takes place over a period of time.64  I focus here on dying and on 
the challenges of dying.  The thought of one’s future death would, of course, be a part of 
                                                 
64 Ninian Smart, “Philosophical Concepts of Death,” in Arnold Toynbee, et al, Man’s Concern with Death 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), 25-35, 27. 
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the dying process for most who undergo a period of time during which they are aware 
they are approaching death.  I will address the thought of death a bit below, but I focus 
more on the decline that often accompanies dying.  I seek to explicate the challenges 
associated with this decline.   
 The paradigmatic dying person I have in mind is an older patient with some kind 
of terminal illness and some measure of mental clarity and awareness intact.  I leave 
“older” ambiguous.  The notion itself changes with advances in medicine.  Most people 
in a dying process are at the older end of “older,” although, of course, terminal illness 
also affects people in their twenties and younger.65  Probably twenty year old terminal 
patients will experience many of the challenges I discuss here.  However, as noted above, 
I don’t focus at all on any issues unique to terminally ill children.  Not everyone has a 
dying process.  Some die suddenly of heart attacks or in car accidents.  I am focused on 
those patients who do undergo a process of dying.  Indeed, many of the challenges I have 
in mind arise only because dying is a process many undergo in the context of 
contemporary American medicine.  The majority of those undergoing that process, as I 
noted just above, are older.66  My aim in this chapter is to focus on that majority of cases, 
although I recognize that some deaths and some dying processes don’t fit the paradigm. 
 Likewise, I leave the notion of mental clarity and awareness somewhat ambiguous 
as well.  For those with no awareness, there are no challenges that they can perceive.  
This is true by definition.  Those with some measure of awareness will be more aware, by 
                                                 
65 Joanne Lynn has documented much about the demographics of dying in contemporary America.  For an 
example of her research, see Joanne Lynn, “Living Longer in Fragile Health: The New Demographics 
Shape End of Life Care,” in Bruce Jennings, Gregory E. Kaebnick, and Thomas H. Murray, eds., 
Improving End of Life Care: Why Has It Been So Hard? Hastings Center Report Special Report 35:6 
(2005): S14-S18. 
66 See Lynn, “Living Longer in Fragile Health,” S14. 
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degrees, of challenges presented by their dying.  My ultimate purpose is to articulate 
virtues that are typically and primarily embodied by those with some capacity for 
meaningful perception, reflection, and judgment.  Thus, I want to focus here on 
challenges experienced by those with some measure of mental competence.67 
Loss of Personal Control and Increasing Dependence 
 Some feel that the loss of control or personal autonomy that comes with a 
patient’s decline into death is the most serious challenge we face in dying.68  Many fear 
the time when they will no longer be able to decide and act for and by themselves.  
Sometimes this happens to those who are not dying.  Spinal cord injuries leading to 
paralysis can present patients with a similar set of challenges, although they are not 
dying.  But dying often involves a gradual loss of the capacities—both mental and 
physical—that are necessary to be independent.  Arnold Toynbee observes that “Death is 
‘un-American’” because of the ways the reality of death challenges crucial articles of 
“the American way of life.”69  If independence and freedom are the dominant American 
values they are often portrayed to be, then the loss of control that attends dying may be 
equally, or more, un-American than death itself.  What Richard Zaner says of his mother 
could easily apply to many contemporary Americans: “An intelligent, articulate, caring, 
                                                 
67 Getting old, losing mental competence, and not being terminally ill is a set of conditions that contains its 
own challenges.  I don’t focus on that particular set of conditions in this dissertation, although I suspect that 
at least some of the virtues I discuss in later chapters could be relevant to those in this state. 
68 In Patience, Compassion, Hope, and the Christian Art of Dying Well (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), Christopher Vogt says, “In the stories of the patients of Timothy Quill I 
retold in chapters 3 and 4, and in the stories of many dying people living in fear of death told by journalist 
Bill Moyers in his PBS television documentary, On Our Own Terms, it becomes clear that what makes 
dying so hard is the inevitable loss of control that accompanies it” (131).  When discussing what made his 
own mother’s death so hard for her (and others attending to her), Richard Zaner echoes this judgment.  See 
Conversations on the Edge: Narratives of Ethics and Illness (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press, 2004), Chapter Six, “The Cruel Clarity of It All,” (111-141). 
69 Arnold Toynbee, “Changing Attitudes Toward Death in the Modern Western World,” in Arnold 
Toynbee, et al, Man’s Concern with Death, 122-132, 131. 
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and independent person throughout her adult life, she gradually found herself withdrawn, 
depressed, isolated, and—horror of horrors in her own eyes—dependent on others, her 
treasured personal freedom all but gone.”70  Americans have never seemed to be 
especially good at acknowledging the ways we are dependent throughout our lives on 
others to provide even basic life goods.  But dying introduces new aspects of dependence 
in areas where we have previously not been dependent (or haven’t been since infancy in 
some cases). 
 Freedom and independence are, of course, important values.  America has often 
been characterized by its independent spirit, which probably had a lot to do with the 
successes of national endeavors such as our westward expansion through the 18th and 19th 
centuries.  Moreover, we have structured our political economy to preserve high levels of 
independence from interference by government and other institutions.  Richard Handler, 
commenting on Tocqueville’s perceptions of America, says, “[f]or Tocqueville, 
individualism is the central cultural fact of the United States….”71  Handler goes on to 
note that modern citizens see personal independence as one of the “positive corollaries” 
of individualism.72  This individualism and independence has its positive side; however, 
it seems that the kind of socialization we undergo, which causes us to hold such values in 
high regard, also makes us vulnerable to a downside we may not fully experience until 
we are dying.  Social scientists have documented how our increasing independence from 
                                                 
70 Zaner, Conversations on the Edge, 112. 
71 Richard Handler, Critics Against Culture: Anthropological Observers of Mass Society (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 28. 
72 Ibid, 31. 
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one another, as a society, has led to a corresponding increase in loneliness.73  We might 
be able to avoid experiencing distress from that loneliness in large measure while we are 
active and independent, but when we become incapacitated and dependent we will no 
doubt find it harder to avoid the reality and consequences of such loneliness.  In spite of 
this, many Americans seem to hold independence and individualism in very high esteem.  
Kierkegaard offers a description of a character-type who, in the words of one 
commentator, recognizes “no binding authority or transcendent values that might limit 
the freedom of the self.”74  For such a person, freedom and independence seem to be 
ultimate values, central to the identities of those who value them in this way.  While 
Kierkegaard may be speaking about an extreme character, some Americans seem to have 
such ultimate values and many Americans seem to fit this description to lesser degrees.   
If so, this might help us to understand what many find so challenging about the 
loss of independence and corresponding increase of various forms of dependence during 
dying.  To the degree that we value freedom and independence from others as intrinsic 
goods, we are more vulnerable to challenges associated with the loss of the same.75  
Those who value independence primarily as a means to other goods may well be able to 
receive those goods from others, such as family.  Patients who place high value on 
                                                 
73 See, for instance, Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen, William Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven Tipton, 
Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (Berkeley, CA: Univ. of CA Press, 
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Simon and Schuster, 2000). 
74 C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations (New York: 
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values as independence, Li Yiting, et al, “End-of-Life Care in China: A View from Beijing” in Robert H. 
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important values in Chinese and Japanese cultures and that this affects the dying experience. 
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independence itself may find it hard to replace when dying erodes it.  This might explain 
why so many find this aspect of dying to be a challenge.  But regardless of how one 
values independence, its loss is surely an obstacle to face. 
 Loss of Dignity 
Further, if we conceive of our dignity as persons in terms of our ability to be 
independent in certain important ways—and arguably the ways in which we think it is 
important to be independent have changed over time76—then an additional challenge 
associated with the loss of control and increasing dependence will be a loss of dignity.  
Even if being relatively more dependent on others is not an indignity from the perspective 
of some absolute standard of human dignity, many perceive a loss of independence as a 
blow to their dignity.  This perception by itself constitutes a challenge to dying well 
because the decline that marks dying so often includes an increasing dependence on 
others and a corresponding loss of personal control.  Thus, in the course of dying we 
often lose, over a period of time, those things we believe contribute to our dignity.  This 
is not necessarily just a perception.  The decline, after all, is real.  When those we love 
and will continue to love regardless of their condition become diminished and something 
less than they were when at their full powers, there is something to mourn.  Even if we 
know that the life cycle includes decline, it is sad to see a person decline from the height 
of her capacities.  It is almost as if the person has fallen from the apex of the human 
being’s telos, from the dignity of a human being at her full powers.77 
                                                 
76 There was a time, for instance, when many households produced their own food and clothing.  This form 
of independence does not seem to garner the same approval as it once did.  And few today feel undignified 
for lacking the skills necessary to be independent in these ways. 
77 This attitude is only heightened in a context in which independence, which I have been characterizing as 
being very American and very much a liability for us when we are dying, is strongly valued.  We think of 
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 The loss of dignity as a challenge of dying well might also be described in more 
particular terms than just a general loss of independence.  Loss of mobility, of control 
over bowel and urinary functioning, of energy and vitality, of the ability to plan for one’s 
own future, and of the ability to live free of mechanical or other technologies frequently 
accompany dying today.  Many of these losses are considered to diminish the dignity of 
the patient’s life, in some sense.  Nursing homes, assisted-living facilities, or hospitals, 
when they are a part of the end of life, limit possessions and control one’s daily 
schedule.78  We frequently think of bodily control as a prerequisite to our normal 
conception of dignity and struggle to accommodate that conception to those we meet who 
lack such control (e.g. those with physical and mental disabilities, seizures, or other 
control-diminishing capacities).  When we become those people, we struggle all the 
more.  Some buck against the experience of lacking the energy to do basic tasks while 
others respond to such conditions with lethargy or even depression.  The sense that death 
will mark a final horizon on one’s life can be accompanied by the experience, during 
dying, of having less and less energy for and say over what one does with numbered 
days.  Finally, dependence on mechanical forms of technology can also threaten dignity.  
Ventilators, for instance, inhibit speech and the ability to swallow, and they are so 
uncomfortable that patients on them are often sedated so they don’t become anxious or 
                                                                                                                                                 
independence as a normal state and find a decline from this state as fundamentally troubling.  For a 
different view, see Alastair V. Campbell, “Dependency: the foundational value in medical ethics,” in 
K.W.M. Fulford, Grant Gillet, and Janet Martin Soskice, eds., Medicine and Moral Reasoning (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 184-92.  Campbell says, “I want to assert that the fundamental 
character of human life is one of dependency, and that therefore a medical ethics which seeks to 
overemphasize the independence of the individual is in danger of being a de-humanizing and inadequate 
account of the therapeutic relationship” (184).  Campbell does recognize a distinction between 
inappropriate and appropriate dependency (191-2). 
78 Zaner, Conversations on the Edge, 113. 
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distressed.  They are one aspect of a dying experience that Elizabeth Kubler-Ross 
describes as now being, “more gruesome in many ways, namely, more lonely, 
mechanical, and dehumanized . . . .”79  The sight of someone on a respirator gives the 
impression that the patient is being enveloped by a machine, that her independent 
existence is being swallowed up by a mechanical entity.  This is gruesome to those who 
knew the patient in other, happier contexts.  It may be that the gruesomeness of 
respirators and similar medical machines is that they remove people from normal 
contexts and throw them into alien setting where machines set the context.  All of the 
above conditions constitute a regular part of the dying experience of many, and each of 
them can be perceived to threaten dignity in some way.   
 We ought to be clear about the sense in which such features of dying compromise 
a patient’s dignity.  My claim is not that dying patients lose dignity in some absolute 
sense, that somehow the moral value of the lives of dying patients is less than that of 
those who are more healthy.  Rather, the sense in which people frequently mourn a loss 
of dignity which precedes death, captured sometimes by PAD advocates in the phrase, 
“death with dignity,” concerns, primarily, a perception about what conditions are fitting 
for a human being.  This perception might be fueled by the ways our culture has been 
influenced by philosophers like Immanuel Kant.  Kant conceives the dignity of humans to 
reside in their capacity for moral agency.80  Dying, as I point out above, erodes our 
                                                 
79 Elizabeth Kubler-Ross, On Death and Dying (New York: Scribner Classics, 1969/1997), 21.  Her 
comparison is, presumably, to earlier times. 
80 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Mary Gregor, ed., with an introduction by 
Christine M. Korsgaard (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).  Charles Taylor, Sources of the 
Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989) provides a 
definitive account of the interconnections between agency and dignity (Taylor uses ‘respect’ for what I 
have been calling dignity).  As he puts it, “I have been arguing that there is a peculiarly modern sense of 
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capacity for agency in a more general sense.  While most Americans are probably not 
self-conscious Kantians, Kant’s ideas have clearly permeated our culture to an extent, and 
this could suggest that humans who are losing agency, even if this is not moral agency 
strictly speaking, are also losing dignity.  The loss of the capacity to impose one’s will on 
the world, I am speculating, suggests to some that one is thereby less dignified.  
Nevertheless, many Americans also believe human moral worth extends beyond our 
capacity for agency.  And this sets up a tension in our thinking.  Because the dying 
remain worthy of moral respect we sometimes bemoan the conditions contemporary 
medical care and the diseases it is responding to put patients in.  In this sense, we can talk 
about dying as presenting a possible threat to the patient’s dignity and retain an 
understanding of why this threat represents a challenge. 
Increased Vulnerability 
 The above discussion implies that patients would do well to have advocates who 
can testify to their continued moral dignity, even in a less capacitated state.  This points 
to another challenge the dying face, one that is related to the loss of independence but 
merits special comment.  Terminal patients are partially vulnerable as a result of their 
condition.  Illness makes us less able to think for ourselves.  We can be “thrown off” by 
the jarring nature of a bad prognosis or the realization that an illness will be a watershed 
moment, changing our lives forever.  When we are ill we are physically weak, and 
therefore less independent, so we are vulnerable to being taken advantage of.  We 
become less compelling advocates on our own behalf.  We carry the social stigma of 
                                                                                                                                                 
what respect involves, which gives a salient place to freedom and self-control, places a high priority on 
avoiding suffering, and sees productive activity and family life as central to our well-being” (14). 
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illness.81  And some of the vulnerability is a function of the unequal relationship that 
exists between doctors and their patients.  Much has been written on this topic.82  I will 
only briefly comment on a few aspects of it.  Doctors hold a good bit of social power and 
can control a number of aspects of a patient’s life.83  The disparity between doctors and 
most patients is true at any life stage, yet terminal illness seems to exacerbate the gap.  
Doctors and other medical professionals often know more about many aspects of a 
patient’s condition than the patient herself.  This knowledge makes patients vulnerable to 
exploitation or abuse, both of which may well be unintentional, as a result of the power 
gap between doctor and patient.  Of course, this need not always be the case.  Edmund 
Pellegrino suggests that patients’ vulnerability to doctors can sometimes threaten their 
self-image, their sense of having a valid independent perspective on themselves and their 
illness.84  This also makes patients vulnerable to a threat to self-knowledge.  They are 
vulnerable to the possibility of someone else speaking more authoritatively about their 
own experience and its meaning than they can.  The objectification of the patient and the 
patient’s body would be one form that this relationship takes.  Sally Gadow remarks that, 
“The body that a patient experiences and that which a practitioner treats are seldom the 
same.”85  Doctors, of course, frequently treat the body they have been trained to treat, one 
captured and isolated in terms of medical data, numbers, and relevant performance charts.  
                                                 
81 Arthur W. Frank, At the Will of the Body: Reflections on Illness (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1991), 91 discusses the social stigma of illness. 
82 See, for instance, Howard Brody, The Healer’s Power (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992).  
For a discussion of the responsibilities this patient vulnerability places on physicians, see Edmund D. 
Pellegrino and David C. Thomasma, The Virtues in Medical Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993). 
83 Zaner, Conversations on the Edge, 65. 
84 Edmund Pellegrino, Humanism and the Physician (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1979), 127. 
85 Sally Gadow, “Body and Self: A Dialectic,” in Victor Kestenbaum, ed., The Humanity of the Ill: 
Phenomenological Perspectives (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1982), 86-100, 86. 
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But this leaves patients vulnerable to objectification of their person and subsequent 
potential loss of self-image.  As Eric Cassell points out, an approach to disease that 
objectifies the body and assumes that disease can and ought to be understood only in 
terms of dysfunction or disruption in bodily systems makes patients vulnerable to a 
failure on the part of medicine to address the particularities that make their illness 
theirs.86  Thus, patients are, ironically, vulnerable to misdiagnosis and mistreatment, 
sometimes by health care professionals operating under what they understand to be the 
best current standards of medicine.  From Cassell’s perspective, it is misdiagnosis and 
mistreatment because the health professional fails to discern the particular form the 
disease has in this patient and fails to treat this patient’s symptoms.  The objectification 
of the body reduces the patient to something less than what he is and treats only the part 
that medicine has typically focused on.  The object of concern to many physicians is the 
body that contains a disease, but Cassell calls for care that treats persons with diseases 
and not just bodies as malfunctioning objects.  The problem might also be compounded 
by an ambivalence medicine has sometimes shown—even in recent years—to providing 
really good care at the end of life.87  In a trend that parallels the concerns raised by 
Cassell, one observer notes that more recent medical texts spend less time discussing how 
a patient might look or feel when dying of a particular disease.  That is, these medical 
                                                 
86 This theme pervades Eric Cassell’s The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2004), especially Chapters Three (“The Nature of Suffering”), Four 
(“Suffering in Chronic Illness”), and Fifteen (“Pain and Suffering”). 
87 Vogt, Christian Art of Dying Well, 1.  Vogt comments there on Joanne Lynn’s observations about the 
changes in medical texts concerning which information is deemed relevant to present to doctors-in-
training..  More recent texts have paid far less attention to personal details, which might help a doctor 
understand her patient better.  Lynn’s essay is titled, “Caring for Those Who Die in Old Age” in Howard 
M. Spiro, Mary G. McCrea Curnen, and Lee Palmet Wandel, eds., Facing Death: Where Culture, Religion 
and Medicine Meet (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996).  
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texts discuss diseases in the context of bodies, but increasingly ignore the wider context 
of the persons in whom the diseases are manifest.   
Further, patients are also vulnerable as a result of their dependence on technology.  
They are vulnerable to others’ decisions concerning whether to grant them access to 
technology, particularly more exotic forms of technology that are not considered to be 
necessary for immediate life-saving purposes.  An example of such decisions might be 
those concerning organ transplants or, in earlier times, use of dialysis machines.  
Technology also controls and limits the lives of those dependent on it as well.  Dialysis 
machines require frequent, regular visits; respirators impose many restrictions on 
movement and speech.  Each of these makes its user dependent in different ways, but this 
dependence makes patients vulnerable in new ways.  Technology-dependent patients are 
vulnerable to being placed on someone else’s time schedule and, thus, losing control of 
their time.  They are also vulnerable to the successes and failures of technology.  Finally, 
they are vulnerable to complications that arise as a result of their treatment through the 
use of such technologies.  These complications might include additional physical 
incapacities and illnesses or exacerbation of the symptoms of their existing ones. 
Patients are not just vulnerable with respect to doctors or the medical 
establishment.  Illness makes them more dependent on family members and others, and 
this makes patients more vulnerable to others’ decisions about their care and treatment.  
The healthy, by virtue of their full capacities, can make decisions affecting patients.  For 
instance, family members of the dying sometimes make decisions based more on their 
own needs and interests than those of the patient in their care.  A son will decide he needs 
a bit more time with his father before “letting go.”  A daughter will find herself unable 
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not to agree to one more round of treatment that her mother has long since become 
comfortable with forgoing. 
Pain and Suffering 
 Although the common phrase “pain and suffering” sometimes elides any 
meaningful distinction between the two words, Eric Cassell has initiated an important 
discussion about the difference between pain and suffering.88  Ultimately Cassell aims, I 
think, to distinguish pain and suffering without separating them.  He sees the two as 
linked in important ways.  But he worries that medicine has oriented itself to attend well 
to one at the expense of the other.  After discussing the distinction between the two, I will 
take up consideration of pain, then suffering, and then look at some connections between 
the two. 
 We can begin to get a sense for Cassell’s distinction by considering a series of 
dichotomies: pain versus suffering; body versus person or patient; disease versus illness; 
sensation versus perception; objective immediacy versus subjective meaning-making.  A 
simplistic understanding of Cassell’s distinction would assign pain to the physical or 
bodily realm and suffering to the emotional or personal realm.  This distinction 
oversimplifies things because Cassell sometimes discusses the emotional or 
psychological content of pain.89  We might also be dubious of this way of formulating the 
distinction when we bear in mind that fear and anxiety have been documented to increase 
pain, suggesting that one’s emotions can cause a certain amount of pain.90  This suggests 
                                                 
88 Eric Cassell, “The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine,” New England Journal of Medicine 
306:11 (1982): 639-45 and his later book by the same title, The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of 
Medicine. 
89 Cassell, The Nature of Suffering, 162-3 and 169-70. 
90 Ibid, 269. 
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that pain is not based purely in the physical realm, or that the “physical realm” is broader 
than we have sometimes imagined.  For Cassell, it also suggests that the longstanding 
philosophical distinction between the mind and the body is not tenable.  Nevertheless, 
pain—when it arises—typically does so as a result of physical malady or dysfunction.  
Persons with diseased bodies experience pain.  Persons or selves, in themselves, 
experience suffering.91  In Cassell’s words, “Suffering occurs when an impending 
destruction of the person is perceived; it continues until the threat of disintegration has 
passed or until the integrity of the person can be restored in some other manner.” Physical 
symptoms might occur in the presence of suffering, but “suffering extends beyond the 
physical.”92  We can be in pain without suffering; this would be to experience some kind 
of unpleasant sensation.  Suffering results from a perceived threat to one’s sense of self.93  
I think Cassell is concerned here with a person’s sense of herself as a cohesive whole.  In 
that sense, his discussion of suffering doesn’t cover all the ways we use the term.  
Someone might suffer guilt at moral failings that prompts him to pursue a more 
integrated self; in the meantime, he might see such suffering as an integral part of who he 
is at the present stage of moral development.94  Cassell clearly has a more specialized 
sense of suffering in mind when he talks of a threat to my self, one which applies well to 
                                                 
91 This neat dichotomy is somewhat upset by the fact that sometimes the body experiencing pain does not 
show any obvious sign of disease.  One doctor I spoke with about this said that in his neurology practice he 
saw plenty of patients who complained of back pain but showed no obvious physical disease (e.g. no 
ruptured discs in the spine), and he saw patients with MRIs indicating many ruptures but who complained 
of little or no pain.  
92 Cassell, The Nature of Suffering, 32. 
93 Cassell’s discussion of suffering seems to apply best to personal suffering.  I might suffer with another 
person, experiencing suffering over their plight, but this would not necessarily constitute a threat to my self 
(unless, perhaps, some of my identity as a person is wrapped up in the well-being of the other).  Suffering 
as a challenge of dying seems to fall within the parameters of personal suffering, so I will use Cassell’s 
definition, although I do not believe it covers all instances of suffering.  Thanks to Betsy Postow for 
pointing this out. 
94 Again, I am grateful to Betsy Postow for pointing out the limits of Cassell’s discussion of suffering. 
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suffering as a result of illness, especially terminal illness.  Pain, while unpleasant, doesn’t 
initially threaten to undo my sense of self (though in time it might).  Indeed, sometimes 
pain is integral to one’s sense of self, if some difficult and painful task informs one’s 
selfhood.  Natural childbirth, for some mothers, functions this way.  But suffering undoes 
me.  Cassell acknowledges that extreme or uncontrollable pain often leads to suffering, 
but he wants to point out that one may have pain without suffering, and, more 
importantly, one may suffer without pain.95  Thus, these two related challenges of dying 
ought to be considered separately before being considered together. 
 If Cassell understands suffering as a threat to one’s sense of self, is there a sense 
in which dying is suffering on a large scale?96  Unless one denies his condition, the 
process of dying includes, in one way or another, the recognition that death—and with it 
the end of the self in some sense—is near.  Is dying inevitably suffering?  For some, it no 
doubt is.  Cassell’s account sheds some light on the experience of those who are wracked 
with grief at the thought that life, in which they have invested themselves in various 
ways, will go without them after they are gone.  Nevertheless, I don’t think the dying 
must inevitably suffer.  A fair number of people seem to aspire to, and achieve, a 
peaceful death.  This implies another limit to Cassell’s account.  It may suggest a sense in 
which some patients do not see their selves as threatened with disintegration upon death.  
Those with certain religious convictions could obviously believe their self will not 
disintegrate, even if their bodies do.  Others lacking the convictions of traditional faiths 
                                                 
95 Cassell, The Nature of Suffering, 34-5. 
96 Not everyone would consider the annihilation of the self as something to be suffered.  Buddhists and 
Stoics might be two examples of a perspective that seeks to minimize or eliminate the self.  If so, these 
constitute different conceptions of a good death, and, as I noted above, not all conceptions of a good death 
will see all of the challenges I discuss in this chapter as equally worthy of concern. 
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may still see a sense in which they can carry on—or be carried on—in the lives of loved 
ones or projects in which they are invested.  And others, as I mentioned previously, may 
welcome disintegration.  Despite these exceptions, many do suffer in dying.  Sometimes 
that suffering arises from pain. 
 Pain 
Pain, of course, has a proper and appropriate function.  When it serves as an early 
warning system, pain preserves us from further physical damage or harm.  We quickly 
remove a hand from fire as result of the pain we feel.  But, when pain arises from disease, 
particularly disease that has already been detected, it is no longer serving this kind of 
function.  The pain from cancer that is pinching a nerve doesn’t give us new information 
we can use, other than to seek treatment for the disease.  Thus, this kind of pain verges on 
being senseless.  Few find any use for pain like this.   
Is pain an issue the dying still face?  One might think that modern medicine can 
successfully treat and block pain.  However, evidence suggests that pain remains an issue 
for the chronically—and terminally—ill.97  One response to severe pain is terminal 
sedation.  However, this alleviates pain at the expense of denying the dying patient any 
opportunity to interact with loved ones at the end of life.  For those who don’t want to be 
sedated out of community, this option is unappealing.  Further, doctors sometimes harbor 
suspicions about patients’ reports of pain, or fear creating addiction in patients.  
Sometimes patients remain unaware of what more can be done to address their pain.  For 
these reasons, pain continues to be a challenge the dying might face.   
                                                 
97 This is confirmed in The SUPPORT Principle Investigators, “A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for 
Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients,” Journal of the American Medical Association 274:20 (1995): 23-56.  
Medicine has responded to this study, particularly by becoming more proactive in asking patients about 
their pain level and adjusting pain medication accordingly. 
 58
What is the nature of the challenge of facing pain?  Elaine Scarry has addressed 
this issue in some detail.98  She begins her book by qualifying what it, or any book on 
pain, can do.  Scarry claims that physical pain, which is her primary focus, is 
inexpressible; the words we use to describe our own or others’ pain do not really do the 
pain justice.99  What she’s saying here probably rings more true as one’s pain becomes 
more severe and enduring.  The more severe and enduring pain becomes, the less 
confident we will often feel that we have adequately given voice to our experience.  The 
pain of a pin prick can be adequately expressed, because it is relatively minor and short-
lived.  But Scarry’s thesis applies much more readily to the pain of pinched nerves in the 
spinal cord, nerves which are tweaked with almost every movement.  We can talk about 
this pain, but we can’t really articulate exactly what the experience and difficulty are for 
those who face it.  Having acknowledged this, Scarry goes on to offer the following 
claims about pain.  First, despite its inexpressibility, or the incompleteness with which we 
express our most severe pain, “[t]o have pain is to have certainty.”100  We don’t doubt our 
pain, unless, perhaps, we find it called into question by others for whom our pain is not so 
certain.  Ironically, while pain is a certainty for those who experience it, claims about 
pain by others have a measure of dubiousness to them.101  We have to trust those 
reporting their pain.  If their body language does not confirm their report, doubts creep in.  
Thus, one aspect of the challenge of pain in dying is that while the pain is indubitably real 
for the patient, it is open to question by others—particularly by health care professionals 
                                                 
98 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985). 
99 Ibid, 3. 
100 Ibid, 13.  She calls it an “incontestable reality” (17). 
101 In Scarry’s words, “to hear about pain is to have doubt” (ibid, 13). 
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who might fear, sometimes with very good reason, that they have something at stake in 
acquiescing to all requests for pain treatment.   
Pain changes my relationship to my body.  Under “normal” circumstances we 
experience our bodies in terms of what Sally Gadow calls “primary immediacy.”102  The 
immediateness with which we are our bodies under such circumstances means that we 
don’t act “with” our bodies; rather, the body’s acting is our acting, claims Gadow.103  But 
pain breaks the immediacy with which our bodies carry out our volitions, intentions, and 
actions.  Other experiences of physical limitation might prove to be equally disruptive, 
but I will focus on pain for now.  Pain makes our bodies alien to us and creates an 
independent voice for them.104  When in pain, the body and self are set at odds with one 
another.105  Scarry points out that the root word for ‘pain’ is poena, from which we also 
derive the word ‘punishment.’106  This surely rings true in our experiences with severe 
pain.  Suddenly we feel as though our body has taken on an agenda of its own and is 
punishing “us.”  Whereas previously we lived our body—and had no trouble integrating 
our bodies into the “we” that we understood as our identity—now our identities are 
somewhat set against our bodies, which seem to be both asserting and inflicting 
themselves upon us.   
This kind of experience can be prompted by things other than pain.  Aging also 
causes our relationship to our body to change in similar ways.  However, this experience 
                                                 
102 Gadow, “Body and Self,” 86.  As Gadow’s discussion makes clear, experiencing our bodies under the 
conditions of primary immediacy is our initial “normalcy.”  Later, we may find other relations to our body 
more “normal.” 
103 Ibid, 87. 
104 Scarry, Body in Pain, 47. 
105 Gadow, “Body and Self,” 88. 
106 Scarry, Body in Pain, 16. 
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can be repeated many times in the course of a person’s life.  Gadow argues that part of 
the human response to a disruption of our “primary immediacy” is to seek a kind of 
reconciliation, a new, if somewhat less immediate, harmony between body and self.107  
Amputees, for instance, often learn new ways of being and acting in the world, such that 
their relatively less capable bodies become, in different ways, the amputee’s acting.  
Those who are not amputees sometimes marvel at what amputees do with available body 
parts.  For example, I am aware that some hand or arm amputees can write, type, or play 
guitar with their feet.  More commonly, all of us learn to accommodate ourselves to new 
limitations imposed by the effects of aging on our bodies.  Such reconciliations could 
occur throughout one’s life.  Indeed, few of us get very far beyond our teen years before 
we begin to experience a disruption in the immediacy of body and self.  And most do 
seem to achieve some kind of reconciliation.  Though, at some point the disruptions may 
overcome a person’s ability to reconcile.  This may be a typical experience for the 
elderly.  For the dying, I think, the challenge of facing this disruption in the relationship 
between body and self is heightened and magnified.  To experience my body as dying is 
to face a new form of disruption.  Scarry defines ‘dying’ as being the realization that my 
body can be killed or die; and she points out that physical pain often “intimates” that 
death is near.108  To experience my body this way greatly reduces the prospects of 
achieving reconciliation of the self with the body.  Therefore, we might think of dying as 
the final, and thus potentially most severe, disruption of self and body.  This makes the 
                                                 
107 Gadow, “Body and Self,” 90-100.  She describes two stages to this reconciliation: “cultivated 
immediacy” and “aesthetic immediacy.” 
108 Scarry, Body in Pain, 31.  Her definition of dying, of course, should be qualified as the experience of 
dying, what Ninian Smart calls “facing death” (in “Philosophical Concepts of Death,” in Toynbee, et al, 
Man’s Concern with Death, 31).  Someone can be dying without experiencing the fact that this is so, either 
because of denial or because of a very subtle terminal illness. 
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pain we face in dying—the pain that often prompts this disruption—that much more of a 
challenge to face.   
Scarry lists the attributes of pain that make this disruption possible: pain’s “sheer 
aversiveness” and alien-ness to me; its dissolution of the psychic boundary that normally 
“protects” us—by means of mental comfort—from threats outside of us; its “solitude of 
absolute privacy with none of the safety;” its capacity to destroy language and thereby 
threaten the trust between those in pain and those attending to them; its capacity to 
destroy, or severely limit, our perception; its resistance to objectification, so that it can be 
named and dealt with; and, finally, its totality.109  “Pain begins by being ‘not oneself’ and 
ends by having eliminated all that is ‘not itself.”110  Pain cripples identity and agency.  
Pain comes in degrees, and, again, I think Scarry’s claims increase in veracity as pain 
increases in severity and duration.  The “sheer aversiveness” of a blister doesn’t compare, 
except by matters of degree, with the sheer aversiveness of a decreasing lung capacity 
brought on COPD (Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder).   
That this is true helps us to reconcile Scarry’s discussion of pain with Cassell’s 
claims about suffering.  Pain, in varying degrees, disrupts the relationship between self 
and body.  Pain, as a challenge we face in dying, threatens the cohesiveness of our selves, 
particularly by setting the body at odds with the self.  However, suffering, Cassell argues, 
threatens to destroy the self, to destroy one’s sense of identity.  Subject to the qualifiers I 
discussed above, suffering is a challenge in dying because in suffering we fear that our 
whole self is in danger of disintegration.  Ironically, Scarry points out that physical pain 
                                                 
109 Scarry, The Body in Pain, 52-56. 
110 Ibid, 54. 
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sometimes temporarily relieves mental suffering by making us less aware of the latter.111  
Sometimes perceiving a disruption of body and self, secures the knowledge that there is a 
self.  That would be a consequence of the certainty of pain.  But, as Cassell points out, 
eventually severe or prolonged pain will lead to suffering, particularly if the patient fears 
that the pain can’t be controlled.112   
 Suffering and the Medical Response 
 One of the burdens of Cassell’s book, The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of 
Medicine, is to argue that medicine currently fails to live up to its ancient responsibility to 
relieve suffering because of how it conceives disease, illness, and suffering.  If true, this  
charge represents a first challenge of those who suffer while dying: while being treated 
for their diseases and pain, they may not be treated for the suffering that arises from these 
conditions.  But this claim must be qualified by some additional considerations.  First, we 
may not want medicine to take on the burden of relieving all suffering.  We might think 
that medicine ought to have moral limits in the sense that it ought to refrain from 
imposing an understanding of well-being which its aims to relieve suffering presume.  As 
I indicated in Chapter Two (and will discuss more in Chapters Five and Six), someone’s 
ground project or his conception of a well-lived life, might lead him to believe that the 
moral cost of relieving some suffering is simply too high.   
Or, we might think medicine ought not become an institution merely committed 
to ameliorating any perceived experience of suffering.  This is a contested area in the 
philosophy of medicine.  One example can indicate the extent of controversy: should 
                                                 
111 Ibid, 33.  She attributes this claim to Marx. 
112 Cassell, The Nature of Suffering, 34-5. 
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medicine relieve the suffering of those who believe their physical sex does not match 
their perceived gender?  Some see no place for medicine in such practices; others see it as 
a legitimate extension of medicine’s commitment to relieve suffering.  The point is that 
patients’ claims of suffering may extend far beyond what medicine typically sees itself as 
committed to relieving.  Second, some believe institutions other than medicine would be 
better suited to relieving some forms of suffering.  Various churches, for instance, might 
claim that the suffering associated with the contemplation of mortality is their domain 
and medicine is ill-equipped to deal with it.  In addition to alternative institutions, 
personal responses, such as embodying virtues relevant to meeting the challenges of 
dying—such as suffering—are another way one may face one’s suffering without 
needing or expecting medicine to seek to relieve it. 
Cassell might be willing to concede these qualifications.  His central concern, I 
think, is to argue that medicine does not relieve all the suffering that it appropriately 
should.  Indeed, he is concerned about suffering that arises from the fact that medicine 
dichotomizes bodies and persons, diseases and suffering.  Cassell offers the description of 
35 year old breast cancer patient to illustrate his case.113  Cassell doesn’t give her a name, 
but I’ll call her Joan.  Joan receives excellent care for her disease and for her pain.  Yet 
even as this excellent care is being provided, Joan receives little or no treatment for her 
suffering.  Because the timing of her relapses coincides, she thinks, with times when she 
has become hopeful and eager to go on living, she fears her desire to live, she fears the 
effects of certain treatments (including disfigurement, loss of hair, and loss of libido, and 
isolation), and she perceives certain social and personal threats concerning what her 
                                                 
113 Ibid, 29-32. 
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future will look like.  All of these threaten Joan’s sense of identity and therefore cause 
her to suffer.  Cassell’s point in discussing this case study is to show how Joan can be 
well cared for by medicine’s current best standards, but not be cared for at all where her 
suffering is concerned.  He thinks this is a function of the way medicine orients itself.   
“Disease theory,” around which medicine organizes its care, suggests that 
diseases such as breast cancer have a physical basis and that proper treatment of the 
disease involves addressing the disruption in the structure or function of physical 
systems.114  But Joan’s suffering results not from her physical systems directly; rather, it 
comes from her perceptions as a person, as an individual.  Her medical care has focused 
on treating her malfunctioning body, but it has ignored the repercussions of her diseased 
body for her whole self.  That Joan’s suffering is somewhat unique to her is an important 
point for Cassell.  Disease theory teaches doctors to see patients in terms of the 
similarities of their physical dysfunctions and symptoms.115  But Joan’s suffering reflects, 
at least in part, on her as an individual.  (I say in part because I can imagine other breast 
cancer patients having a similar set of concerns causing suffering, though Cassell is 
surely right that each individual patient’s particular matrix of concerns and fears is 
unique to that person.)  Contemporary medicine rarely seeks to know or address the 
causes of a patient’s suffering.  Thus, one challenge of facing suffering in dying is 
medicine’s inability or unwillingness—given its current form—to address suffering in a 
robust way. 
                                                 
114 Ibid, 47. 
115 Ibid, 260. 
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 An alternative challenge might arise were medicine to respond to Cassell’s thesis 
seriously.  If medicine did begin to systematically seek to address patients’ suffering, as 
Cassell wants it to, then some patients might be vulnerable to having their understanding 
of their suffering subsumed under a totalizing understanding offered by the institutions of 
medicine.  Thus, patients might have their suffering, which on Cassell’s argument is an 
expression of their person, addressed in terms they find foreign and even threatening.116  
Put simply, some may wish to have their suffering addressed by institutions other than 
medicine.  For those who take this perspective, as I am inclined to, a challenge associated 
with suffering in dying might be that medicine is seeking to impose a false relief on it.117 
 Suffering 
 How medicine addresses suffering might present a challenge for the dying, but 
what is the challenge of suffering itself?  Cassell’s account, which has in many ways 
defined suffering within the field of bioethics, claims that suffering is a function of 
persons who perceive, or fear, that their person—their identity—is threatened.  As 
Cassell notes, suffering has a temporal element to it.  Suffering is about the patient’s 
perception of her future.118  Indeed, Cassell’s understanding of suffering may be entirely 
prospective.  We can’t suffer when we are dead, he thinks, but we can suffer as we 
anticipate our death.  In particular, the fear is that future events or conditions will destroy 
my sense of identity.  This resonates with Scarry’s claim, in her subtitle, that pain 
                                                 
116 Something like this concern has been expressed by Stanley Hauerwas, in a lecture at the University of 
Tennessee in June of 2001, and by Ivan Illich in Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health (New 
York: Bantam Books, 1976). 
117 In Chapter Six, I discuss how Christians, in particular, might look to resources other than those provided 
by medicine for relief of their suffering.  Of course, someone needn’t be a Christian to believe she has 
resources for dealing with suffering that are beyond or different from those offered by medicine. 
118 Cassell, The Nature of Suffering, 35. 
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“unmakes” us.119  Pain, which is often a cause of suffering, can become so intense that 
we fear it is uncontrollable.  At that point, Cassell—echoing Scarry—claims, the 
uncontrolled pain will undo us, will take away our identity by making the pain so 
immediate, perhaps, that nothing else can be.   
 Pain is not the only way we can suffer.   Because memory is central to one’s sense 
of self and identity, the realization that one’s memories might be, or have been, destroyed 
would cause, for most, suffering.120  This helps us understand the kind of suffering 
encountered by those facing progressive degenerative brain diseases, such as 
Alzheimer’s.  In this case, the fear will not be unfounded.  Whereas I might suffer 
because I doubt I can withstand chronic pain much longer, I could be wrong about my 
ability to withstand the pain.  In this case, the suffering would be based on a misplaced 
fear.  But if I am diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease, the prospective fear of loss of my 
sense of identity is not misplaced.  If I do not die before the disease takes full effect, then 
I will suffer not just from the fear of loss of self, but also from the actual loss of self.  
Could I suffer from that, from having lost a sense of self?  Perhaps the best way to 
interpret Cassell at this point would be to say that what the Alzheimer’s patient suffers 
from is a lack of cohesive or coherent sense of self.  To have end-stage Alzheimer’s 
disease is not to lack all sense of perspective.  Rather, it is to suffer from a lack of unified 
and coherent perspective.  I suffer from the vague sense that I ought to know those in my 
room.  I suffer from a belated realization that it is my wife whom I have struck, whereas 
                                                 
119 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World. 
120 Cassell, The Nature of Suffering, 37.  I refer both to the capacity for having memories and to specific 
memories. 
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earlier I was confused about her presence.  In these ways, I suffer—in a way consistent 
with Cassell’s sense—from a memory-eroding disease. 
The case of Alzheimer’s suggests another aspect of suffering which Cassell 
discusses.  A sense of self derives in large part from social relations, and social relations 
break down somewhat in the face of memory loss.  I define who I am, in part, by my 
relationships to those around me.  Cassell argues that chronic illness tends to remove 
sufferers from good standing in their social worlds.  Whereas modern medicine—with 
disease theory as its organizing principle—tends to fare relatively well in treating acute 
illness, it fares less well treating chronic illness, particularly in regard to the suffering 
involved.121  Medicine generally fails to predict or relieve the suffering associated with 
chronic illness.  But this may be due, in part, to the special challenges of chronic illness, 
which are related to the socially-derived aspect of the self.  Drawing on Arthur Lovejoy’s 
claims about the social elements of human nature, Cassell notes that persons tend to have 
a desire to be approved of (“approbativeness”) and a desire to be considered superior or 
worthy of imitation (“emulativeness”).122  These define, in part, our understanding of 
how to relate to others.  But the chronically ill often fail to meet just these kinds of 
standards because of their conditions.  Concerning Lovejoy’s second element, if we 
desire to be considered superior, then someone must be inferior by comparison.  One 
class of people who typically receive that designation in our social context is the elderly.  
In our society, taking many medications, especially painkillers, having one’s weaknesses 
on display, and having one’s bodily functions—or lack thereof—on display cause many 
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others to withhold their social approval.123  This leads to suffering—to a sense of threat to 
oneself—when chronically ill patients internalize this lack of approval.  Self-conflict 
results from a person’s desire for social approval which conflicts with the chronically ill 
patient’s uncooperative body or mind.124  Gadow’s discussion of the disrupted harmony 
between body and self is relevant here.  But another important part of this aspect of the 
challenge of dying well comes from one’s social circumstances.  Those chronically ill 
who face a long decline toward death will be vulnerable to suffering from social 
disapproval.  In a previous section, I noted that illness carries a social stigma, and this can 
be a source of great suffering.  This might be mitigated by a more intimate social 
community—one’s family, perhaps, or a community of fellow sufferers.  Of course, these 
same people might contribute to a sense of social disapproval, and their disapproval may 
prove more devastating than that of relative strangers.  Either way, the threat, or reality, 
of being at odds with the broader community remains a cause of suffering. 
Suffering challenges us in many ways.  How we respond to the challenge of 
suffering is also fraught with some difficulties of its own.  Stan van Hooft points out that 
many respond to suffering by trying to find some meaning in it in an effort to make it 
“bearable or acceptable.”125  This project doesn’t always succeed, which raises the 
specter of meaningless suffering.  However, even if successful this project is in tension 
with the claim that justifying the suffering of others, or oneself, by giving it meaning and 
                                                 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid, 52. 
125 Stan van Hooft, “The Meanings of Suffering,” Hastings Center Report 28:5 (1998): 13-19, 14.  This 
issue has also been addressed in Ivan Illich, Medical Nemesis, cited above. 
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purpose “is to denigrate the other by making him a means to some purpose.”126  The story 
told about the purpose of the suffering takes a privileged place over the sufferer who is 
just a piece in a larger puzzle, a means to some larger end.  In this latter approach, the 
suffering must be meaningless in order not to threaten the “authenticity” of the sufferer.  
Suffering challenges us both by possibly being meaningless and by the possibility that we 
should somehow not want it to be otherwise.127 
Suffering via Pain and Pain via Suffering 
I would like to conclude my discussion of pain and suffering by briefly 
considering the interplay between the two.  I have already mentioned one connection 
which is fairly straightforward.  Cassell points out that uncontrolled pain, or pain that we 
fear is uncontrollable, leads to suffering.128  We suffer from a belief that we cannot 
maintain our sense of self under this pain but that the pain will not be ameliorated.  The 
elemental experience of pain “like this” is inconsistent with our perceptions of who we 
are or hope to be.  Or, perhaps a patient fears a future—maybe permanent—in which his 
identity is very closely connected with the pain he is currently experiencing.  In a case 
like this, pain leads to suffering. 
                                                 
126 Van Hooft, “The Meanings of Suffeing,” 16.  Van Hooft is drawing on the ideas of Emmanuel Levinas 
in making this claim. 
127 Van Hooft’s account is open to interrogation.  In Chapter Six, I discuss how the Christian moral 
tradition might respond to van Hooft’s claim that meaning-making threatens authenticity.  Betsy Postow 
has pointed out to me that some people would also have other reasons to question van Hooft’s claims.  If, 
for instance, the purpose of suffering is to purify the self or to provide an opportunity to gain 
enlightenment, then the suffering seems to have meaning and it seems not to make the sufferer a means to 
some other end outside of herself. 
128 Cassell, The Nature of Suffering, 34.  Cassell describes pain likely to lead to suffering as being 
overwhelmingly intense, longstanding, or feared by the patient to be uncontrollable. 
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But suffering also causes or exacerbates pain.  Cassell calls to our attention the 
way that fear, panic, anger, or suffering may aggravate our pain.129  He attributes this to 
the meaning we assign to our pain.  If we interpret the pain as having an especially grave 
significance—the recurrence of cancer, or a heart attack—the pain is more severe.  
Cassell points to Dr. Henry Beecher’s observations during World War II concerning 
severely wounded soldiers who would be sent home for recovery versus those whose 
wounds would not take them out of the fight.  The former, observed Beecher, seemed to 
experience less pain.130  The fear of returning to a battlefield fraught with dangers seems 
to have affected soldiers’ perceptions of pain.  As a kind of fear, suffering can also 
exacerbate pain and make it more severe.   
The Length of Dying 
 Another challenge of dying in our contemporary medical context involves time.  
Advances in medicine, sanitation, and immunization have brought increasing life spans, 
but these advances have also led to a longer dying period.  A historical contrast illustrates 
this point.  James C. Riley reports that in the period 1600 to 1870 dysentery, cholera, 
influenza, plague, smallpox, typhoid fever, and tuberculosis were the main causes of 
death.131  With diseases like these, the longest one was usually sick was eight weeks.  
Many diseases killed, if they were going to be fatal, much sooner than that.132  Daniel 
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131 James C. Riley, Sickness, Recovery and Death (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1989), 109. 
132 Ibid, 188. 
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Callahan reports that death from infectious disease with “rapid onset and quick crisis” 
was the norm for this historical period and earlier.133   
 Today we have very different fears about our dying.  Cancer, on average, takes 
around three years from time of detection to kill, if it is fatal.  When Alzheimer’s disease 
is detected, it will take around seven years to kill.  Likewise, heart conditions and 
diabetes can take many years to do the cumulative damage that leads to death.134  The 
contrast between 130-400 years ago and now is striking.  For many of us, this means we 
can anticipate a prolonged period of dying.  We will have more time to face all of the 
other challenges discussed in this chapter.  And, we will have to navigate the murky 
waters between living with a condition and recognizing that we are dying from it, 
something our earlier ancestors very rarely faced.135  So a prolonged dying is another 
challenge we face.  Associated with this, we might fear that we could die “too late.”  A 
“postmature” death would be one in which a patient senses that her life’s work has 
finished but her life lingers on.  This is not so much a challenge of dying as of entering 
the end stages of life and finding that one’s death does not correspond with one’s 
preparedness to die.  In general, the challenge we face here is that our dying will likely 
take a long time.  Statistically, we can certainly expect to be dying for much longer than 
those from earlier eras.  Thus, as noted above, we can expect to deal with all of the other 
challenges that make dying well difficult for longer periods of time.   
                                                 
133 Daniel Callahan, The Troubled Dream of Life (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2000), 
28.  Callahan is drawing on Philippe Aries’s The Hour of Our Death, trans. Helen Weaver (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1981). 
134 Callahan, The Troubled Dream of Life, 43.  He notes too that medical technology can sometimes 
lengthen these estimates.  John Lachs discusses additional sociological data on an increasing elderly 
population and prolonged dying in “Dying Old as a Social Problem,” in Glen McGee, ed., Pragmatic 
Bioethics, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press, 2003), 207-17, especially pp. 207-8. 
135 Joanne Lynn and Joan Harrold, Handbook for Mortals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 7-8. 
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“Technological Brinkmanship” 
 Daniel Callahan coined the term “technological brinkmanship” to describe the 
challenge of using technology as long as possible to preserve a good quality of life 
without pushing one’s use of it into a realm where the patient is harmed.136  This is not so 
much about dependence on technology, discussed above.  Rather, this is about a patient’s 
decisions about how far to go in engaging technology.  The challenge comes in that a 
patient could opt for one treatment too many.  For instance, the use of a respirator up to a 
certain point might preserve one’s chances of leaving the hospital at a later date.  But at 
some point, the possibility of being weaned from the respirator vanishes and one is 
trapped.  Some fear a time when technology will no longer be serving them but will have 
taken on ends of its own.  At this point, the technology preserves life against the patient’s 
wishes or entraps the patient in a way of life that—if it could have been anticipated—
would have been avoided.  The sense of being trapped could take a number of forms.  If a 
patient believes PAD not to be a morally legitimate option, she may also be leery of 
discontinuing life-preserving technology when it seems to be effectively preserving (even 
unwanted) life.  If a patient passes a “natural” point for forgoing technology in hopes that 
her condition will improve, she is effectively betting that it will or must accept that it 
won’t and that her dying is being prolonged by the partial effectiveness of medical care.  
The care is good enough to preserve life but not in the form or at the level of capacity that 
the patient hoped for.  The concern of technological brinkmanship may not be so much 
about legal rights to refuse treatment as it is about a patient’s sense of where she is in the 
dying process, her psychological outlook on it.   The challenge for patients whose care 
                                                 
136 Callahan, The Troubled Dream of Life, 41. 
 73
requires the use of medical technology is to discern the proper limits of such technology.  
Of course for some patients there will be no such limits, but many will want to stop using 
medical technology some time before all possible options have been exhausted and the 
patient has been caught up in the technology.   
 Some might seek to circumvent the challenges of technological brinkmanship by 
writing advanced directives, but this presents challenges of its own.  The act of trying to 
identify how far I will want to go in my use of technology presumes that my wishes and 
interests will remain stable.  Donna Dickenson argues that this presumption is dubious at 
best.137  In particular, she argues—and points to empirical evidence supporting the 
claim—that we cannot successfully know our wishes concerning the use of various 
technologies at the end of life in advance of actually living that stage of our lives.  But, of 
course, if we wait to make such decisions we run the original risk of going too far and 
winding up legally incompetent and technology-dependent.  Thus, technological 
brinkmanship and attempts to evade it with advanced directives present yet another 
challenge to the dying. 
Other Psychological Challenges 
 Elizabeth Kubler-Ross brought to popular consciousness the psychological 
challenges that surround dying.  She discusses denial, isolation, anger, desperation, and 
depression as typical psychological attitudes the dying face.138  Rosenfeld, et al, add 
                                                 
137 Donna Dickenson, Risk and Luck in Medical Ethics (Cambridge: Polity Press/Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers Inc., 2003), 97-100.   
138 Elizabeth Kubler-Ross, On Death and Dying (New York: Scribner Classics, 1969/ 1997), Chapters 3-6.  
She discusses these psychological attitudes within her well-known discussion of the five stages of dying: 
denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance. 
 74
hopelessness to the list of psychological challenges the dying may face.139  Each of these 
can be difficult to bear.  In some cases such psychological responses might represent a 
“normal” human reaction to mortality.  In other cases, such responses might result from 
the particular ideals we hold as a culture and as individuals.  When dying challenges 
ideals or ideas I consider to be central to who I am, it may be natural to respond with 
anger, denial, or depression.140   
Additionally, one might suffer, in Cassell’s sense, from the threat to one’s identity 
that can accompany such psychological responses.  A sense of isolation and depression 
might certainly cause one to fear the loss of her sense of identity.  How one responds to 
such suffering is not always obvious.  Anti-depression and anti-anxiety medications can 
effectively relieve clinical depression for many, but they sometimes leave one with a 
sense of confusion about one’s true self.141  How ought I respond to my mortality?  Is this 
response an expression of me or is it the drugs talking?  Would the value of retaining 
what I think of as my “true self” outweigh the challenge of dealing with sadness that may 
verge on clinical depression?  Such questions constitute an additional kind of challenge at 
the intersection of our psychology and our dying. 
 
 
                                                 
139 Barry Rosenfeld, Jennifer Abbey, and Hayley Pessin, “Depression and Hopelessness Near the End of 
Life: Assessment and Treatment,” in James L. Werth, Jr. and Dean Blevins, eds., Psychosocial Issues Near 
the End of Life: A Resource for Professional Care Providers (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological 
Association, 2006), 163-82. 
140 John Hardwig discusses personal ideals that can be threatened by having to face one’s mortality in 
“Philosophies That Won’t Take You All the Way to the End,” (unpublished manuscript). 
141 Carl Elliot discusses some of the issues at the intersection of identity and pharmaceutical technology in 
Better Than Well: American Medicine Meets the American Dream (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003).  This 
is consistent with Cassell’s claim that we can suffer from the treatment of our diseases as well as from the 
diseases themselves.  See The Nature of Suffering, 30. 
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Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have surveyed the variety of challenges that patients can face 
when dying in our contemporary medical context.  While not every patient will face all of 
them, I believe most patients will face at least some of these challenges.  A patient’s 
perception of a condition as a challenge might depend on his conception of a good death.  
How one conceives of a good death will obviously affect what look like obstacles to 
achieving that good death.  The kind of person a patient becomes in her pursuit of a good 
death will also affect her perceptions and experiences of the challenges of dying.  To 
embody certain virtues would be to dispose oneself not to notice or perceive as a 
challenge a condition that might greatly vex someone else with a different set of 
dispositions.  Virtues are one way of responding to the challenges of dying.  In the next 
chapter, I will discuss emotion-dispositions and virtues in order to show how they are the 
kind of feature of moral psychology that could enable a patient to respond to the 
challenges of dying.  In the chapter following the next, I apply those claims to an 
examination of specific virtues and sets of virtues that can enable a person to achieve a 














 This dissertation deals with virtues and their role in pursuing a good death.  
Having looked at different conceptions of a good death and at the challenges patients face 
when dying in our contemporary social and medical context, I will now begin to explain 
how virtues could help us to die well.  In this chapter, I look at some characteristics of 
virtues that I will draw on in the next two chapters when discussing how virtues can 
actually help a person to die well.  This chapter argues for some theoretical claims 
concerning virtues and the role that emotions play in them.   
In what follows, I stake out a position concerning virtues and, in particular, the 
roles that emotion-dispositions play in virtues.  Emotion-dispositions are dispositions to 
have certain emotions.  Those who embody virtues will also embody emotion-
dispositions that are a part of the virtue in question.  For example, to have the virtue of 
patience is to also have emotion-dispositions such that the agent experiences emotions 
consistent with the actions for which the virtue of patience calls.  I shall argue for two 
main theses concerning emotions as a part of virtues.  My first main thesis in this chapter 
is that these emotions constitute a leading benefit to the virtuous agent.  I offer some 
arguments to try to make this claim clear and compelling.   
My second main thesis in the chapter is that emotions facilitate practical wisdom 
and enable us to make practical judgments.  Emotions, as a kind of perception or 
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“appearing as” (this is Aristotle’s description142), have a number of roles in the moral life.  
One role of emotions is to enable the virtuous agent to appropriately perceive situations, 
relative to the agent’s other moral convictions.  Assuming they are proper to the virtue in 
question, emotions attune the agent to morally salient features of a set of circumstances.  
This attunement is relevant for making wise practical judgments about how to act or 
respond.  
Virtues and Vices 
 Much of what I will say concerning virtues and the relationship between emotions 
and virtues applies equally well to vices.  Both virtues and vices are character traits which 
are partially made up of dispositions to have certain emotions.  While the moral 
psychology I will describe applies equally well to most virtues and most vices, a typical 
expectation in moral philosophy is that we should be able to distinguish between them.  
In this section I will offer a formal distinction between virtues and vices that serves to 
define, formally at least, each of them.  Because it is only a formal definition of a virtue, 
this account will be unsatisfying in some ways.  It will not tell us which actual traits are 
virtues and which are vices.  In Chapter Six, I will briefly discuss the prospects of making 
more substantive distinctions between virtues and vices when considering engagement 
between moral traditions.   
                                                 
142 Aristotle, Rhetoric, in Jonathan Barnes, ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume II (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), 1382a21-3 (all references to Aristotle’s works will use the Bekker 
pagination which is common to most published editions of his writings). W.W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on 
Emotion (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1975) observes that Aristotle had already distinguished his 
own view from what would be that of William James who argued that emotions are bodily sensations (12).  
In contrast, Aristotle recognized a cognitive component of emotions (17).  Below I will discuss these 
matters in greater detail. 
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The formal definition is this: Virtues are those traits that are constituent in being, 
or aids to becoming, the sort of person that one believes will tend to live a good human 
life and/or admires for any of a variety of reasons.143  Vices, by contrast, are constituents 
in being, or aids to becoming, one of what may be a variety of kinds of people whom one 
believes cannot live well and/or one finds unadmirable.144  Vices may also be traits that 
hinder one from achieving the sort of character one believes will tend to enable one to 
live well and/or one finds admirable. 
  By way of comparison, I would like to briefly discuss some other conceptions of 
virtue and how they are similar to and different from my own.  My definition borrows 
from Aristotle, so I will begin by considering his view and then go on to consider some 
views held by contemporary philosophers who also borrow from Aristotle to one degree 
or another.  Aristotle says that, “every virtue causes its possessors to be in a good state 
and to perform their functions well.”145  I take this to contain some central claims for 
Aristotle about what a virtue is.  A more commonly cited definition of virtue for Aristotle 
may be found a few pages later where he says that a virtue “is a state that decides, 
                                                 
143 In Chapter Two I considered a variety of different conceptions of a good death.  My definition of a 
virtue suggests that there are a variety of different conceptions of the kind of person who would tend to live 
well and of good lives.  However, I will not give extended consideration to different conceptions of good 
persons and good lives because, a) there are many more of these than there are of good deaths and this 
would make consideration of them prohibitively complex, and b) my overall focus in this dissertation is on 
good deaths.  A consideration of good deaths is necessary to make my overall argument succeed in a way 
that a consideration of good persons and lives is not. 
144 For my definitions of both virtues and vices, I have used the phrase ‘one believes’ to signal my intention 
here to allow for consideration of a broad array of different conceptions of a well-lived life.  Of course, 
someone might be wrong in his belief about what constitutes a good person or a well-lived human life.  
However, consistent with the pluralizing theme I began in Chapter Two, I will not here attempt to argue for 
one, or even just a few conceptions, of a good person or a well-lived life.  Later in the chapter I will make 
arguments that implicitly rule out some ways of conceiving of the kind of person who could live well, but 
those arguments are in service of a different aim from that of making judgments about the value or 
goodness of different conceptions of persons or lives.  I recognize the value of this latter task.  However, 
for this dissertation I don’t take on that additional challenge. 
145 Arisotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2nd ed., Terence Irwin, trans. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1999), 1106a17-18. 
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consisting in a mean, the mean relative to us, which is defined by reference to reason, that 
is to say, to the reason by reference to which the prudent person would define it.”146  The 
“state that decides” and the suggestion that reason accords with how the “prudent person 
would define it” both seem to me to depend on the virtuous agent being “in a good state” 
and functioning properly.  The prudent person who decides well is the one who is in a 
good state, so I take a lot of the weight of Aristotle’s definition of virtue to fall on that 
concept.  That concept (being in a good state) can be interpreted in terms of two other 
concepts Aristotle employs.  The first is the notion of the fine or the noble (kalos), as in 
Aristotle’s claim that a brave person must be “moved by the fine, not by compulsion.”147  
The other concept is happiness or flourishing (eudaimonia), which Aristotle associates 
with living well.148  His conception of the fine seems to define, in part, the kind of person 
he believes could be happy.  My own definition of a virtue is broadly in line, I believe, 
with that of Aristotle, although I do not narrow my focus in this dissertation, as Aristotle 
perhaps does, to one particular understanding of a well-lived life.  I take the concepts of 
the fine and of happiness to be ingredient in most people’s conceptions of a well-lived 
life, although there will, as I acknowledge, be many different conceptions of them.149  
The concept of the fine may track more closely with my claim that virtues are 
constitutive elements in a person one finds admirable, and the concept of happiness may 
                                                 
146 Ibid, 1107a1-3. 
147 Ibid, 1116b3. 
148 Ibid, 1095a19-20. 
149 In saying that my account of virtue is eudaimonistic, like Aristotle’s, I should acknowledge that there 
are other accounts of virtue that are not eudaimonistic.  Virtues, I believe, have two kinds of functions in 
the moral life.  They can enable their possessor to live well, to flourish, and they can enable their 
possessors to live right.  In the latter instance, virtues would be dispositions to perform morally right 
actions, whose rightness might be based on something entirely different from living well.  For an example 
of the latter, see Michael Slote, Morals from Motives (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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track more closely with my claim that virtues enable one to become the kind of person 
that tends to live well.  However, as in Aristotle, I think these concepts often overlap in 
terms of their practical implications for adopting moral exemplars, about which I will 
have more to say later. 
Alasdair MacIntyre writes, in many ways, as a contemporary Aristotelian.  His 
definition of a virtue is as follows: “A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession 
and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to 
practices and the lack of which prevents us from achieving any such goods.”150  
MacIntyre’s definition occurs within the context of a discussion of a number of other 
concepts, namely practices and internal goods, which fill out his definition.  Without 
going into much detail about these interrelated concepts, we can say that MacIntyre is 
also engaged in a neo-Aristotelian project.  The practices he is most interested in are 
those he believes are related to a well-lived life.  For instance, he discusses friendship as 
a practice, which Aristotle also esteems highly in his conception of a good human life.151  
While MacIntyre draws on a variety of interrelated concepts to build up a definition of a 
virtue, he clearly means to use this definition in the service of conceiving of, and arguing 
for, an understanding of a well-lived human life.  My own definition does not make use 
of his sub-concepts but more generally asserts the place of virtues in living well by 
                                                 
150 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 191 
(italics in original). 
151 Ibid, 192-3.  For further confirmation that MacIntyre is interested in a neo-Aristotelian project, see his 
Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues (Chicago: Open Court Press, 1999) 
where he discusses the role of practical reasoning in achieving good lives.  There he says, “Human beings 
need to learn to understand themselves as practical reasoners about goods, about what on particular 
occasions it is best for them to do and about how it is best for them to live out their lives” (67). 
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making them constituents of the kind of person who tends to live well and/or is 
admirable. 
Rosaline Hursthouse is another neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicist.  She defines a 
virtue as “a character trait a human being needs for eudaimonia, to flourish or live well.”  
She breaks that definition down into three sub-theses about virtues: “The virtues benefit 
their possessor;” “The virtues make their possessor a good human being;” and “The 
above two features of the virtues are interrelated.”152  Hursthouse’s first sub-thesis 
suggests that she believes the virtuous can live well.  Her second sub-thesis suggests that 
in order to live well (because she claims the two sub-theses are interrelated) one must 
become a certain kind of person.  My own view parallels hers in that I separate becoming 
the kind of person one believes tends to live well and the well-lived life.  I discuss the 
connections and disconnections between these two concepts in a number of places below.  
A good human being may also be an admirable one, as in my definition above.  And, as I 
noted just above in my discussion of Aristotle, I, like Hursthouse, believe that being a 
good or admirable human being and flourishing are interrelated.  Hursthouse may think 
that interrelation always applies (since she offers no qualification on sub-thesis three), 
whereas I endorse the claim that sometimes the admirable moral exemplar does not 
flourish in the short-term, and may not flourish for indefinite periods of time. I revisit that 
theme below. 
Christine Swanton pluralizes many different aspects and aims of virtues.  She 
defines a virtue as follows: “A virtue is a good quality of character, more specifically a 
disposition to respond to, or acknowledge, items within its field or fields in an excellent 
                                                 
152 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 167. 
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or good enough way.”153  Swanton later qualifies this definition by arguing that virtues 
must respond in a plurality of ways to a variety of different kinds of object.154  Thus, 
what makes a character trait a virtue is not one thing (such as that it promotes flourishing) 
but a variety of different things.  When I claim that a virtue is a trait constituent in being 
the sort of person one believes will tend to live a good human life and/or one admires, I 
have sought to make room for Swanton’s claim.  Although I allow that there are many 
different conceptions of the kind of person who will tend to live well and/or be admired 
held by many different people, I assume that at least some, maybe many, of those 
conceptions will allow for the kind of pluralism for which Swanton argues.  Everyday 
people seeking to become good and live well are perhaps more inclined to recognize a 
plurality of values and kinds of recognition, as Swanton argues for, than theorists 
attempting to make tidy moral theories.  In saying that I adopt a conception of the kind of 
person I believe tends to live well and/or admire, I am saying that I adopt a conception of 
a person who has a variety of different aims the sum total of which add up to usually 
tending to live well.  But, as I discuss below, I may have moral aims that do not directly 
benefit me.  They are a part of my conception of the kind of person I aspire to be, and I 
aspire to be that kind of person simply because I find such a person admirable.155  On 
some occasions—maybe many occasions under certain circumstances—I acknowledge 
                                                 
153 Christine Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 19. 
154 A revised version of the definition that takes these arguments into account may be found on page 93 of 
Swanton’s book. 
155 Why I find such a person admirable takes us into the terrain of the ultimate origins of moral value in the 
universe.  Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski offers the following claim concerning this topic: “I think the 
metaphysical question of the origin of value ought to be given much more attention than it typically gets 
from moral philosophers” (Divine Motivation Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
386).  While I acknowledge the desirability of offering an account of what it is that makes the moral 
exemplars we emulate admirable, I will not be able to offer such an account in this dissertation. 
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that the variety of different moral convictions that are a part of my conception will not 
necessarily lead directly to flourishing.  I may still “live well” in some sense that depends 
on my convictions about the kind of person I should be, the kind of person I could not 
imagine not being.  But I do not flourish in a straightforward, everyday sense of the word.  
I take it that something like this conviction is shared by Swanton. 
My own definition requires further unpacking.  First, we should distinguish 
between the virtuous person and the well-lived life.  I claim that, generally, people adopt 
and pursue a conception of the kind of person they believe will tend to live well and/or 
admire.  So, part of the reason for adopting and pursuing a particular conception will be 
that one believes this enables her to live well, although later I will discuss some issues 
related to adopting a moral exemplar as someone one finds admirable.  Being virtuous is 
no guarantee of living well because, as Aristotle notes, the virtuous agent would also 
need some external goods.156  Aristotle, however, cautions against placing too much 
focus on one’s fortunes concerning external goods because, although human life “needs 
these added,” “activities in accord with virtue control happiness.”157  Some conceptions 
of a well-lived life might strictly equate being virtuous with living well, but I think most 
conceptions understand contingency to be a fact of life and so make the more modest 
claim that the virtuous tend to live well.  This raises the question of how to assess the 
condition—from a eudaimonistic perspective—of a virtuous agent who, on some 
conception, does not appear to be living well.  That is, he does not appear to be happy or 
flourishing.  I will address that question later in this chapter.   
                                                 
156 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1100a7-8. 
157 Ibid, 1100b9-11. 
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The contingent connection I have drawn between being virtuous and living well 
may suggest that there is a standard for living well that stands apart from, even above, the 
virtues.  It may seem that someone could live well without having any virtues.  Following 
Aristotle, I will reject this claim.  As the above quotation from Aristotle shows, he 
believes that happiness results from activity in accord with virtue, and I agree.  While the 
external goods might be necessary, for most, to live well, they alone would not be 
sufficient.158  We require virtues as well, and I have defined virtues as those character 
traits that enable us to become the kind of person we believe will tend to live well and/or 
admire.  In saying this, I am claiming that living well requires that the agent be personally 
engaged in pursuing goods rather than being the passive recipient of them.  Virtues are 
the names we may assign to the form one’s character takes on because the moral agent 
believes that someone with this form of character is the kind of person who can live well.  
My claim is that eudaimonism is, in large part, about what kind of person one is.  The 
virtues are descriptors of that kind of person.  Another way of saying this is that virtues 
are constituent elements in the agent’s becoming the sort of person she believes can live 
well.  The virtues are virtues, in part, because they make someone—or, define someone 
as—the sort of person who can live well.  The moral agent begins with a conception of a 
certain kind of person (who can live well and/or is admirable), and then asks what virtues 
define that person.  In conceiving of, or reflecting on, the kind of person who can live 
well, the moral agent may consider a variety of different aspects of this person’s 
character.  Highly respected people are usually respected for a variety of different 
                                                 
158 Later in the chapter I will discuss the possibility that, in some sense, external goods might not even be 
necessary.  But this will lead to a qualified understanding of living well or eudaimonia. 
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reasons.  What makes a moral exemplar attractive is her overall character as well as the 
implications this has for the kind of life she will tend to lead. 
In Chapter Five, I will discuss the necessity of personal engagement for dying 
well and offer some arguments for why this personal engagement is necessary.  As I have 
defined them, virtues are the shape one’s character takes when one pursues a well-lived 
life.  We cannot control much of what happens to us, but we can exercise some control 
over the kind of person we become.159  Virtues identify an individual’s aspirations 
concerning the kind of person she hopes to become in the course of living life.  Virtues 
are necessary in the sense that an individual’s character will take some shape that 
contributes to the overall quality of her life.  However, virtues are necessary but not 
sufficient.  The word ‘tend’ in my definition indicates my agreement with Aristotle that 
external goods are often ingredient in enabling a person to really live well.  Having 
virtues tends to enable someone to live well; lacking virtues tends to militate against 
being able to live well.  My use of the word ‘tends’ is meant to peel apart two concepts 
that might otherwise be run together.  On the one hand, there is the kind of person the 
agent aspires to be.  On the other hand, there is the life that this “kind of person” lives.  
The moral agent aspires to be a certain kind of person in part because of the kind of life 
she believes this person tends to live, but she can have other reasons as well.  These 
reasons would involve a moral agent’s finding an exemplar admirable.  Below I will 
discuss how one’s metaphysical convictions or one’s adoption of a moral exemplar could 
also inform one’s convictions about the kind of person one ought to be.  But at least part 
                                                 
159 On this, see Nancy Sherman, The Fabric of Character: Aristotle’s Theory of Virtue (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), particularly Chapter Five, “The Habituation of Character.” 
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of the attraction is that this is the kind of person one believes tends to live well.  The 
virtues are constituent elements in the “kind of person.”  I claim that becoming a certain 
kind of person—with the virtues constituent in being this kind of person—tends to enable 
one to live well. 
A wide variety of traits of character or personality might contribute to becoming 
the kind of person who can live well.160  However, I will focus on a few features that 
should strike most readers as the features most relevant to virtues as character traits.  
These are dispositions to act (including habits or regular practices), emotions (including 
dispositions to certain emotions and to the feelings that often—but not always—
accompany such emotions), patterns of perception (of situations, persons, events, 
narratives, etc.), and a capacity for moral imagination. 
The Distinction Between Virtues and Vices 
The formal distinction between virtues and vices assumes a number of claims that 
should be made clear.  First, eudaimonism in ethics is concerned with living well, or 
living a good human life.161  I have a particular concern here for someone’s becoming a 
particular kind of person—achieving a certain character—such that one will tend to live 
well.  The best we can hope for in pursuing eudaimonia is that we should become the 
kind of person we believe is capable of living well and that luck, or providence, should 
go our way as well.  But we cannot control the latter; we only have influence over the 
                                                 
160 I will not attempt to make a principled distinction between character and personality traits.  Generally, I 
think character traits are “deeper” than personality traits, which is to say they are a more significant part of 
one’s identity and perhaps contribute more significantly to one’s conception of the kind of person who can 
live well.  Peter Goldie defends this judgment about the “deeper” aspect of character traits in On 
Personality (New York: Routledge, 2004). 
161 I do not assume that all forms of virtues ethics are eudaimonistic.  Michael Slote and Christine Swanton, 
both cited above, offer virtue theories that are not.  Below I will discuss ways that my own theory is not 
entirely eudaimonistic. 
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former.  Bad luck may hinder one from achieving certain aspects of a well-lived human 
life.  Some have conceptions of a good life and an accompanying vision of good 
character that are more dependent on the hope (or optimism) that misfortune does not 
befall them.  In my chapter on good deaths, I discussed one conception—avoiding the 
experience of death—which depends heavily for its success on the outcome of events that 
are beyond any person’s control (such as dying suddenly in one’s sleep).  Other 
conceptions of a good life (and death) focus more on resilient character and, while they 
don’t wish for misfortune, individuals who accept those conceptions could handle it 
better and, perhaps, have sought to become the sort of person who could handle it 
relatively well.  The Stoics are a relatively extreme example in history of the latter.  To 
one degree or another, though, all must reckon with the fact that much of our lives is not 
in our control.  Our vision of what kind of person it would be good to become is often 
influenced by this fact. 
 A second claim to call attention to in my formal distinction concerns the place of 
virtues in the character of individuals hoping to live good human lives.  In some cases, 
virtues will be constituent parts of that vision of a certain sort of person.  For instance, 
many would probably agree that some version of patience (both with oneself and with 
others) constitutes part of the kind of person who can live well.  Embodying patience as a 
virtue entails a kind of graciousness and respect toward others who for a variety of 
reasons “impose” on us.  If part of a well-lived human life involves having this kind 
regard for others, then that value is captured in the moral agent’s becoming a certain sort 
of person—namely a patient one.  The character trait is a component of the kind of 
person he aspires to be.  In other cases character traits might only be aids to achieving 
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such character.  For instance, although some would see inquisitiveness as a character trait 
constituent of a good life, others might see it only as a means to some other end.  
Inquisitiveness might only be useful to some insofar as it leads them to pursue what are 
eventually settled convictions about certain important matters.  By contrast, others see 
inquiring about and rethinking important matters throughout their lives as an important 
component of a well-lived life.  On that account, inquisitiveness would be a constituent 
feature of this person’s conception of the kind of character necessary to live well. 
 I suspect that more often than not virtues are those traits that we think of as 
constituent elements of our conception of the kind of person we believe would tend to 
live a good human life and/or admire, rather than merely a means to becoming that sort of 
person or living that sort of life.  On some occasions it might be tempting to see virtues as 
merely useful, as good character traits for getting us other things that we want (such as a 
well-lived human life or a good death).  This suggests that virtues are merely means to 
what it is that we really value.  But this view of virtues is reductionistic.  Most of the 
time, what we think of as virtues are those traits that characterize the sort of person we 
believe tends to live (or die) well.  This places the focus first on the kind of person we 
seek to become, and second on the life that we live as a result of pursuing and becoming 
that sort of person.  We can have relatively greater control over our becoming a certain 
kind of person than we can over the kind of life we live as a result.   Although the kind of 
person we seek to become is informed by our beliefs about the life this kind of person 
tends to live.  To put this claim in terms of the concerns of this study, a good death is one 
in which we become a certain sort a person who we believe is capable of dealing with, 
and will in fact tend to deal with, death well.  If this is the case, virtues are not merely a 
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means to achieving something else, such as a “good death.”  Rather, a good death is one 
in which we embody the character we believe will tend to enable us to die well.  On my 
account the virtues are not only useful as a means to another end; they are part of the end.  
In some sense, the virtues characterize the end. 
 A third comment on my distinction between virtues and vices involves the idea of 
moral formation.  Nobody spends their whole life having already become the kind of 
person who can live well.  Indeed, most people for whom moral growth and development 
are important spend much of their lives in the process of undergoing such formation.  
People growing into physical and developmental maturity often begin to form, or 
unconsciously assume from influences around them, ideas about the kind of person it 
would be good for them to be.  They then spend much of their lives pursuing and refining 
that vision.  Those most attentive to the shape of such growth will take an interest in how 
various habits, practices, discrete actions, and other sorts of activities shape them as 
persons.  Certain habits, practices, etc., as well as encounters with new exemplars of the 
kind of life we think is worth pursuing will cause us to alter some aspects of our vision.  
MacIntyre uses the term ‘quest’ to describe a journey of moral formation in which what 
the seeker is after is not yet “adequately characterized.”162  However, I believe many 
people have a more concrete vision of the kind of person they would do well to become 
than MacIntyre suggests with his “provisional conclusion about the good life for man” 
which is that the good life is one “spent in seeking for the good life for man….”163  
MacIntyre’s “provisional conclusion” suggests that a good life is about always seeking 
                                                 
162 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 219.   
163 Ibid. 
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and refining one’s understanding of what it means to live well.  This presumes the seeker 
has some idea of what is worth further consideration and what is worth refining.  Thus, 
one’s conception of a well-lived life, however provisional, must include something more 
concrete than the formal claim that a good life is one spent looking for the good life.  
Perhaps one way to read MacIntyre on this point would have him saying that a well-lived 
life is one where the agent is consciously or unconsciously refining her vision.  The 
continual “seeking” MacIntyre describes may just be refinement or extension into new 
territory of some original conception. 
 Where do people get their original conceptions of the kind of person who will 
tend to live a good human life and/or be worthy of admiration?  The moral traditions that 
people grow up in and around can do a great deal to influence a person’s perception what 
this ideal type of person might look like.  The sense in which I discuss moral traditions 
here is that of local instantiations (and variations) of what are often—though not 
always—larger, historical traditions, which often inform people’s perception of and 
outlook on the world and inform people about what it would mean to live well in the 
world.  Religious traditions certainly inform many people’s conceptions of the kind of 
person who could live a good human life.  Small towns and close knit communities 
sometimes embrace “traditional” ways of living and in doing so give local instantiation to 
(at least parts of) some larger tradition.164  Political affiliations and activities, educators, 
and apprenticeships might also play a role in shaping a person’s vision of the kind of 
                                                 
164 A discussion and example of this can be found in the collective work of Wendell Berry.  Berry is an 
agrarian farmer-writer who is keenly aware of and a strong proponent for a particular body of “local 
wisdom.”  For a non-fiction discussion of this, see Wendell Berry, What Are People For? (New York: 
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1990); for a fictional account of similar themes, see Wendell Berry, Jayber 
Crow (Washington, D.C.: Counterpoint, 2000). 
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person they would do well to seek to become.  To a certain degree various habits or 
practices we are socialized into also shape us and set limits on our mental horizons 
concerning worthwhile lives.   
 Linda Zagzebski offers the notion of moral exemplars as a source of our ideas 
about what would be a good sort of person to become.  Her suggestion could apply to any 
of the above cited sources.  As she says, “[w]e do not have criteria for goodness in 
advance of identifying the exemplars of goodness.”165  She likens her argument for the 
primacy of moral exemplars for our understanding of moral goodness to Kripke’s and 
Putnam’s arguments for the theory of direct reference in order to fix the reference of our 
words.  For Kripke and Putnam, gold is whatever that is, even if we don’t yet know its 
essence.166  Her “direct reference” theory of goodness is especially on target concerning 
the formation of conceptions of a well-lived life and of the kind of people who could live 
them.  For our understanding of this kind of goodness, personal exemplars are especially 
relevant. 
 Moral Exemplars and Eudaimonia 
 Zagzebski’s work contains two ambiguities on which I would like to comment in 
order to clarify aspects of my own position.  She cites empirical evidence from 
psychologists concerning the degree to which humans learn through imitation.167  The 
psychologists are making descriptive claims about how much humans do in fact learn this 
                                                 
165 Linda Zagzebski, Divine Motivation Theory, 41. 
166 Ibid, 42. 
167 Zagzebski cites Andrew N. Meltzoff, “Elements of a Developmental Theory of Imitation” in A.N. 
Meltzoff and W. Prinz, eds., The Imitative Mind: Development, Evolution, and Brain Bases (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 19-41 and A. Bandura, Social Foundations of Thought and Action 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986) on pages 47-48.  Zagzebski notes that Bandura argues that 
attitudes and emotional reactions, in addition to overt actions, are among the things people imitate. 
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way.  Zagzebski seems to want to draw from this claims about how humans ought to 
learn their concepts of moral goodness.  Thus, there is an ambiguity between the 
descriptive and normative claims.  Zagzebski touches on this ambiguity when she claims 
that, since we all learn a great deal through imitation anyway, we might as well imitate 
the best exemplars we can find.168  This, after all, is what makes us think of them as 
exemplars in the first place.  Why would someone seek to imitate a person whom they 
don’t find to be attractive in some sense?  The descriptive and normative claims blend 
here.  We don’t just learn through imitation; we learn through imitation of those we take 
to be good exemplars.  Of course this raises the question of which exemplars we ought to 
follow.  Zagzebski is happy to acknowledge a kind of pluralism concerning moral 
exemplars.  However, she also believes that the best way to adjudicate disputes among 
moral traditions (though she does not use that term) represented by moral exemplars is 
for the exemplars themselves to engage in discussion.169  She likens moral exemplars to 
ideal agents (akin to ideal observers), and argues that, since each embodies a kind of 
practical wisdom relative to a particular tradition, these exemplars are best suited to 
engage in conversation aimed at resolving disagreements between traditions.170    
 Zagzebski’s work also implies a possible ambiguity concerning whether moral 
exemplars are appealing in a eudaimonistic sense—that is, the exemplars are attractive 
because they are living good all-around lives—or in a more restricted “moral” sense—in 
which the exemplars are attractive because they so successfully embody “moral” 
                                                 
168 Zagzebski, Divine Motivation Theory, 57. 
169 Lee Yearly offers an imaginary conversation along something like these lines in Mencius and Aquinas: 
Theories of Virtue and Conceptions of Courage (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1990). 
170 Zagzebski, Divine Motivation Theory, these themes are the subject matter of Chapter 9, “Ideal 
observers, ideal agents, and moral diversity,” pp. 347-387. 
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principles.171  Virtue-based approaches to ethics have often contained this ambiguity.  
Virtues can enable their possessors both to live “morally” and to live well.172  But there 
may be occasions where a tension arises between those two results.  On those occasions, 
the “function” of the virtue might become ambiguous.     
 I am imagining this latter ambiguity would occur to Kantians for whom the 
“counsels of prudence” and the “commands of morality” are sometimes different.173  I 
want to embrace this latter ambiguity by saying that for many a good life is, at least 
partly, a “moral” life.  In the words of Jeanine Grenberg, “[s]urely, whatever one’s 
account of happiness, it is reasonable to expect that achievement of virtue would be 
considered one important component of it.  Failure to achieve any level of moral 
competency would, in any event, be a genuine obstacle to happiness.”174  What makes 
moral exemplars eudaimonistically attractive is, at least in part, their commitment to 
“moral” ideals, in the form of virtues that constitute a portion of their character.  While 
                                                 
171 In this paragraph (and below) I will put the term ‘moral’ in quotation marks when my use of it is more 
akin to that of someone like Kant.  For Kant morality concerns objective, categorical duties we have to 
ourselves and others.  My own understanding of morality is more general and encompasses (more or less) 
everything that might be included within a discussion of what would enable humans to live well. 
172 These two aspects of virtues are taken up in Gregory W. Trianosky, “Rightly Ordered Appetites: How to 
Live Morally and Live Well,” American Philosophical Quarterly 25:1 (January, 1988): 1-12.  Trianosky 
argues that virtues can enable the virtuous to live morally and to live well.   
173  This distinction is discussed in Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.  See Immanuel 
Kant, Practical Philosophy, Mary J. Gregor, trans. and ed. and Allen Wood, intro. (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996).  There Kant distinguishes “rules of skill, or counsels of prudence, or commands 
(laws) of morality.  For, only law brings with it the concept of an unconditional and objective and hence 
universally valid necessity, and commands are laws that must be obeyed, that is, must be followed even 
against inclination.  Giving counsel does involve necessity, which, however, can hold only under a 
subjective and contingent condition, whether this or that man counts this or that in his happiness;…” 
(69/4:416). 
174 Jeanine Grenberg, Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption, and Virtue 
(New York: Cambridge UP, 2005), 22-23.  I agree with Grenberg in the quote cited but would like to note 
that part of what makes these matters complicated is the fact that different approaches to morality will have 
different understandings of the moral domain.  In other words, the difference between moral and “moral” 
virtues is not an uncontested one. 
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we might be dubious of the overall attractiveness of strict “moral” saints,175 moral 
exemplars can be attractive because they balance “moral” concerns with a broader 
concern to become the sort of person who can live a good overall life.  Nevertheless, this 
dissertation is more focused on achieving a good death than pursuing a “moral” death.  
While many conceptions of a good death will incorporate “moral” concerns, my focus is 
not primarily on the “moral” concerns.  Nevertheless, I am committed to the claim that 
the virtues, as constitutive elements of one’s becoming the sort of person who will tend to 
live and die well, are necessary (if not sufficient) to die well on most accounts of a good 
death.176 
 Thus, the two apparent ambiguities in Zagzebski’s work which are discussed here 
are related in the following way.  We tend to imitate people we admire or whose lives we 
find attractive.  But in many cases, part of the attractiveness of these exemplars is their 
“achievement of virtue” because a lack of “moral” competency would seem to hinder 
happiness.  The “moral” aspect of exemplars is part of what attracts us to them.  Why 
does the “moral” aspect of exemplars continue to be part of our attraction to them?  
Ultimately, this question leads us back to the metaphysical origins of value, about which 
there are many disputes.  This topic is beyond the focus of this study.  However, for my 
purposes here, it is enough to point out that a great many moral exemplars are admired in 
part because of our attraction to the specifically “moral” aspects of their character.  Not 
all exemplars are hailed for their “moral” character.  It may be that some would want to 
                                                 
175 For an argument about the unattractiveness of moral saints, see Susan Wolf, “Moral Saints,” in Roger 
Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., Virtue Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 79-98. 
176 See the section “Dying as a Practice” in Chapter Five for an attempt to argue that virtues are necessary 
for dying well.  There I will distinguish between dying well and having a good death, and I will offer 
arguments for why one ought to do more than hope to have a good death.  Also, note that virtues necessary 
to die well need not be strictly “moral” virtues. 
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pursue a vision of a good life (and death) that ignores, disregards, or discounts the 
concerns of others.  And for some conceptions of a good life, it may even be possible to 
discount altogether the shape of one’s character.  On such a conception, a good life 
consists of good external circumstances that I am lucky enough to fall in to.  But I believe 
most people believe that their identity, the kind of person they become, is a necessary 
part of their living a good life.  That’s to say that most people probably have some limit 
on what identity- or character-deforming activity they’d be willing to take up in order to 
secure good external circumstances.177 
 To throw one’s hat in with those in the history of philosophy who have endorsed a 
eudaimonistic ethic is to open oneself to an objection which has special relevance to this 
project.    The eudaimonistic approach may be helpful for answering questions such as 
“Why be moral?”  But it has some theoretical liabilities as well.  Kant is a useful dialogue 
partner here in identifying a significant liability.  Jerome Schneewind points out that, 
although he has sometimes been taken to do so, Kant does not ignore happiness or 
eudaimonia.  Although Kant believes that “moral worth is the supreme good,” he does 
not believe it is “the perfect or complete good.”  The latter “requires that happiness be 
distributed in accordance with virtue.”178  Of course experience tells us (and Kant) that in 
fact happiness is not distributed this way.  For Kant, this leads to an opposition between 
the “counsels of prudence”—what would lead to eudaimonia or happiness—and the 
“command of morality”—what I must categorically do, whether it would lead to my 
                                                 
177 For a discussion of issues related to integrity and good outcomes, see Bernard Williams, “A Critique of 
Utilitarianism,” in J. Smart and B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985). 
178 J. B. Schneewind, “Autonomy, obligation, and virtue: An overview of Kant’s moral philosophy,” in 
Paul Guyer, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Kant (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 309-
341, 333.  Schneedwind cites Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, 5:110-111 and 114-115 for these claims. 
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happiness or not.  When we are forced to choose, Kant believes we ought always follow 
the commands of morality.  They are categorical commands, and do not depend on our 
desiring to do so, or perceiving them to be in our interest.  Kant’s response to this issue 
can also be reconfigured as an objection he has to approaches to ethics which do not 
follow this route.  The general objection is this: assuming that one does not say that the 
“moral” thing to do is whatever is also prudent for my personal happiness, how does the 
eudaimonist deal with conflicts between “prudence” and “morality” (to borrow Kant’s 
terms)?  More particular to this project, can one’s commitment to embodying certain 
virtues ever lead to a more painful—an unhappier—death than one might otherwise 
experience?  For example, assisted suicide might address many (though not all) of the 
potential challenges to dying.  But if one’s commitment to one’s virtues leads one to 
resist this option, then is there a conflict between virtue and prudence (as Kant uses the 
latter term)?  How do we explain the possibility of conflict between virtue and prudence, 
and how can we explain why someone might choose to maintain virtue in such a 
circumstance if the original reason for seeking out such virtues was because they would 
help one to live well?  In this case, the implications of the same virtues means that one 
will live less well than one who has no such scruples.   
 This objection gives me an opportunity to distinguish between my own 
conception of the place of virtues in a well-lived life and other possible positions.  I have 
claimed that virtues are those traits constitutive in or necessary for becoming the kind of 
person who will tend to live well and/or is admirable.  Aristotle famously claims that a 
good life will require, in addition to virtue, an element of good luck, what he describes as 
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external goods beyond our control.179  But we cannot have any assurance that such luck 
will come to us.  Rather, all we can do is become the sort of person we believe tends to 
live well and/or find admirable, assuming some luck comes to us.  The point is that in 
emulating a moral exemplar I am endorsing a certain kind of person, a kind of person I 
think it is good to be.  This is different from merely seeking to live a happy life or 
seeking good life circumstances.  The connection between this kind of person and living 
well is that generally I believe such a person is best disposed to live well.  However, as I 
have discussed it above, my admiration for the moral exemplar goes beyond the kind of 
life they lead.  I admire and seek to emulate the person not just their life.  Having become 
such a person, I cannot change my character on a whim.  Personal change involves, for 
the “deepest” aspects of our character, a kind of conversion from being—and seeing the 
world—one way to being and seeing something very different.  Because people cannot 
simply change who they are and how they see the world to fit with what is advantageous 
at the time, there will sometimes be a sense of conflict between how someone’s virtues 
dispose him to see the world and what look, at least in the short-term, like prudent actions 
to the contrary. 
Still, unless we are Stoics for whom it is purportedly a matter of indifference how 
life circumstances play out, part of what attracts us to moral exemplars is the connection 
we believe exists between the kind of person one is and the kind of life this enables one 
to lead.  A Stoic might say that maintaining such character guarantees that one will live 
well by definition.  But I am not endorsing that claim.  My construal of the situation 
would be something like the following.  I am committed to achieving a certain sort of 
                                                 
179 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1099a31. 
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character, and I would like to have certain things go my way in life such that I can live 
out that character in relatively favorable conditions.  However, I understand that life will 
not always present such favorable conditions.  I may live in social or political conditions 
that are in tension with my own conception of a well-lived life, or I may just have bad 
luck and fail to secure the external goods Aristotle thinks we need to flourish.  Will I 
forego commitments entailed by my character in order to pursue or maintain maximally 
favorable conditions?  No; for the deepest held commitments, I cannot realistically 
conceive, in terms of my immediate psychology, of being other that the kind of person I 
am seeking to become.  Thus, I am prepared to endure less than favorable conditions—I 
am prepared to pursue virtue despite its “imprudence”—because I cannot imagine being 
other than that kind of person.180  This helps us to understand how a eudaimonist could 
make sacrifices for moral reasons, or even become a martyr.  This construal also helps us 
to understand how a eudaimonist could be prepared to undergo certain forms of suffering 
at the end of life. 
The above account requires two further things in order to be successful.  First, we 
need clarification of how the moral agent initially forms and then retains her convictions 
about the kind of person she believes she ought to be, even if the social conditions around 
her don’t support it.  She cannot have gotten these convictions by the more direct route of 
asking, “What kind of person is likely to flourish in this society?”  Second, we need 
clarification of the sense in which we are still talking about living well or flourishing if 
one’s convictions about character put one at odds, practically speaking, with the 
                                                 
180 Lisa Tessman also discusses the idea of there being “virtues that do not, at least in certain circumstances, 
contribute to their bearer’s well-being” in the context of political struggles against various forms of 
oppression.  See, Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 4. 
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dominant values in the surrounding society or one’s current circumstances.  Concerning 
the first question, I will appeal, again, to Zagzebski’s notion of a moral exemplar.  If a 
moral agent grows up with and forms her sense of the kind of person who can live well 
under the influence of one or more moral exemplars, she will have acquired a sense of the 
kind of person she ought to be regardless of how well rewarded such a person is in her 
society.  This is to say that the moral exemplar is admirable whether or not she is 
rewarded for it.  MacIntyre’s notion of the “quest” suggests that such a conception will be 
subject to critical reflection.  Presumably, some of the most stable and enduring 
conceptions of flourishing moral agents will be supported by metaphysical claims.  
Aristotle, for instance, defends his claims about the kind of person who can flourish with 
references to human nature.181  Likewise, Aquinas grounds his conception of the good 
person in God’s character, a position that Linda Zagzebski has recently defended.182  
Human nature and God’s character form metaphysical foundations for two different 
conceptions of the kind of person one ought to be in order to live well.  Social conditions 
or bad luck might not support such a conception, but the fact that it is a metaphysical 
conception—a purported truth about the nature of reality, regardless of whether that truth 
is widely acknowledged—means that moral agents might believe such a conception is the 
right one or the only true one to pursue even if it doesn’t lead to flourishing in the short-
                                                 
181 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1147a24, 1167b29, and 1170a13 
182 Aquinas’s view is indicated in passages such as Summa Contra Gentiles, Vernon J. Bourke, trans. 
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), III.1, cc. 18-22.  Zagzebski’s claim is defended 
in Part II of Divine Motivation Theory, pp. 185ff.  Both Aquinas and Zagzebski suggest an account of 
flourishing in which an agent’s ability to flourish depends on her becoming the kind of person who is 
capable of friendship with God.  On Aristotle’s account of character friendships, on which both Aquinas 
and Zagzebski draw, friendship requires some likeness of character (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 
VIII). 
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term or near future.183  If the agent believes the metaphysical claims that support the 
conception of the flourishing agent to be true, then she will believe that she could not, in 
good faith, seek to be otherwise.  As noted above, there are two sets of reasons to seek 
virtues.  One set of reasons concerns the conviction that the kind of person I seek to 
become tends to live well, but the other set of reasons concerns either a commitment to 
certain metaphysical claims or a strong commitment to emulate a valued moral exemplar.  
While the metaphysical account might provide the best explanation for why someone 
would retain a conception of the admired agent under adverse conditions, I think we 
should recognize that sometimes people maintain their loyalty to a conception even 
without strong metaphysical claims.  For instance, a son might be so shaped by his 
father’s example that he cannot seriously contemplate being otherwise, even if he realizes 
that his current social circumstances rarely reward such a person.184   
Whether through metaphysical or more mundane sources, the moral agent in 
question believes she ought not be other than the kind of person she is seeking to become.  
Yet her circumstances don’t reward her, so in what sense is she flourishing?185  The 
answer to this question will take us into the central theme of this chapter which is the 
place of emotions and emotion-dispositions in virtues.  I will offer an answer to this 
                                                 
183 To speak of social conditions supporting a conception of a good person or a good life is to speak of 
social conditions which reinforce one’s individual convictions.  That is, the convictions are widely shared 
and readily agreed to.  Under those conditions, there would be little cognitive dissonance concerning 
holding such convictions. 
184 When I say that he “cannot seriously contemplate being otherwise,” I mean to say that he doesn’t see 
acting “out of character” as a realistic option psychologically.  He cannot imagine being who he sees 
himself to be and doing something contrary to this self-image. 
185 Historically, one option at this point has been to claim that the virtuous don’t really flourish until the 
afterlife.  Augustine, Aquinas, and Kant have been among the more prominent philosophers to hold this 
view.  Recall from above that Kant believes that the perfect or complete good would require that happiness 
be distributed according to the merits of one’s virtue.  Kant believes this is not the case on earth but will be 
so in the afterlife.  See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral 
Philosophy, trans. Lewis White Beck (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), 214-20. 
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question that relies on a sketch of a theory of the nature of emotions that I will develop 
more fully below. 
A longstanding tradition in philosophy sees emotions as a kind of perception.  
Aristotle describes emotions as a kind of “appearing as” in his Rhetoric.186  As a kind of 
perception, emotions shape our ways of experiencing the world.  Someone with a strong 
disposition to anger has his experience of the world and life events shaped by that 
emotion.  If Freud is right about the possibility of suppressed emotion, this can be true 
even when the person in question doesn’t consciously feel her emotions.  Even in this 
circumstance, the emotion shapes our experience, this time doing so at a subconscious 
level.  Emotions also encapsulate certain of our moral values.  Robert Roberts opens his 
book on emotions with a lengthy quotation from Anthony Trollope’s novel The Prime 
Minister which describes an unsavory character.  Roberts then observes that “Trollope 
here unmistakably sketches a man of momentous moral defects, just by indicating his 
patterns of emotional responsiveness….”187  Our emotional responses indicate the things 
that we value: what makes us angry, what makes us joyful, what makes us sad, etc.  Thus, 
certain of our core convictions about how to value the world are carried in the forms of 
perceiving the world that we commonly call emotions.  Many of these emotions are a part 
of various virtues as well (and some virtues may just be dispositions to experience certain 
emotions appropriately).  For instance, many will agree that a man who does not become 
angry upon learning that his wife has been assaulted or that his child has been abused is 
morally defective.  Somehow, other things being equal, anger would be part of a morally 
                                                 
186 Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1382a21-3. 
187 Roberts, Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 1. 
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appropriate response to such news because we assume that the man values his wife and 
children in a way that colors his perception of what’s happened to them. 
Part of what a moral agent might learn from a moral exemplar is patterns of 
emotion.  Imitating the practices of the exemplar will very often lead to having the same 
patterns of emotional response.  Parents of young children will know that their offspring 
regularly imitate not just the actions of the parents (and other role models) but also the 
emotions.  Thus, the moral agent, who takes from the exemplar a conception of the kind 
of person who can live well and/or is admirable, will also likely take from the exemplar a 
pattern of emotion-dispositions which will reinforce, support, and in some ways 
encapsulate the values shared by agent and exemplar.  The values contained in the 
emotion-dispositions will shape how the moral agent perceives the world.  All of this 
suggests that a moral agent who embarks on a course of moral development toward 
acquiring a set of virtues she believes will enable her to live well will also have her way 
of perceiving the world and her place in it shaped by the emotion-dispositions that are a 
part of the virtues in question.   
This puts us in position to answer the question we started with: how can a moral 
agent flourish in adverse social conditions or with bad luck?  The moral agent’s character 
is shaped by her virtues and so her identity is also strongly interwoven with the values 
captured by her emotion-dispositions and virtues.  Such an agent could not, on pain of 
denying her identity, seriously imagine being other than the kind of person she is.  Her 
values, emotion-dispositions, and identity form an internally coherent whole, and one 
important ingredient in flourishing is the degree to which she can maintain the unity of 
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this whole.188  If this conception of the kind of person who tends to live well and/or is 
admired is supported by the metaphysical claims discussed above, then she still has 
reason to maintain this conception even in the face of adverse circumstances.189 
Consider two examples to illustrate this.  Once a year Sports Illustrated magazine 
devotes its regular feature “Faces in the Crowd” to “men and women who embody the 
ideals of sportsmanship.”  The following account was offered of Halsey Copp of Poland, 
Maine: “Halsey, a senior and member of the Poland Regional High golf team, assessed 
himself a one-stroke penalty when his ball rolled from its original spot as he was 
preparing to putt during the state championship—even though the roll was unnoticed by 
competitors and officials.  His team lost the Class B state title by one stroke.”190  Copp 
does not flourish in the sense that he wins a state golf title.  He achieves no recognition 
for his sports abilities per se.  However, is there another sense in which he does flourish?  
Without knowing anything further about Copp or his decision to assess himself the title-
losing stroke (perhaps he agonized over the decision or only assessed himself the stroke 
because he thought he would be caught if he hadn’t), we can imagine a version of Halsey 
Copp who cannot imagine not maintaining his integrity in these circumstances, who 
                                                 
188 This statement requires some qualification.  One cannot flourish if one’s conception of a good person is 
called into question by any circumstance which may undermine one’s ability to live well.  However, this is 
not to say that flourishing moral agents, as I’ve conceived them, could never reexamine their views.  When 
reexamination is called for would be a judgment the agent has to make, and these are tough judgments to 
make precisely because we make judgments partially on the basis of emotion-based perceptions which are a 
part of our identity. 
189 In addition to the metaphysical claims supporting one’s conviction that she ought to seek to become a 
certain sort of person, there is another consideration.  Empirically, it is simply a matter of fact that people 
can’t just change large portions of their character quickly.  Thus, if I form my character and then find 
myself in circumstances where I won’t tend to flourish, I don’t really have open to me the possibility of 
simply seeking to become a different sort of person in the moment.  But this will, of course, depend on the 
original strength of my character.  Weak character is that which does change in adversity.  As I say in the 
previous footnote, an agent must make a judgment about when she seek to strengthen her character and 
when she should consider revising it altogether, even if this will take time. 
190 Sports Illustrated, 103:21 (November 28, 2005): 33. 
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could not celebrate a victory he didn’t earn with integrity, etc.  In this sense, the imagined 
Copp flourishes in that he maintains the coherent whole discussed above.  His actions are 
consistent with his values, emotion-dispositions, and identity.  He may agonize over 
having lost the title, but his emotions are such that he can be happy with himself for his 
decision and his integrity. 
 A second example comes from the movie Black Hawk Down, which is based on 
true events.  During a 1993 raid gone bad, a US military helicopter is shot down in hostile 
Mogadishu, Somalia.  Some soldiers in another helicopter notice some of the crew are 
still alive as a crowd of Somalis are moving in.  They request—two different times in the 
movie—permission to be dropped off to defend the crew of the downed helicopter.  The 
commanders refuse at first and tell them that they don’t have the resources to support 
such a maneuver, meaning it would be a nearly “suicidal” mission.  The two soldiers, 
mindful of the Army creed about not leaving a fallen brother behind, again insist on being 
put in to do what they can.  They are granted permission and both die fighting off 
Somalis, although their actions saved the life of the one crew member who had survived 
the crash.  My interpretation of their actions is that they could not imagine not doing what 
they could to rescue fallen comrades, even at the expense of their own lives.191  Their 
emotion-dispositions led them to perceive the situation in such a way as to make it 
                                                 
191 I have used the language “could not imagine not doing…” in describing both Copp’s and the soldiers’ 
situation.  Obviously, this is not literally true.  No doubt each of them is cognitively capable of imagining a 
world in which he did otherwise.  The sense in which I use the phrase appeals to the sense of identity held 
by each of the actors in these examples.  I have hypothesized that each held so strong a sense of the kind of 
person he is or was that doing other than what they did was not an option in these circumstances.  The 
demands of their character were such that other options were excluded for this kind of person in this kind of 
situation.  It would be too identity-damaging to do otherwise. 
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exceedingly difficult for them to remain in their relatively safe position while their 
vulnerable comrades’ lives were threatened. 
 These two examples suggest a kind of “internal” or intra-personal flourishing that 
can occur despite unfavorable external circumstances.  Copp and the two soldiers flourish 
in that they continue to maintain their identity and character despite adverse conditions.  
They flourish in the sense that they act in accord with their conception of a good, or 
admired, person.  If they have good reasons (metaphysical or mundane) for believing that 
the kind of person they have sought to become is a good kind of person to be, then they 
can flourish in the sense that they successfully embody the desired character under 
adverse conditions.  Each of them might wish, other things being equal, to be able to 
manifest the same character and identity in other circumstances where they might also 
flourish in an external or circumstantial sense.  But having found himself in this set of 
circumstances each seems to realize that doing other than what his character and identity 
demand of him would lead to a loss far worse than what the circumstances present.192 
Emotions and Virtues 
 The account I have just offered concerning “internal” flourishing can be explained 
in terms of emotions.  Copp and the soldiers may struggle in some sense with what their 
moral values call upon them to do, but they do not suffer from a certain kind of emotional 
dissonance.  Their convictions about the kind of people they ought to be such that they 
                                                 
192 The case of the soldiers, in particular, indicates how we might understand the case of the martyr.  The 
martyr does not seek death, but she believes that when she is forced to choose between her life and core, 
identity-forming convictions (many of which may find their expression in her character), she ought always 
to choose to remain faithful to the latter.  Preserving her life at the cost of faithfulness to those convictions 
would be so damaging to her identity that she will not accept that “deal.”  Martyrs flourish (and are often 
venerated) in that they remain faithful to their convictions and their identity even in the face of highly 
adverse circumstances.  I believe something similar is true of Copp and the soldiers. 
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can live well shape and are at least partially contained in their way of perceiving the 
world.  I have argued that these perceptions are related to emotions and emotion-
dispositions.  In what follows, I discuss and partially defend an account of emotions and 
then apply that account to support two claims about the place of emotions in virtues.  My 
two claims are these: well-formed emotions constitute a leading benefit, for the moral 
agent, of having virtues, and emotions facilitate and are an important component in the 
making of wise practical judgments. 
 Emotions 
 What are emotions?  A long tradition in philosophy has viewed emotions as forms 
of perception.  Aristotle described fear, a typical emotion, as “a certain sort of pain and 
disturbance out of the appearance of an impending bad thing.”193  The perception of some 
object as dangerous or “bad” is the emotion of fear.  Emotions have intentional objects; 
there is something the emotion is about, something that prompts the emotion.  Often, but 
not always, we feel our emotions.  We can feel them in our minds—in the form of 
psychic pain or pleasure—and we can feel them in our bodies, as when, for example, fear 
causes the heart to race, the palms to sweat, the stomach to tighten, etc.  William James 
tried to argue that the object of an emotion (what we perceive) is the changes we typically 
experience in our bodies.194  But many recent emotion theorists have disagreed with 
James by noting the strong cognitive component of emotions.195  In a section titled, “Why 
                                                 
193 Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1382a21-3. 
194 William James, “What is an Emotion?,” Mind 9 (1884): 188-205. 
195 A sample of recent literature might include Robert C. Roberts, Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral 
Psychology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press, 1987), and many others.  As noted above, W.W. Fortenbaugh argues that Aristotle 
maintain such a position as well (see Aristotle on Emotion, 12-18). 
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Emotions are Not Bodily States,” Robert Roberts identifies a number of the reasons many 
contemporary theorists have rejected James’s claim: bodily states are not about anything 
the way that emotions are, bodily states do not always have the kind significance for 
human lives that emotions do, and distinctions among bodily states are nowhere near as 
discriminating as our ordinary language is about the differences between emotions such 
as envy versus anger, or resentment versus pride.196  While bodily states are certainly 
associated with and connected to emotions in important ways, the recent focus on the 
cognitive aspects of emotion has attempted to relocate the central focus of emotion 
theories. 
 Cognitive approaches to emotion theory might go too far, however.  Robert 
Solomon and Martha Nussbaum have both argued that emotions either are or are partially 
made up of judgments.197  Robert Roberts argues against this view.  He offers an account 
of what judgments are and then discusses some claims that contradict the view that 
emotions are or are partially judgments.  For instance, “the propositional content of some 
full-fledged emotions is not assented to by the subject of the emotion” as would be the 
case with a judgment, “the very same judgment that is supposedly identical with an 
emotion is sometimes made in the absence of the emotion,” and “emotions are subject to 
voluntary control in a way that they would not be were they judgments.”198  These 
arguments presume a conception of what judgments are, which Roberts argues for and 
                                                 
196 Roberts, Emotions, 152-54. 
197 Robert C. Solomon, “On Emotions as Judgments,” American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (1988): 183-
191 and The Passions (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1977) and Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of 
Thought and The Therapy of Desire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
198 Roberts, Emotions, 84.  The arguments are fleshed out on pp. 89-103. 
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uses to defend the claim that emotions as a kind of perception are not necessarily 
judgments.199 
 What then does it mean to say that emotions are a kind of perception?  According 
to Ronald de Sousa, “Emotions are a species of determinate patterns of salience among 
objects of attention, lines of inquiry, and inferential strategies.”200  Emotions are a way of 
perceiving a situation or a set of circumstances and making meaningful sense of it.  In a 
similar vein, Roberts defines emotions as “concern-based construals.”201  Roberts defines 
construing as attending to or dwelling on some aspect of a situation.202  It is to see one 
thing in terms of another.203  In organizing such things as perceptions and inferences so 
that they are meaningful, emotions do not simply project an interpretation onto a canvas 
that is open for whatever we care to project onto it.  To see one thing in terms of another 
is not simply to lay our projected meaning onto an otherwise random field of information 
or impressions.  Rather, a construal is, as Roberts points out, a characterization of the 
object of our attention.204 
 Connecting Emotions to Virtues 
 At this point, I would like to draw a connection between emotions and virtues and 
then, by way of a comparison, identify some ways that the virtuous benefit from the 
emotion-dispositions that are a part of their virtues. 
                                                 
199 Ibid, 84-7. 
200Ronald de Sousa, Rationality of Emotion, 196. 
201Robert C. Roberts, Emotions, 64.  Roberts initially presented his thesis about emotions in two earlier 
articles, “What an Emotion Is: A Sketch,” The Philosophical Review 97:2 (1988), 183-209 and 
“Propositions and Animal Emotion,” Philosophy 71 (1996), 147-56. 
202 Roberts, “What an Emotion Is,” 187.  Roberts also speaks of bringing a paradigm to bear upon a 
situation.  Note that de Sousa invokes Kuhn’s discussion of paradigms as well (198). 
203 Roberts, “What an Emotion Is,” 190.  Note that de Sousa uses the nearly identical phrase, “in terms of” 
(196). 
204 Roberts, “What an Emotion Is,” 192. 
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 For the fully virtuous, according to Aristotle, virtues involve both actions and 
emotions.205  Further, Aristotle notes that the feelings that are a part of virtues should 
conform to certain standards.  “But having these feelings at the right times, about the 
right things, toward the right people, for the right end, and in the right way, is the 
intermediate and best condition, and this is proper to virtue.”206  The virtuous will be 
disposed not just to act but also to feel in certain ways, appropriate to the virtue in 
question.  Thus, they will have emotion-dispositions which are appropriate to the virtue 
in question. 
 But Aristotle also discusses some other conditions of character.  Three, he says, 
should be avoided: vice, incontinence, and bestiality.  The contraries to these are virtue, 
continence, and what he describes as a heroic, divine sort of virtue.207  I want to focus on 
the contrast between virtue and continence, both of which, Aristotle thinks, are worthy of 
some praise.  In particular, I want to argue that a way to conceive of the difference 
between the continent and the virtuous is that the latter have well-formed emotion-
dispositions which the former lack.208  When I speak of the virtuous having well-formed 
emotion-dispositions, I mean that they have an internally consistent set of dispositions 
that cohere with their judgments.  The continent have emotions, but these are not 
necessarily consistent with one another and do not cohere with their judgments about or 
knowledge of what they ought to do.  In focusing on two morally praiseworthy states I 
                                                 
205 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1106b25. 
206 Ibid, 1106b21-24. 
207 Ibid, 1145a15-21. 
208 This discussion is not strictly aimed at interpreting Aristotle.  Aristotelian moral psychology contains 
many complicated parts most of which I will not incorporate into my discussion.  Rather, my aim is to 
depict a distinction between virtue and continence that depends on the difference in their emotion-
dispositions. 
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am setting aside the possibility of being immoral or amoral for now.  Below, when I talk 
about how the virtuous benefit from their emotions, it will be in contrast to the condition 
of continence.  A separate argument altogether may be necessary to show why the 
virtuous live well as compared to the vicious.  In this dissertation I am not making that 
type of argument since, for now, I am willing to consider a plurality of different 
conceptions of a good life and a good death. 
The continent perform the right action, but do so from a state different than that of 
the virtuous.  “The continent person seems to be the same as one who abides by his 
rational calculation….”  He “knows that his appetites are base, but because of reason 
does not follow them.”209  One way to articulate the difference between the continent and 
the virtuous is in terms of emotions.  As noted above, being virtuous, for Aristotle, 
includes have the right sorts of feelings felt in the right sorts of ways.  The virtuous have 
feelings that are consistent with their actions and judgments about what to do.  When he 
discusses the continent, Aristotle focuses on the continent person’s ability to rationally 
calculate and know the right thing to do even though his “appetites” and the emotion-
perceptions on which they are based don’t support that conviction.  So, while continence 
is worthy of some praise, it is clearly a stage of moral development below that of full 
virtue.   
What marks the difference?  Aristotle’s account suggests the difference lies in the 
emotions and the emotion-dispositions.  Even if it is not fully faithful to all the different 
aspects of Aristotle’s moral psychology, we can imagine a way of distinguishing two 
stages of moral development (continence and virtue) in which the central difference lies 
                                                 
209 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1145b11-14. 
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in the area of emotions.  Given the account of emotions that I have laid out above, we can 
envision a virtuous person whose emotion-dispositions lead her to perceive or construe a 
situation in which virtue is called for in very particular ways.  The concerns incorporated 
into her construal of the situation will shape how she perceives the situation and her place 
in it.  This will result in a kind of coherence between the virtuous agent’s actions and 
emotions.  To have a virtue, on this account, is to perceive a situation in a particular way 
and to act in a way that is consistent with one’s perception.  However the continent, who 
may know the right action to perform, lack such perceptions of the situations.210  This 
would be one way to account, in part, for the “appetites,” or contrary desires, that 
Aristotle says the continent must not follow.211  They know the action is correct, but they 
don’t have the perceptions (shaped by the right concerns) to “see” the situation as the 
virtuous do.  To put this in terms of Roberts’s account of emotions, the continent lack the 
concerns which shape construals, or, if they have those concerns they only have them at a 
distance.  We might say they know of the concern but don’t actually fully own or 
embrace it.  So, they must exercise a measure of willpower in order to act in a way 
contrary to their perception of the situation. 
 
 
                                                 
210 I take it that the continent know what they ought to do on the basis of some other authority.  Perhaps a 
morally virtuous agent has instructed them to perform certain actions or perhaps they are able to recognize 
this as one common instance in which a rule applies. 
211 In Aristotelian moral psychology, an appetite is a “nonrational desire for an object believed to be 
pleasant” (from Terence Irwin’s glossary, which accompanies Nicomachean Ethics, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis, 
IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999), 323).  Presumably many different things could cause an object to 
be believed pleasant.  Among those would be emotions which, on the account given here, cause their 
possessor to perceive objects under the light of certain concerns.  Thus, the continent, who lack virtuous 
emotion-dispositions, would be disposed to perceive objects of desire in the wrong kinds of ways or to the 
wrong degrees, etc. 
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Virtues, Emotions, and Benefits 
This account can be used to highlight some ways that the virtuous benefit from 
their emotion-dispositions.  To discuss some of those benefits, I will use the following 
story.  Imagine two characters, Alan and Beth, who, at different times, find themselves 
behind an elderly person in the checkout line at the grocery store.  The elderly person is 
moving very slowly and shows no particular concern about wrapping up his interchange 
with the checkout attendant in a hurry.  Imagine, too, that this is taking place in the early 
evening just before Alan and Beth are, individually, due to go home to prepare supper for 
guests.  Alan is continent while Beth is virtuous.  Both of them know that the situation 
calls for them to act patiently.  Alan self-consciously avoids tapping his fingers 
impatiently and letting out exasperated sighs although he feels like doing so.  He 
perceives the situation impatiently, but he acts patiently.  He knows that the elderly 
deserve respect and that one way to show such respect is by not becoming, or at least not 
acting, impatient.  He knows this, of course, not on the basis of his emotions which cause 
him to perceive the situation as Beth does.  Rather, he knows this because he has been 
told, and believes, that he ought to act patiently towards the elderly.  He hopes, over time, 
to become the sort of person who sees the elderly shopper with patience, but for now he 
doesn’t.  So, he does the next best thing and acts patiently. 
Beth, by contrast, really is virtuous.  She knows that the situation she faces calls 
for the virtue of patience and her patient actions flow from the emotions that are also a 
part of this virtue.  She has taken up and internalized the concerns central to the value of 
patience as a virtue and these concerns inform and shape the way that she perceives the 
elderly shopper.  Her actions follow accordingly.  In some sense, there is a difference 
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between Alan’s and Beth’s actions.  Beth’s actions are characterized, in part, by the 
emotional state from which they arise, whereas Alan’s actions are in tension with his 
emotions.  Thus, Beth’s are patient actions, while Alan is acting patiently.  But for our 
purposes here, imagine that to all appearances the outward act or set of acts is the same 
for both of them.  The difference lies in their emotions and emotion-dispositions. 
“Borrowed” Motivation 
How does Beth benefit from her emotions?  Because Beth is disposed to have 
emotions consistent with the overall value of patience, she can more or less directly 
perceive the goodness of the patient actions called for.  Her perception, in terms of 
emotions consistent with patience, motivates her to patient action.  Zagzebski, who 
articulates an account of emotion similar to, though not exactly like, the one I have 
discussed above, says that “[a]n emotion is motivating because of the combination of its 
affective component and its intentionality.”212  She notes that both Hume and Aristotle 
believed that the affective component is necessary to motivate action.213  Roberts also 
agrees that emotions are motivating.  An emotion, he says, “serves as a sort of lens in 
which general concerns are focused into more specific desires, and as a sort of rational 
stimulus by which disposition concerns become occurrent desires….”214  The “affective 
component” is bound up with the perception, which is shaped by concerns the moral 
                                                 
212 Zagzebski, Divine Motivation Theory, 71.  She also notes there that emotions need not necessarily be 
motivating. 
213 Ibid.  Hume is often associated with this position.  But Zagzebski quotes Aristotle in De Anima to 
similar effect: “That which moves therefore is a single faculty and the faculty of appetite,” and “Mind is 
never found producing movement without appetite” (433a21-24). 
214 Roberts, Emotions, 162. 
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agent has.215  In light of this, we can say that Beth derives at least a significant part of her 
motivation to act as she does from the emotions which are a part of her virtues. 
Alan, by contrast, must “borrow” his motivation.  He knows what he ought to do, 
but he does not feel it the way that Beth does.  Or, perhaps it would be more accurate to 
say that Alan may be feeling any of a number of different conflicting emotions.  In any 
case, what he lacks is a unified set of emotion-dispositions related to the virtue of 
patience.  Lacking this “affective component,” he has to muster other sources to replace 
this as his source of motivation.  He might be motivated to perform good acts in hopes 
that habitual good acts will shape his emotion-dispositions.216  But then he is borrowing 
from his general desire to grow morally in order to be motivated to act well on this 
occasion.  And while he is still undergoing this moral development, his motivation to 
perform this act does not stem from the emotions associated with the virtue in question.  
Thus, this action is somewhat artificial compared to Beth’s.  Alan may simply exercise 
willpower.  In doing so, he is doing what a more virtuous agent like Beth perceives to be 
the right act to perform.  In any case, he lacks the emotional formation that would enable 
him to perceive (and to feel) that this action is a good one to perform.  So, he “borrows” 
his motivation from those who do. 
                                                 
215 Roberts distinguishes between emotions and feelings, calling the latter construals of our emotions (Ibid, 
319-20).  Thus, to feel an emotion is to perceive that you are perceiving or construing a situation in light of 
certain concerns.  It is probably the normal case to feel our emotions.  Thus, when we have emotions, they 
will often provide the “affective component” Zagzebski and many in the history of philosophy have 
thought necessary to motivate. 
216 Aristotle claims that this is how good character is acquired (Nicomachean Ethics, 1103a16-17).  Nancey 
Murphy notes that, “[v]irtues are acquired by practice; practice makes stable changes in the strength of 
relevant neural pathways.  Antonio Damasio argues that intelligent action of all sorts is dependent on 
‘somatic markers’ that reflect one’s acquired affective relation to the proposed course of action.”  See 
Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006),138-9.  She cites 
Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: G.P. Putnam’ 
Sons, 1994). 
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But Beth is clearly in a better position compared to Alan here.  She faces no 
internal dissonance between what she knows she ought to do and how she perceives, or 
feels about, the situation.  She has no intra-personal conflict here, as Alan does.  Her 
motivation is her own in the sense that she perceives and feels the goodness of what she 
also knows she ought to do.  So, she benefits from the emotion-dispositions that are a 
component of her virtues. 
It may be that someone could have a mix of good and bad emotions and 
accompanying motivations.  Such a person would not necessarily need to borrow 
motivation from someone else.  He would have the motivation along with contrary 
motivations.  How does Beth stand in comparison to this person?  I tend to think that 
Beth is still better off because she is unified in a way that allows her to avoid emotional 
dissonance, or conflict between her emotions (which do the motivating).  Certainly she is 
better off if she desires to be so unified and avoid the conflicting motivations found in 
this other person.  The other person whom I have imagined will, at least, need some 
strategy and skills of will power for managing these conflicting motivations.217 
Unity of Self and Character 
 The above argument suggests that, in addition to Beth’s benefiting from the fact 
that she “owns” her motivation as opposed to having to borrow it from elsewhere, Beth 
also benefits from a kind of intra-personal unity.  She benefits from being a unified self, 
and she faces little or no disharmony or conflict within herself.  But before exploring this 
benefit, I would like to offer a few qualifiers.  First, we do well to recognize that unity of 
self should be measured on a relative standard, not an absolute one.  Complete unity is 
                                                 
217 Thanks to Betsy Postow for suggesting this alternative to consider. 
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hard to come by.  We might think that in a world fraught with many seemingly 
competing and incompatible goods that complete unity of character would be undesirable 
or artificial.  Second, this standard does not necessarily distinguish between the virtuous 
and the vicious.  Some vicious agents may be as unified as the virtuous are.  As noted 
above, my attempts to articulate the benefits that the virtuous derive from their emotion-
dispositions are in the context of a comparison between the virtuous and the continent.  
Thus, I am not, by appealing to this standard, attempting to distinguish the virtuous from 
the vicious.  I am only trying to show that the virtuous benefit from their emotion-
dispositions in a way that is not open to the continent who lack the proper emotion-
dispositions.   
 The ancient philosophers thought of unity of character as a key ethical standard.  
If one’s foundational moral beliefs are incoherent or inconsistent, this introduces division 
within the self which leads to a loss of singular identity (assuming that one’s value 
commitments are part of the constitution of the self).218  While the ancients offered some 
complex metaphysical arguments for the unity of goodness, I will not explore those here.  
I am inclined to think that if this benefit has traction today, it will be because of how the 
benefit plays out in the virtuous agent’s life.  Commenting on ancient ethical theories, 
Julia Annas observes that, “[t]here is also a push towards unification that comes when the 
agent articulates why he is virtuous.”219  Achieving a relative unity of character and 
identity is one reason why one might pursue virtue, and it also constitutes a benefit to the 
virtuous agent. 
                                                 
218 See John Rist, Real Ethics: Rethinking the Foundations of Morality (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 65.  Rist’s discussion of this point may be found on pp. 65-72. 
219 Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 75. 
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 Gregory Trianosky describes something like unity of self this way: “To have well-
ordered affections, a mind ‘well-compos’d and easy within itself,’ is just to find upon 
reflection that one has positive higher-order feelings towards one’s own emotions.”  By 
contrast, he describes a lack of such unity as follows:  
To have first-order emotions that consistently and substantially 
conflict with one’s higher-order feelings is to lead a seriously 
divided affective life.  A life in which one’s feelings about the 
world and about others are a constant source of anxiety, anger, and 
resentment against oneself is to that extent not a life we prize and 
encourage from a removed or general point of view….220 
 
Trianosky appeals to a set of “higher order feelings” as a perspective from which to 
evaluate our first-order emotions.  We might think of these as second-order perceptions 
of our perceptions.   He describes unity of self or character in terms of a coherence 
between our basic (or “first-order) emotions and the “higher order feelings” that perceive 
those basic emotions.  The unified self perceives the various objects of emotion in the 
self’s affective, perceptual world in a coherent fashion.  The concerns taken up in one 
kind of emotion-disposition cohere with concerns taken up by other emotion-dispositions, 
as well as with other beliefs, attitudes, commitments, and convictions (other aspects of 
character or personality).  And, when one reflects on (or perceives) her concerns and 
emotion-dispositions, she can construe them in a “positive” light because they have the 
kind of coherence among themselves I’ve just described. 
 All of this has a positive ring to it.  It seems right to say that a person who 
embodied this kind of internal coherence would flourish relative to those who lack it or 
have less of it.  And Trianosky has described this unity of self in terms of emotions and 
                                                 
220 Gregory W. Trianosky, “Virtue, Action, and the Good Life: Toward a Theory of the Virtues,” Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly 68 (1987): 124-47, 136-7. 
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feelings.  Can we draw a closer connection between the idea of unity of self or character 
and the emotions that make up at least part of a person’s character?  The idea is that if 
Trianosky is right to talk about unity of self in terms of internally coherent emotions and 
perceptions of those first-order emotions, then at least some of the benefit we gain from 
being unified selves arises from having internally coherent emotions.  In other words, 
how closely connected are the concepts of a self and emotion?   
Roberts offers the following attempt to draw a close connection between the two.  
He begins by pointing out that “[a] self is a construct of agential powers, mental and 
physical dispositions and attributes, relationships (personal and nonpersonal), and past 
actions and relevant events.”221  In addition to being centered in a particular body and 
mind, the self “has relational and narrative properties”.222  A good biography of a self 
will tell some external facts about the person in question (where she was born, what she 
looks like, who she’s related to, etc.), but it will also probe deeper for the cares, concerns, 
convictions, etc. that make the person who she is.  Close to the center of the self, claims 
Roberts, is “a set of organizing cares—attachments to persons, interests in projects, the 
concern to survive, the concern to be well thought of….”223 These concerns are, of 
course, very often captured in emotions.  If I have concerns regarding my children, often 
that concern manifests itself in my having certain emotions towards my children.  Roberts 
says, “Being concern-based construals, a person’s anger, hope, gratitude, or 
embarrassment gather together, focus, and actualize some concerns (which may be 
central to the personality) in terms of some concepts and models for viewing the world 
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(which are often of ethical relevance).  The subject’s emotions embody her projects, 
attachments, and commitments….”224   
Of course, someone might object that certain beliefs and convictions could also be 
at the core of one’s self, and those need not be emotions.  By way of response, we might 
question the degree to which such a belief or conviction is really at the core of one’s self.  
We talk about a person who really feels the weight of his convictions, and in doing so we 
imply that deeply held convictions will be felt.  They will form our way of perceiving or 
construing the world.  But concerns taken up consistently in that sort of way become 
emotion-dispositions insofar as they lead us to construe our world in light of those 
concerns.  This implies that emotions are at, or near, the core of the self.  Another 
response to the objection would be to concede that some, though not all, of the elements 
at the core of one’s self might not be emotions at all.  For my purposes here, it is enough 
if some significant part of my identity is constituted by my emotions.  Roberts’s account 
suggests just that. 
So far I’ve assumed something that should be made explicit.  I’ve assumed that 
the moral concerns taken up in the full inventory of virtues held by the virtuous person 
are consistent with one another.  They form a coherent whole.  This would seem to be a 
safe assumption to make of the best conceptions of complete virtue.  If that’s true, the 
person who embodies such virtues enjoys a greater unity of self because the emotions that 
partially constitute such virtues form an internally coherent personal perspective on the 
world and what is valuable in it.  That is, the person enjoys a unity of self or character 
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that arises from having well-formed emotions vis-à-vis her virtues.  This is supported by 
the assessment of Julia Annas: 
the intelligent person [her term for the practically wise person] will not 
have to fight his feelings, for in any area his disposition to make 
certain judgments will have developed along with his disposition to 
have appropriate reactions.  And since in obvious ways having the 
appropriate attitude favours the making of the judgments, and vice 
versa, the person with developed practical intelligence will be a person 
whose attitudes and emotions are in harmony with his judgments….225 
 
Someone might ask why we should want to be unified selves.  Perhaps it 
simplifies the affective life, but at the cost of perceiving reality in its multi-orbed light.  
As I noted earlier, the world is filled with competing goods, and we might think the well-
formed person will be the one who feels properly ambivalent about her commitment to a 
variety of incommensurate goods.  I agree the world contains many different kinds of 
competing goods, and I think a well-formed person ought to be able to appreciate this, 
even feel the weight of it.  Still, I believe that those with virtues benefit from having the 
kind of emotional formation that comes with those virtues. 
One possible objection to this might come from the perspective that we ought not 
want to be unified selves, but rather that we ought to be divided selves, divided according 
to the diversity of goods and practices to which we find our different selves attracted.  
Richard Gale portrays William James this way.  The “divided self of William James” is 
part scientist, part moral agent, part mystic, and part artist.226  The contrast here is 
between Gale’s portrait of James as a divided self, motivated in part by a Promethean 
desire to “have it all” and my claim that the virtuous benefit from unified character, even 
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if such character allows the virtuous to appreciate a diversity of goods.227  Should we 
aspire to be divided selves or unified selves pursuing a diversity of goods?  I claim we 
ought to pursue the latter to the degree we are able.  Below I will offer an argument 
aimed at securing that conclusion.  Even if this argument is not finally persuasive, I 
would like to note that the unity in question would still be a benefit to those who find it 
attractive, even if I cannot prove that the unified are objectively better off.228 
Emotions, Practical Wisdom, and Unity of Character 
To explain why, I’d like to offer an argument about how emotions facilitate wise 
practical judgments.  Practical wisdom involves being able to discern the good in this 
particular circumstance.  Practical wisdom is assisted by the other virtues.229  The other 
virtues contribute an ability to perceive particular goods in that those virtues involve 
emotion-dispositions which constitute a way of construing, or giving order to, the 
situation where some good is in question.  Emotions work, Ronald de Sousa believes, by 
limiting for a time and focusing the range of information to which we attend.230  This is 
something that the most logically consistent and information-rich machine could never 
do.  Logic works as a set of parameters on our thinking, but it never guides us positively 
in terms of how to focus our attention.  “No logic determines salience: what to notice, 
what to attend to, what to inquire about.”231  Thus, the morally relevant emotions that are 
part of virtues function as a kind of attunement to the various goods related to the virtues 
and emotions in question.  They limit and focus our attention.  This enables the virtuous 
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to make wise practical judgments and thus, to live well.  “Acting in the light of a 
conception of how to live requires selecting and acting on the right concern.”232  While 
not crediting emotions with the role I am proposing, John McDowell clearly recognizes 
the importance of the function in question for practical wisdom.  “It is by virtue of his 
seeing this particular fact rather than that one as the salient fact about the situation that he 
is moved to act on this concern rather than that one.  This perception of saliences is the 
shape taken here by the appreciation of particular cases….”233  McDowell claims that the 
perceptions in question are not codifiable; they are not the result of following discrete 
rules for action.  Rather, they are critically habituated patterns of perception which the 
virtuous embody via the emotion-dispositions which make up a part of their virtues and 
which the virtuous use to make wise practical judgments. 
To be a unified self is to have virtues and emotion-dispositions that enable one to 
perceive one’s good from an internally coherent, unified perspective.  One will still 
appreciate multiple and competing goods but do so from a coherent, unified perspective.  
For example, imagine that I believe that each of the following contribute in one way or 
another to what will amount to a well-lived life for me: my commitments to my marriage 
and children, my own ongoing moral and spiritual development as a person, my physical 
fitness and well-being, various kinds of friendships and different forms of community, 
my professional development as a philosopher, etc.  Most days I can’t fit all of these in to 
the degree that I’d like.  That’s my concession to the concern that the world contains 
competing goods.  But I think I’d be better off to the degree that I could see, appreciate, 
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and make judgments about these various goods from the unified perspective of being this 
particular unified self.  By contrast, I might live in such a way that I identify myself more 
with my professional ambitions when those are going well and I’m fighting with my 
wife, or I identify myself more with my running when that’s going well and my kids 
don’t seem especially interested in me or appreciative of my efforts with them.  That kind 
of person is shifting and has an inconsistent perspective from which he sees the value of 
each of these competing goods.  Similarly, if William James cannot judge from a unified 
perspective how to invest himself, if scientific knowledge looks more valuable to the 
scientist James but mystic awareness looks more valuable to the mystic James, then he is 
ill-equipped to make such a judgment.  From the perspective of practical wisdom, of 
actually making judgments that balance diverse goods, we are better off to the degree we 
are able to embody a unified perspective.  That unified self can be described in terms of a 
set of coherent emotion-dispositions.  Virtuous agents flourish to the degree that they 
embody such emotion-dispositions. 
A critic advancing the most recent objection might come back with the response 
that even if we do not desire it to be so, the character of late modern and postmodern life 
demands that we be divided selves.  Most contemporary societies and cultures shape us to 
be divided selves by the nature of the kind of socialization they impose upon us.  Thus, 
we have to embrace ourselves as divided selves.  That may be.  But if it is true, two 
things follow.  First, to the degree one is a divided self—that is, to the degree that one is 
not “one”—she must give up any aspiration to a unified and coherent inquiry into and 
pursuit of a conception of what is good for her over time.  Such a moral agent lacks any 
 124
unified “I” that can pursue what is good for that “I.”234  So be it, the divided self (selves?) 
might reply.  But if this is the case, then, Alasdair MacIntyre argues, the divided self must 
also recognize that she cannot participate in a conversation about why this is good or bad 
for her.235  The divided self cannot inquire into, offer, or defend any account of her good, 
because she lacks a stable perspective from which to do so.  Alternatively, I am inclined 
to think it is more apt to describe us as single selves pursuing diverse goods, in which 
case the virtuous benefit from the unity of character that allows them to have a singular 
perspective on those diverse goods.236 
Conclusion 
  In this chapter, I have argued that the virtuous benefit from having the kinds of 
emotion-dispositions that are constituent in many virtues.  Such emotion-dispositions 
enable moral agents to “own” their motivation and to embody the kind of unified 
perspective that enables wise practical judgments.  Thus, a key part of living a good 
human life is having the emotion-dispositions constituent in the virtues the moral agent 
needs in order to enable her to become the sort of person who is admired and/or tends to 
live well.  Emotions are perceptions that are based on, or shaped by, concerns of the 
moral agent.  Emotions shape the way an agent perceives the world and her place in it.  
They help her to identify those goods she ought to pursue and dangers of various kinds 
that she ought to avoid.  Emotion-dispositions such as these, along with the virtues they 
are often a part of, enable the moral agent to manage the challenges of living and of 
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dying.  In the next chapter, I will argue specifically for the claim that virtues can enable 




























 In this chapter, I examine and argue for the claim that virtues can enable patients 
to die well.  I begin by distinguishing having a good death from dying well and argue that 
we can think of dying as a practice, or at least a part of a practice.  Thus, a good death can 
be more than just something that happens to a patient, but can be something the patient 
actively pursues.  Virtues enable patients to more successfully pursue good deaths.  Next, 
I look at some virtues that I argue have relevance to a broad variety of conditions near the 
end of life and to a variety of different conceptions of a good death.  Finally, I look at the 
particular conceptions of a good death examined in Chapter Two, “Conceptions of a 
Good Death,” to see how different virtues could enable adherents of particular 
conceptions to die well. 
Dying as a Practice? 
 When asked how they want to die, undergraduate bioethics students will 
frequently say they’d like to die painlessly, quickly, in their sleep, and with no previous 
incapacity.  Such a death might require no virtues at all.  What if someone got such a 
death?  Should we say that they died well?  Perhaps; or perhaps we should say that they 
had a good death, as opposed to dying well.  This distinction is aimed at clarifying the 
sense in which we could say that virtues enable one to die well.  If informal surveys of 
bioethics students are accurate, then many would say that the person I’ve just described is 
fortunate to have died the way she did.  However, Aristotle claims, “[b]ut surely it is 
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quite wrong to take our cue from someone’s fortunes.  For his doing well or badly does 
not rest on them.  A human life, as we said, needs these added, but activities in accord 
with virtue control happiness….”237  Happiness, according to Aristotle, is an “activity of 
the soul in accord with virtue” and not strictly the result of fortune.238  Someone might 
respond that Aristotle is quibbling over words, that in our everyday, ordinary sense of 
‘happiness’ the person I described above could, if they could somehow view it from a 
distance, say that theirs was a happy death, that they died well.  At the very least, they 
could say that they were not unhappy in their dying.  I am willing to concede that such a 
person had a good death.  But I want to distinguish this from dying well and from the 
kind of happiness one might enjoy if he died well.  After discussing this distinction, I will 
offer some reasons to pursue dying well as opposed to simply hoping to have a good 
death. 
The distinction mirrors the distinction between what happens to the agent and 
what the agent does.  When Aristotle says that happiness is an activity of the soul in 
accord with virtue, he implies that it is some kind of active engagement with the world.  
Dying well, as opposed to having a good death, implies a kind of active engagement with 
one’s dying.  Such an active engagement might be a candidate for what Alasdair 
MacIntyre calls a practice.  He defines a practice as follows: 
By a ‘practice’ I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of 
socially established cooperative human activity through which goods 
internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to 
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and 
partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human 
                                                 
237 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2nd ed., trans. by Terence Irwin (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1999), 1100b8-11.  I have added the italics. 
238 Ibid, 1099b26-7. 
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powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and 
goods involved, are systematically extended.239 
 
Let’s unpack this definition.  A practice is form of social activity.  So, for instance, 
Americans are in the practice of driving on the right and running facing traffic.  But 
MacIntyre uses the word to refer to more complex activities than just where we drive or 
run.  He lists playing football and chess, designing architecture, farming, scientific and 
historical enquiries, painting, and music as examples of complex practices.240  What 
distinguishes these activities as practices in MacIntyre’s sense is that they have a 
complexity concerning the ways we might excel in engaging in them.  Players of football 
or chess engage in an ongoing conversation about how best to play either of these games.  
If we think of good deaths in terms of having a good death, then they are clearly not 
practices, since they are not activities really.  Having a good death involves only having 
certain circumstances happen to you.  Of course, you might do some things in hopes of 
increasing your odds of having a good death.  I have an acquaintance who is probably 
only half joking when he says that his high cholesterol diet is aimed at enabling him to 
have a massive heart attack and die quickly.  Still, doing things like this won’t guarantee 
you will have a good death and such activities don’t seem to be connected to their 
purported end in the kinds of ways that would indicate they form a practice.   
Is dying well a practice?  I’d like to suggest that it is, in some sense, or at the very 
least that it could be if we as a society were more attentive to our mortality (as other 
                                                 
239 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 187. 
240 Ibid. 
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societies have been).241  When MacIntyre introduces the notion of practices, he uses 
complex, but discrete, activities as examples.  His examples constitute aspects of a life.  
But, in some sense, living a whole life should count as a practice on MacIntyre’s 
definition.  It is social—our embodied-ness makes us dependent on others and most 
desire social engagement beyond what is necessary for survival.  It has a complexity 
concerning the ways we might excel at it.  We frequently hold up individuals as having 
lived well and examine the ways their character and the various discrete practices that 
made up their lives contributed to their lives overall.  However, it is not any one discrete 
activity, or even a discrete cluster of activities in the way that playing football or 
designing architecture is.  That MacIntyre chooses to focus, initially, on discrete activities 
is a reflection, I think, of his concern that we are not in a position to talk about excellence 
in the overarching practice of living a human life.242   According to MacIntyre, we live 
amidst the fragments of a variety of different conceptions of and approaches to ethics and 
are not, at the point he is writing in late 20th century Western society, equipped to begin 
with reflection on the good of whole lives.  Thus, he starts with discrete practices.243  But 
such an approach does not disqualify the activity of living a human life, as a whole, from 
being considered a practice.  And if that is the case, then perhaps dying—the last stage of 
                                                 
241 For an example of one time period where a society was more attentive to dying as a practice, see 
Christopher P. Vogt, Patience, Compassion, Hope and the Christian Art of Dying Well (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), particularly Chapter Two “Dying Well in Historical 
Perspective: The Ars Moriendi Tradition of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries.”  The ars moriendi 
(art of dying) literature is a set of books or pamphlets written to help Christians prepare to die well.  Both 
writers and readers assume that how one died mattered for moral and spiritual reasons, so they engaged, as 
a society, in the kind of collective reflection on the activity of dying that MacIntyre suggests is part of a 
practice. 
242 See the “disquieting suggestion” with which he begins After Virtue. 
243 Julia Annas believes MacIntyre is not sufficiently sensitive to the pluralism that characterized the 
ancient ethical world, a world that was not afraid to think of living a human life as a complex activity at 
which one could excel.  See The Morality of Happiness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 451, 
footnote 23. 
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the life lived—is a practice or at very least a part of one.  It, too, is social, and we can 
discuss ways that some excel at taking on the challenges of dying where others fail to 
excel.  As it turns out, we do not currently engage in much discussion along these lines, 
but I think that to be a practice the activity must only be the kind of activity about which 
we could engage in collective deliberation about excellence.  If a patient does not have 
the good fortune of having a good death, in the sense discussed above, then she will have 
good reasons to actively engage with the activity of dying.  In the best cases, such activity 
would constitute a practice aimed at achieving a good death.  The virtues that can enable 
one to die well, then, would be virtues that enable the patient to gain goods internal to the 
practice of dying. 
There are at least two reasons why the distinction I have been articulating 
(between having a good death and dying well) matters.  First, the chances, as many who 
take the time to reflect upon it know, of having a good death such as I described above 
are not good.  Statistically, few die that way in contemporary Western societies.244  Just 
about every adult can tell a story of a grandparent, parent, aunt or uncle, or some other 
close relation or friend who died in a way decidedly other than what I have described 
above as having a good death.  Thus, virtues are relevant because they can apply to a 
wider range of potential scenarios in which one might die.  It might be that in a society in 
which many or most people died quickly and without pain or incapacity the virtues would 
not be relevant to having a good death.  Perhaps they might still be relevant to living well 
but not to dying well.  That this is the case suggests that the way that I argue for the 
                                                 
244 See, for example, Joanne Lynn, “Living Long in Fragile Health: The New Demographics Shape End of 
Life Care,” in Bruce Jennings, Gregory E. Kaebnick, and Thomas H. Murray, eds., Improving End of Life 
Care: Why Has It Been So Difficult? Hastings Center Report Special Report 35:6 (2005): S14-S18. 
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relevance of virtues to dying is contextualized.  I will be looking in this chapter at the 
way that virtues can help us to die well in the setting of contemporary medical 
technology and society.  In other, different contexts the relevance of virtues to dying well 
might be very different, and it might even be nonexistent. 
The second reason I have sought to distinguish having a good death from dying 
well is that embodying virtues relevant to one’s dying might make even a fortunate death 
better.  Of course, virtues would be of no relevance to a sudden death.  But even in a case 
where a patient died relatively quickly and without serious complication, virtues might 
equip that person to deal with the psychological and existential challenges they could still 
face in an abbreviated form.  Indeed, becoming aware that you will die very soon—what 
many in contemporary American would consider to be a very fortunate death—might 
carry challenges of its own, even if it is an atypical death.  From the perspective of those 
who embrace the Growth in Dying model of a good death, for example, dying presents an 
opportunity for which virtues are necessary if the opportunity is to be fully seized.  
Arguably, on any conception of a good death, one’s dying could be viewed as an 
opportunity for which virtues—different ones on different conceptions—are necessary or 
at least beneficial. 
How Do Virtues Help? 
 How does having virtues help one to die well?  The central claim of this 
dissertation is that virtues can enable one to die well in the appropriate circumstances.  
How does that happen?  The answer to that question may be as varied as are the virtues 
that are relevant to dying.  Different virtues will help a patient to die well in different 
ways.  However, one basic kind of way that a variety of different kinds of virtues will be 
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relevant to dying well concerns how they cause us to perceive and relate to basic aspects 
of embodied life.  To explain this, I would like to draw on Rosalind Hursthouse’s 
discussion of the connection of virtues to the moral question of abortion.245  Setting aside 
complex metaphysical questions about the moral status of the fetus, Hursthouse thinks 
that virtues ought to shape the moral agent’s comportment to “the familiar biological 
facts” of how humans conceive, gestate, give birth to, and parent their offspring, thereby 
continuing the human race.246  When we gather such familiar facts, Hursthouse believes, 
we are in a position to ask the following question: “How do these facts figure in the 
practical reasoning, actions and passions, thoughts and reactions, of the virtuous and the 
non-virtuous?  What is the mark of having the right attitude to these facts...?”247  A 
central theme in the discussion that follows Hursthouse’s posing of these questions is the 
kinds of emotions one ought to have towards the “familiar biological facts.”  In other 
words, how do one’s virtues cause one to perceive, emotionally, these facts of biology?  
How does the moral agent relate to or interact with these facts? 
Hursthouse’s organizing question implies a kind of relationship between the facts 
of biology and the emotions one has in response to them.  Her discussion also implies 
that there are proper and improper ways to feel about these facts.248  My discussion of 
emotions as “concern-based construals” above suggests that we are not simply passive in 
                                                 
245 Rosalind Hursthouse, “Virtue Theory and Abortion,” in Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., Virtue 
Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 217-38. 
246 Ibid, 228. 
247 Ibid, 229. 
248 Linda Zagzebski also discusses the notion of emotions fitting their objects in Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, 
Divine Motivation Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 39.  Zagzebski’s account, with 
which I agree, claims that different moral traditions with different moral exemplars will have different 
judgments about how emotions ought to fit their objects.  See her Chapter Nine, “Ideal observers, ideal 
agents, and moral diversity.” 
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responding to these facts.249  Rather, we organize our perception of such facts around 
concerns we embody.  In a sense, we interpret the facts through the lens of concerns and 
values that shape our identity.  Thus, our emotions towards such facts reveal a great deal 
about us.  Hursthouse’s idea is that we can and should talk about appropriate and 
inappropriate sorts of ways of relating to these facts.  She suggests this is a distinctive 
aspect of virtue-based ethical theories.250 
 Dying and death also involve some familiar biological facts, interwoven—as in 
Hursthouse’s example—with some facts about the state of medical technology and its 
capacity to respond to and act on these facts.  At some point in the human life cycle we 
are no longer growing into maturity but are declining from it.  Our physical and cognitive 
abilities eventually begin to erode, and we can expect this erosion to continue, sometimes 
faster, sometimes slower, until death.  Medical technology can slow this decline 
somewhat but cannot stop it.  Eventually, if we do not die suddenly from some other 
cause, we will acquire some disease or condition that causes us to die.  At some point in 
this decline, it makes sense to say that we are dying, though that point may not be clear in 
every case.  Following Hursthouse, we might ask how these facts ought to figure in the 
formation of virtues and emotion-dispositions.  How should one perceive and respond to 
these facts?  What sort of moral development of one’s character should a moral agent 
pursue in the light of these facts?  Presumably, virtues that tend to enable one to live well 
will take into account these facts.  Ironically, Aristotle, whose name is probably most 
closely associated with virtues in the history of philosophy, might not have fully taken 
                                                 
249 On “concern-based construals,” see Robert C. Roberts, Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
250 Hursthouse, “Virtue Theory,” 230. 
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these considerations into account.251  That might have been, however, because in his day 
people died quickly and most didn’t have to go through the kind of dying process most 
face today.  Setting aside Aristotle’s aspirations to live a “pro-immortal” life of study and 
contemplation,252 how ought humans respond to basic facts about the human lifespan and 
its decline toward death in particular?  Different conceptions of a good death will imply 
different ideas about how to perceive and live with these facts.  Within each conception 
of a good death will be a set of ideas about what kind of person one ought to become—
what sorts of traits ought to define you—with respect to these facts.  Below I will look at 
the conceptions of a good death I examined earlier to see what sorts of virtues they imply 
concerning our response to human decline and dying.   
 The difference between Aristotle’s ideal life of study and contemplation and the 
idea of a conception of a good death marks another distinction.  Aristotle’s vision 
suggests how humans might flourish under quite ideal conditions, conditions that mask or 
obscure our mortality.253  The idea of a good death requires us to think in terms of 
flourishing under conditions as they exist for humans.  That is, biological constraints like 
mortality are among the basic facts, as Hursthouse discusses, which must be taken into 
account in conceiving of a good life and death. 
 One point of this section is to reinforce the claim that virtues don’t benefit a moral 
agent the way a hammer benefits a carpenter.  They are not tools to be used 
                                                 
251 See his discussion in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics of contemplation or “theoretical study” 
(Nicomachean Ethics, 2nd ed., Terence Irwin, trans. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999), 
1176a30-1179a33.) 
252 Ibid, 1177b35. 
253 With this claim I am thinking of Aristotle’s statement that “complete happiness” comes from a life of 
“theoretical study” (ibid, 1177b12-19).  This is the topic of his discussion in Nicomachean Ethics, Book 
X.7. 
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instrumentally.  They do not have some kind of “exterior” relationship to the person who 
hopes to die well as a result of having them.  Rather, the person who hopes to die well is 
shaped by virtues that are relevant to meeting the challenges of dying.  There is an 
“internal” connection between the future patient and the virtues in question.  The virtues 
come to shape who she is, such that she can die well.  In some sense, the virtues relevant 
to dying are markers of the kind of person one becomes in response to the challenges of 
dying. 
 At this point, I would like to consider some virtues or sets of virtues that seem to 
have broad relevance across different conceptions of a good death.  Some virtues, by their 
nature, appear to be especially relevant to human dying.  Of course, different conceptions 
might specify or develop these virtues and their implications in different ways.  Beyond 
that, individuals holding different conceptions of a good death might differentiate still 
further what the implications of such virtues are.   
Virtues that Apply to Most Deaths 
 I suspect that some virtues or kinds of virtues can help their possessors regardless 
of the conceptions of a good death they hold.254  Later I will examine virtues that are 
especially relevant to particular conceptions, but for now I would like to look at some 
kinds of virtues that can apply more broadly.  Such a project lends itself to the possibility 
of some false starts, however.  One of the most significant ones concerns the use of a 
virtue or virtue-concept across moral traditions and conceptions of a well-lived life.   
 
                                                 
254 The one exception to this claim might be the “Avoiding Death” conception of a good death.  I don’t 
believe the virtues I am going to discuss in this section would necessarily facilitate a good death for a 




At a level of generality, a broad variety of traditions might appear to agree on the 
value of a virtue.  However, the specific practices and perspectives which inculcate and 
mark the expression of this virtue are sometimes very different.  Martha Nussbaum 
wrestles with such issues in her essay, “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian 
Approach.”255  She believes there are some common “spheres” and some “features of our 
common humanity” that suggest virtues that are not relative to any particular moral 
tradition.  Nussbaum discusses the “sphere” of “[f]ear of important damages, esp. death” 
as one that necessitates the virtue of courage.256  She later describes, as a “feature of our 
common humanity,” mortality, about which she says, “No matter how death is 
understood, all human beings face it and (after a certain age) know that they face it.  This 
fact shapes every aspect of more or less every human life.”257  Her account suggests that 
courage will be a relevant virtue for just about all humans, since “more or less” every 
human faces mortality.  Courage is a preservative virtue.258  It is a virtue aimed at 
preserving the agent’s moral and/or practical commitments and convictions in the face of 
dangers and threats.  What are some of the commitments that courage preserves?  In 
some cases, it can preserve our lives against the threat of death, so it preserves a 
commitment to go on living.  To that degree, its application may be “non-relative.”  Of 
                                                 
255 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach,” in Peter A. French, Theodore 
E. Uehling, Jr, and Howard K. Wettstein, eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Volume XIII, Ethical 
Theory: Character and Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 32-53.  
Nussbaum’s approach is motivated by her concern that virtue ethics suggests or entails relativism and by 
her desire to be able to critique oppressive social practices that some cultures engage in and approve of.  I 
agree with her aims, although, for reasons I don’t go into in this dissertation, I disagree with the approach 
she takes. 
256 Ibid, 35. 
257 Ibid, 48. 
258 For two accounts of courage that paint it in similar terms, see N.J.H. Dent, “The Value of Courage,” 
Philosophy 56 (1981): 574-7 and Antony Duff, “Aristotelian Courage,” Ratio 29:1 (June 1987): 2-15. 
 137
course, even this assumes something that seems not to be true: that all people will regard 
their lives as worth preserving in every case.  Martyrs or people who believe they have a 
duty to die in order to avoid consuming resources needed by family members serve as 
examples to the contrary.259  However, beyond that, it seems there is a diverse set of aims 
for which people might seek courage as a preservative.  This diversity extends to our 
concern with avoiding death.  In Chapter Two of this dissertation, I discuss different 
conceptions of a good death, which introduces an element of diversity into how people 
come to terms with, or evade, their mortality.  Different people might use courage to 
preserve different aims or in service of diverse convictions about how to spend their 
remaining days.   
At a general level, we can say that courage benefits the dying because it enables 
them to preserve aims, values, and convictions that are threatened by any number of 
different challenges of dying, such as pain or a loss of control of key aspects of our lives.  
Thus, courage and other virtues that function like it to preserve various goods are relevant 
to a broad variety of challenges of dying.  However, someone looking closely at the 
particular aims, values, and convictions of patients with different conceptions of a good 
death may find that courage preserves different things and even means, in practical terms, 
different things to different people.260  Thus, one danger in attempting to talk about 
                                                 
259 John Hardwig, “Is There a Duty to Die?,” Hastings Center Report 27:2 (1997): 34-42.  A key qualifier 
here is “in every case.”  Martyrs or those with a duty to die might, other things being equal, want to 
preserve their lives.  It is only under particular circumstances that they believe other considerations 
override a commitment to living.  Betsy Postow has suggested to me that an example of someone who does 
not, in any case, want to preserve her life would be a convict who, out of remorse for her crimes, wants to 
be executed. 
260 Lee Yearley, Mencius and Aquinas: Theories of Virtue and Conceptions of Courage (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1990) is an example of a close analysis of a particular virtue (courage) as it 
is understood by two thinkers with a quite a few differences.  Yearley tracks how Aquinas’s and Mencius’s 
different conceptions of human flourishing affected their understanding the virtue of courage. 
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virtues that can help almost anyone to die well is that what sounds good at a general level 
will be less valuable or accurate at a more specific level, such as at a level where different 
conceptions of a good death are distinguished.   
Virtues of Acknowledged Dependence 
Courage is an example of a virtue that can be relevant to most deaths.  But, as I’ve 
noted, what it means to practice courage may vary with different conceptions of a good 
death which suggest different goods the patient might want to preserve.  Just as dying 
often threatens our connections to various goods, dying also often presents us with 
increasing levels of dependence on others.  As I discuss in Chapter Three on “The 
Challenges of Dying,” one common feature of the dying process in contemporary 
medicine is the patient’s increasing dependence on other people and technologies.  If we 
set aside those who die suddenly or from a disease with a very rapid onset, almost every 
patient dying today will face a steadily increasing loss of independence and a 
corresponding increase in dependence.  Thus, virtues which enable someone to bear with 
increasing dependence or which constitute responses to this phenomenon will help the 
terminal patient to die well. 
What Alasdair MacIntyre describes as “virtues of acknowledged dependence,” 
would appear to be candidates for such a role.261  MacIntyre begins his discussion of 
these virtues by observing that a strict contrast between self-interested and altruistic 
behavior causes us to ignore or forget shared goods.  If I assume my actions either aim at 
                                                 
261 Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues (Chicago: Open 
Court Press, 1999), 119-28. 
 139
my good or at someone else’s, I miss those goods that can only be shared between us.262  
Shared goods form an important part of the basis for communities of various kinds.  
Friendship, for instance, both is a shared good and depends on the friends’ being able to 
share certain goods between them, if they are to be able to distinguish their relationship 
from a merely contractual relationship.263  The concept of shared goods introduces the 
notion of the Other into one’s moral framework.  Whereas I can think and act from a 
more individualistic perspective when contemplating self-interested goods, I can only 
contemplate shared goods if I open myself to the possibility of another person being 
involved.  Virtues of acknowledged dependence are aimed at acknowledging others.  
Gratitude, for instance, “involves a truthful acknowledgment of dependence” on 
others.264 
MacIntyre contrasts the grateful person with Aristotle’s magnamimous person.265  
Aristotle describes the person marked by the virtue of magnanimity as being “ashamed 
when he receives [good from others]” and able “to remember the good they do, but not 
what they receive….”266  MacIntyre comments that such a person labors under “an 
illusion of self-sufficiency.”267  That this is an illusion should be clear for many reasons 
but especially to anyone who has watched another person dying in a contemporary 
                                                 
262 Ibid, 119. 
263 Or from one of what Aristotle considers to be the lower forms of friendship: friendships of utility and of 
pleasure, where the relationship is “coincidental” and “easily dissolved” (Nichomachean Ethics, 1156a17-
20).  For a general discussion, see Nicomachean Ethics, VIII.3. 
264 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 127. 
265 Ibid. 
266 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1124b10, 13-14.  That Aristotle believes this is a virtue indicates again 
that there are very different competing accounts of human flourishing which undergird conceptions of 
virtue.  In fairness to Aristotle, it is important to concede to him that the virtue he is describing may well 
have a place.  He’s talking about a relatively superior person (1123b5) and is discussing a virtue concerning 
how such a person should carry his greatness.  Still, I think Aristotle carries this idea too far, as the quotes 
indicate. 
267 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 127. 
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medical context where each new complication seems to bring a new form or degree of 
dependence.  Increasing dependence is a characteristic feature of most instances of dying 
in our setting, so virtues that help us to acknowledge this would seem to be universally 
relevant.  Aristotle’s magnanimous person is not well-suited to being confronted with 
dying.  A person with the kinds of commitments the magnanimous person has would 
have to hope to die quickly or somehow not be confronted with his dying.  A person with 
this “virtue” might be a candidate to embrace the “Avoiding Death” conception of a good 
death.  By contrast, someone who can acknowledge her dependence on others stands a 
better chance of dying well.   
What does it mean to acknowledge dependence here?  Recall that Hursthouse 
claims that part of what characterizes a virtuous person is her emotional comportment, 
her relationship to certain biological facts (in her case concerning abortion).  To 
acknowledge dependence in dying would be to have the kind of emotion-dispositions that 
enable the dying patient to perceive her growing dependence on others in a relatively less 
troubled fashion.  Her feelings would not be disturbed by the growing reality and 
realization of dependence on other persons and technologies.  Of course, these comments 
should be set against a backdrop in which we assume some understanding of appropriate 
levels of dependence and independence.  Someone who is all too happy to “depend” on 
others for what he refuses to do for himself does not qualify—on my assumption above—
as embodying virtues of acknowledged dependence.  Acknowledging dependence on 
others is hard for those who have been used to being able to care for themselves.  The 
virtues of acknowledged dependence, if they are to be understood as virtues, must be part 
of a larger constellation of virtues, some of which are aimed at enabling us to be 
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appropriately independent in various ways and at various times in our lives.268  Gratitude 
is one example of a virtue of acknowledged dependence.  It opens us to the other and 
allows us to gladly acknowledge our dependence on that other.  Gratitude involves the 
agent’s emotions as well.  There’s “more to it than just saying thank you.”269  To be 
grateful is to act gratefully but also to feel gratitude on the appropriate occasions.  The 
grammar of gratitude presumes that we are gladly in another’s “debt.”  In terms of 
emotions, to be grateful is to perceive another’s kindness, generosity, or aid in the light of 
a desire to have some aspect of my life interwoven with that of another.  Friends are glad 
to receive gifts—they are grateful—not just because they now don’t have to go out and 
buy what was given but also because of how a gift knits two lives together.  In this sense, 
gratitude is a virtue of acknowledged dependence. 
I am not suggesting just that dying patients should be grateful to their medical and 
familial caregivers in order to die well.  Rather, my claim is that those who are 
characterized by a virtue like gratitude, which is one of the “virtues of acknowledged 
dependence,” are so constituted as to be able to acknowledge the other, to be relatively 
peaceful or glad about being in another’s debt, and to be generally comfortable with their 
dependence on others.  Embodying a set of virtues shapes a person’s perspective on 
herself, others, and the world.  Even when a grateful person is not actively expressing 
                                                 
268 In fact, MacIntyre devotes a chapter of Dependent Rational Animals to consideration how we “become 
independent practical reasoners” (see ibid, Chapter Eight “How do we become independent practical 
reasoners? How do virtues make this possible?”).  MacIntyre assumes, as we should, that discussion of 
virtues of acknowledged dependence must take place against a backdrop of assumptions concerning virtues 
of appropriate independence. 
269 Terrance McConnell, Gratitude (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), xi. 
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gratitude, her perspective is shaped or characterized by embodying the virtue.270  That 
gratitude is a virtue that characterizes persons is suggested by a consideration of our 
ordinary language and intuitions concerning its use.  We speak of “debts of gratitude.”  
However, they are not like other debts: those owed a debt of gratitude normally don’t 
demand payment, debts of gratitude can’t be paid by third parties, and one can be 
pleasantly disposed to be in another’s debt of gratitude, but we don’t often feel that way 
about ordinary debts.271  These considerations indicate that gratitude is more about a 
comportment of my character towards the actions and intentions of another than about 
some strict exchange.  Gratitude marks a person before it can be characteristic of an 
exchange.272  Grateful people will, it seems, have been emotionally comfortable, 
extenuating circumstances not withstanding, with dependence as a phenomenon 
throughout their lives.273  Thus, when the level of dependence increases at the end of life, 
they are already disposed to receive this in a relatively better manner than the kind of 
person, such as Aristotle describes, who has avoided conscious recognition of his 
dependence and is prone to perceive it in a negative light. 
As with courage, gratitude—as a representative of the “virtues of acknowledged 
dependence”—strikes me as being widely relevant across a variety of different 
                                                 
270 The distinction between potentiality and actualization concerning virtues is discussed in Richard Davies, 
“Some Quodlibets on the Virtues,” The Modern Schoolman 76 (1998): 43-60, 46.  Aristotle claims that 
happiness depends on activity in accord with virtue (Nicomachean Ethics, 1098b30-1099a7).  My account 
could be made consistent with his if we understand perception as an activity, as an active “seeing as.”  The 
account of emotions I offer in Chapter Four, “Emotions and Virtues,” is consistent with such a claim. 
271 McConnell, Gratitude, 5.  McConnell uses these observations to make a different point from the one I 
am making here, although he appears to be sympathetic to it (see his Chapter Three, “Gratitude, Feelings, 
and Emotions”). 
272 Of course, we become grateful by construing certain exchanges in the light of the grammar of gratitude I 
discussed above. 
273 MacIntyre observes that dependence is a phenomenon of all stages of human life, even if it is 
particularly acute at the beginning and ending stages (Dependent Rational Animals, 1). 
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conceptions of a good death.  But different conceptions and different individuals may 
come to different judgments about the particulars of gratitude.  How one acknowledges 
dependence might vary with other commitments she has concerning a well-lived life and 
a good death. 
Other-Centering Virtues 
Gratitude is at least partially an other-regarding virtue.  However, the distinction 
between self-regarding and other-regarding virtues has been over-stated.274  My account 
suggests that while gratitude is ostensibly focused on the other and benefits the other to 
some degree, it ends up providing a benefit to the possessor of the virtue as well.  Those 
who are grateful are better disposed to acknowledge and be at peace with their increasing 
dependence on others at the end of life.  Thus, they benefit from being grateful.  But 
ironically, the grateful benefit from their virtue by being at least partially other-regarding, 
by thinking of others and their contributions rather than oneself.  This seems to be a 
feature of some other virtues as well, which might be gathered with gratitude into a class 
we could call other-centering virtues.275  As I’ve suggested in the discussion so far, there 
might be considerable overlap between the “virtues of acknowledged dependence” and 
other-centering virtues.  But as with preservative virtues like courage and virtues of 
acknowledged dependence like gratitude, other-centering virtues seem to benefit dying 
patients across a broad spectrum of conceptions of a good death.   
                                                 
274 For an example of what I take to be an over-statement of the distinction, see Brad Hooker, “Does Moral 
Virtue Constitute a Benefit to the Agent?,” in Roger Crisp, ed., How Should One Live?: Essays on the 
Virtues (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 141-55. 
275 Traditionally other-regarding virtues have been considered those that demand that the moral agent give 
due regard to others in ways that have been conceived not to be to any advantage for the moral agent 
himself.  Brad Hooker’s usage and conclusions follow in this tradition (see “Does Moral Virtue Constitute 
a Benefit to the Agent,” cited above).  What I am calling other-centering virtues are virtues that benefit the 
moral agent by making her attentive to others. 
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Those who are dying will in some ways want to be focused on themselves.  We 
would find it awkward if a dying person always and only wanted to talk about others and 
their plans, as if there would be time later to catch up on the dying individual.  Such 
behavior might cause us to speculate that this person is avoiding the thought of death or 
hasn’t come to terms with and wants to be distracted from it.  This will not enable one to 
die well, except perhaps on the “Avoiding Death” conception of a good death.  Success 
on this conception will depend on the patient’s ability to maintain a focus on something 
besides dying.  But a person who is too focused on himself also seems to be a poor 
candidate for a good death.  For one thing, such a person would not seem to be in a good 
position to acknowledge others and their role in his life.  Thus, such a person could not 
embody the virtues of acknowledged dependence.  But he would also not be in a good 
position to wrap up and bring closure to important relationships.276  Second, intense self-
focus might only heighten the perceived suffering concerning the ending of my life.  Eric 
Cassell argues that suffering (as distinguished from pain) “occurs when an impending 
destruction of the person is perceived….”277  If the borders of my concern stop at my self, 
then death takes everything with which I am concerned.278  Such a perspective might well 
intensify the anguish of dying. 
By contrast, a person who has concerns beyond herself, who is invested in 
relationships with others and is characterized by virtues and emotion-dispositions that 
carry those concerns, will be better situated to face her own demise.  Things she values 
                                                 
276 Julia Neuberger, Dying Well: a guide to enabling a good death, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Radcliffe 
Publishing Ltd., 2004), 136-8. 
277 Eric Cassell, The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 32. 
278 On this, see Hardwig, “Duty to Die,” 41-2. 
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will continue on after her death, and she can take some comfort from that while she is 
dying if she embodies other-centering virtues.   
My example of an other-centering virtue that can enable a person to die well is 
humility.  As with some other virtues, humility is open to misconstruals that could render 
it questionable as a virtue.  Humility is sometimes associated with servility, particularly 
among those who are concerned about humility’s religious origins.279  Jeanine Grenberg 
surveys recent assessments of humility as a religious virtue in which commentators 
describe the humility in question as “overreaching,” “laughable,” and “pessimistic.”280  
Indeed, confusing humility with servility does not benefit the moral agent.281  However, 
humility can be rehabilitated, and a qualified form of it need not depend on any particular 
religious convictions nor need it involve any loss of self-respect.  Gabriele Taylor claims, 
to the contrary, that, “[b]eing virtuously humble does not mean losing one’s human 
dignity and self-respect.  The humble will still ‘have their pride,’ still think that a certain 
kind of treatment is due to them, and that a certain kind of behavior on their part is due to 
others.”282  The properly humble will not lack self-respect.  However, they won’t ground 
                                                 
279 Before the Christian writers, the ancient philosophers had little time for humility as a virtue, except 
maybe as pertaining to modesty of dress.  See Servais-Theodore Pinckaers, O.P., “The Sources of the 
Ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas,” in Stephen J. Pope, ed., The Ethics of Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2002),17-29, 23. 
280 Jeanine Grenberg, Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption, and Virtue 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 108.  Such commentators seem to be echoing Hume who 
famously named humility as one of “the whole train of monkish virtues” (David Hume, Enquiry 
Concerning the Principles of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 219, cited in Grenberg, 1). 
281 On servility as a vice, see Thomas Hill, Jr., “Servility and Self-Respect,” The Monist 57 (1973), 98.  
This essay is also suggestive of how humility could be a virtue opposite servility. 
282 Gabriele Taylor, Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1985), 51. 
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their self-respect in a comparison with others aimed at putting others down.283  Rather 
than using comparisons as a means of boosting self-respect and self-esteem, the properly 
humble regard themselves as having a kind of basic intrinsic worth which they share with 
others.  Grenberg describes humility as “that meta-attitude which constitutes the moral 
agent’s proper perspective on herself as a dependent and corrupt but capable and 
dignified rational agent.”284  Thus, the humble don’t rely on comparisons with others to 
shore up their own esteem.  Nor do they have to be preoccupied with the concern that 
someone else may be bettering them in some respect.  Rather, they are freed up, by virtue 
of their humility, to enjoy others. 
I suggest above that those who embody other-centered virtues put themselves in a 
position to die relatively well.  Humility is one of these virtues.  Humility enables one to 
maintain a balance of perspective between the value of one’s own life and self and the 
value of others as well.  The humble can be happily invested in the well-being of others 
without concern that this somehow undermines their own worth.  They can rejoice in the 
pursuits and successes of others.  Thus, in the dying phase of life, the humble can take 
some joy from the presence of valued others and from the fact that goods they value will 
go on, even if they won’t.  Perhaps the humble see their lives as being part of a “story” 
that is much larger than they are as individuals.  As individuals, they have a place in that 
story, but given that they are only individuals among a larger throng, they have no more 
                                                 
283 Ibid, 52.  The person demonstrating humility won’t take for granted that he’s inferior to others; “he may 
not think in terms of comparison with others at all.  That is to say, some kinds of comparison … will not for 
him have much significance, for he will not assume that such things are constitutive of human worth” (52). 
284 Grenberg, Kant and the Ethics of Humility, 133.  Of course, one could replace the Kantian ground of 
dignity with any of a number of other convictions, including religious ones, despite the criticisms 
mentioned above, if it played a similar role of establishing one’s worth as based in something inherent in 
the person that is shared by others and not derived from a comparison with others. 
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than a place in that story.  That the dying patient will no longer be able to participate in 
the lives of these others is certainly cause for sadness.  However, this sadness differs 
considerably from that of a moral agent whose preoccupation with himself leaves him 
without a perspective that enables him to enjoy relationships with others for their sake 
and not his own. 
Practical Wisdom 
The last broadly applicable virtue I would like to discuss is practical wisdom.  
Practical wisdom as a disposition or capacity to make judgments about what is good for 
the agent (and others) in her particular circumstances will be relevant to many different 
kinds of decisions, about treatment and other things, at the end of life.  Most patients will 
either have to make such decisions, delegate them to a surrogate decision-maker, or 
tacitly accept the suggestions of doctors, who will at some point very near the end of life 
often become less inclined to go forward on their own judgment because it becomes 
increasingly clear to them that there are value judgments at stake in what medical course 
to take.  To the degree that a patient seeks to die well—and not simply hope to have a 
good death—he will need to be an active participant in such decisions.  In Chapter Three 
on “The Challenges of Dying,” I discussed a challenge associated with many different 
kinds of end of life decisions.  “Technological brinkmanship” names the challenge of 
using technology as long as possible to preserve a good quality of life without pushing 
one’s use of it to a point where the patient is harmed.285  A respirator might be useful as a 
transitional therapy for someone hoping to later leave the hospital, but over time it could 
                                                 
285 Daniel Callahan, The Troubled Dream of Life (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2000), 
41. 
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become a technology that traps the patient in the hospital long after she has conceded her 
life.  Thus, a danger of going too far in such brinkmanship is that patients will have their 
lives prolonged and intertwined with technologies that prevent them from, among other 
things, meaningful regular contact with loved ones.  Most patients will not have given 
much thought to which treatments they might want to pursue at the end of life.  And, they 
often expect the doctor to initiate discussion of these issues.286  Practical wisdom, in this 
case, would not necessarily take the form of having already made these decisions.287  
Rather, it would be a wisdom about which will be the most important factors to consider 
and what kind of weight to give to each of them while in the midst of dying. 
Practical wisdom concerning when and how to engage or disengage technology 
would appear to be an important virtue for those who hope to die well.  The well-formed 
moral agent will have the variety of virtues and accompanying emotion-dispositions 
which enable her to perceive salient aspects of her condition and her technological 
options.  Virtues must be indexed to a conception of a well-lived life or a good death.  
The nature of the virtues in question will shape how one perceives her condition.  By 
doing this, they contribute to the function of practical wisdom because practical wisdom 
relies, in part, on the perceptions that inform judgments.  So, as indicated under the 
discussion of courage above, practical wisdom is a broadly relevant virtue but one with a 
shape and implications that will depend on the conception in which it is in service.   
                                                 
286 Janna C. Merrick, “Death and Dying: The American Experience,” in Robert H. Blank and Janna C. 
Merrick, eds., End-of-Life Decision Making: A Cross-National Study (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 
219-241, 232.  Merrick reports that in the same study that indicated patients expect doctors to initiate 
discussion of treatment decisions at the end of life, the doctors expected the patients to. 
287 Donna Dickenson, Risk and Luck in Medical Ethics (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press/ Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishers, Inc., 2003), 97-100 discusses the implausibility of believing that I can know in 
advance what I will want at the end of life. 
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But regardless of which conception of a good death informs the patient’s practical 
wisdom, a good death will clearly require some proactive decision making on the part of 
the patient.  This can’t be done by formula or by following a set of guidelines; it may 
often be the case that one’s own guidelines set earlier in life, maybe in the form of an 
advanced directive, will be unhelpful or no longer relevant.  Consider how practical 
wisdom might be relevant to one particular kind of decision.  Most terminally ill patients 
express or have expressed a desire to die in their homes, but in fact relatively few do.  
Further, the leading factor in determining whether a patient dies at home or in the hospital 
is not what his desire is but instead is determined by the availability of hospital 
services.288  If dying well includes, for many, dying at home—and there are good reasons 
why it might—then achieving that aim will require an ability to perceive and/or seek out 
information on where one is in the dying process.  But this is something doctors 
sometimes don’t know.  So, it might also involve making judgments about the relative 
merits of the services one receives in hospitals as opposed to the goods one can achieve 
in the home.  Avoiding going too far in technological brinkmanship may require the 
patient seeking a good death to make a relatively uncertain judgment.  Practical wisdom 
is the virtue aimed at making good judgments in such situations. 
 I have been discussing here and in the sections above some virtues and kinds of 
virtues that I believe are relevant to most kinds of deaths and will be of service to patients 
with different conceptions of a good death.  I have also noted that how each of these 
virtues is specified might differ with different conceptions of a good death.  Now I would 
                                                 
288 Merrick, “Death and Dying,” 219-221. 
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like to discuss the particular conceptions of a good death I have identified and look at 
how various virtues might facilitate such good deaths. 
Virtues and Avoiding Death 
 If there is a conception of a good death for which no virtues are relevant, this 
might be it.  Practical wisdom and courage of some kind might be useful here, but the 
virtues of acknowledged dependence seem alien to the perspective in question here. 
Those who embrace “Avoiding Death” hope not to experience death or dying.  As I 
discussed in Chapter Two, they will seek to avoid or deny the thought of death, the 
prolonged awareness of their own decline, and maybe the experience of death itself.289  
This conception of a good death was prompted in my thinking by what I frequently hear 
undergraduate bioethics students say when asked how they would like to die.  Most often, 
the majority of the students in a class will say, essentially, that they hope to avoid 
engagement with the thought or activity of dying.  They want death to take them while 
they sleep with little, or ideally, no decline prior to death.  These students seem to be 
representative of many others in our society, so I claim that some—certainly not all—
people envision a good death to be one that they avoid and don’t have to confront.   
In part, I think this conception indicates one way of responding to the experience 
of having seen someone die in our contemporary medical context.   Despite some 
successes in improving medical care at the end of life, many still observe deaths they 
would like very much not to repeat.290  So, one way to manifest this desire is by 
imagining a death that avoids all one takes to be bad about dying today.  But virtues are, 
                                                 
289 This last hope, I noted previously, depends on success in the area of life extension technology. 
290 The tone of contemporary end of life care can be captured by the title of a recent Hastings Center 
Special Report: Improving End of Life Care: Why Has It Been So Difficult? Hastings Center Report Special 
Report 35:6 (2005). 
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in part, character traits aimed at enabling us to respond to challenges presented in the 
normal course of living.291  What those avoiding death mostly hope for is a set of external 
conditions.  Avoiding death involves some measure of personal response, as I discuss 
below, but it also trades heavily on maintaining a hope for a particular set of external 
circumstances, a set of circumstances which avoids many of the challenges of dying.  
This conception is characterized by one’s hope—a very unrealistic one, it turns out—that 
such challenges won’t need to be engaged. 
Nevertheless, there might be some virtues useful for maintaining this stance of 
avoidance.  It seems virtues of forgetfulness would be most relevant here.  Aristotle’s 
magnanimous persons hope “to remember the good they do, but not what they 
receive….”292  The magnanimous person might set a precedent for a realistic conception 
of virtues of forgetfulness.293  Surely the magnanimous know, in some sense, that they 
must receive.  They don’t have a literal form of selective amnesia.  Rather, the 
magnanimous seem to be more eager to dwell on the good they do.  That forms a part of 
their self-concept, whereas what they have received from others does not.  Something 
similar might be said of those who avoid death via virtues of forgetfulness.  Their self-
concept revolves around issues that do not include a consideration of their mortality, so, 
on this account, it is a virtue to be forgetful or “unmindful” of such considerations.  The 
                                                 
291 Karen Lebacqz, “The Virtuous Patient,” in Earl E. Shelp, ed., Virtue and Medicine: Explorations in the 
Character of Medicine (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company/ Hingham, MA: Kluwer 
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virtuous, on this conception, “forget” in the form of a kind of selective focus or 
concentration.  In a similar fashion, those seeking to avoid death, might cultivate habits 
of perception that enable them to keep the reality of our mortality from becoming a part 
of their self-concept. 
Because so much about the dying experience of most patients in contemporary 
America would seem to go against habits of perception meant to shield their possessor 
from the thought of mortality, adherents to this conception of a good death might also 
find useful virtues of will power.  Such virtues could involve such things as 
psychological technical skills of self-management and/or management of inclinations.294  
Such skills would seem to facilitate embodying and maintaining virtues of forgetfulness. 
In his short story “The Death of Ivan Ilych,” Leo Tolstoy portrays a character who 
seems to exemplify and desire such virtues.295  In the story Ilych, a middle-class Russian 
bureaucrat, suffers what appears to be a minor injury while fixing some drapes in his 
home.  While the seriousness of the injuries to his internal organs only becomes clear 
later, Ilych continues to hold on to the notion that he is okay long beyond what seems 
warranted by the increasing severity of his symptoms.  He says, “It’s a good thing I’m a 
bit of an athlete.  Another man might have been killed, but I merely knocked myself, just 
here….”296  Despite growing evidence to the contrary, “Ilych made efforts to force 
himself to think that he was better.”297  Even when his condition becomes so severe that 
                                                 
294 Robert C. Roberts, “Will Power and the Virtues,” in Robert B. Kruschwitz and Robert C. Roberts, eds., 
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he can no longer avoid the thought that he is likely to die soon, he finds himself 
unaccustomed to the thought and unable to fully grasp it.  So, he tries to manage his 
thinking about his condition in a way that is conducive to his convictions about how best 
to live.  “He tried to get back into the former current of thoughts that had once screened 
the thought of death from him.  But strange to say, all that had formerly shut off, hidden, 
and destroyed, his consciousness of death, no longer had that effect.  Ivan Ilych now 
spent most of his time in attempting to re-establish that old current.”298  Presumably the 
virtues of forgetfulness would be a central part of the character of a person who managed 
to hold on to this conception of a good death.  Such a person would be well adapted to 
maintaining, perhaps even in the face evidence to the contrary, what Ilych calls his 
“former current of thoughts” in which his own death plays no part.   
A good death on this conception does not result from not dying (though some fans 
of life extension technologies might actively embrace such a hope); rather, it results from 
not thinking about or confronting it.  What is striking about a patient whose last words 
are, “I’m going to beat this thing” is not that he didn’t beat the disease but that he 
maintained that attitude toward the disease to the end of his life.  He died with that 
conviction.  To that end, the virtues of forgetfulness seem useful.  Such a person would 
be characterized by a cultivated perspective that allows no place for dying or death.  Such 
a perspective fails not if the person actually does die, but if the person can no longer keep 
the thought of mortality at bay, can no long maintain her connection to something like 
Ilych’s “former current of thoughts.” 
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through something like virtues of forgetfulness is of primary interest. 
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Virtues and Growth in Dying 
 This conception of a good death views dying as a new opportunity for growth.  
The growth may be from some “lesser” state, since dying can make one more focused 
and attentive to serious matters, or it may just be growth as a normal developmental 
process.  Some might view growth in dying as a way to redeem an otherwise tragic 
period of life; others might see growth as being intrinsically valuable and worthwhile for 
that, even if no other, reason.  What virtues might coincide with such aims?  Courage will 
enable the patient to take up issues and concerns that may have been long buried or 
undiscussed.299  Many will have accumulated, in the course of their lives, some relational 
disharmony.  The task of initiating reconciliation as a form of intra- and interpersonal 
growth will take courage.  Aristotle describes a version of truthfulness which is aimed at 
honesty in social relations.300  Such truthfulness, marked by a willingness to look 
honestly at oneself and one’s relations with others, would seem to be a relevant virtue for 
the tasks of growing toward reconciliation.  Hope, or hopefulness, marks a patient’s 
confidence that such tasks are worth taking up, since to others they may not appear 
worthwhile or may just feel futile since the end is the same.  Love, in the sense in which 
it is conceived as a basic regard or concern for the well-being of the other, will motivate 
such a endeavor.  The dying patient might view a good death to involve, in part, 
facilitating growth for others as well.  “The sharing of genuine emotion, the talking about 
things that matter, either at the bedside or after a death, can bring families that have 
                                                 
299 Ira Byock, M.D., Dying Well: The Prospect for Growth at the End of Life (New York: Riverhead Books, 
1997), 34. 
300 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, IV.7 (1127a14-1127b35). 
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become distant from each other closer together.”301  Curiosity, inquisitiveness, and 
openness, which all facilitate growth at other times in life, will be equally relevant in 
dying.  Openness, for instance, would involve a disposition to see change and new 
challenges in a positive light.  Such openness would look for the good in the new instead 
of focusing on the loss of the old. 
Of his own father Seymour’s dying, Ira Byock remarks, “[a]t that moment he 
stopped resisting his physical dependence and turned toward it, as if acceptance of his 
naked, utter vulnerability was the next landmark on his route out of life.”302  In the 
context of this conception, the virtues of acknowledged dependence could constitute a 
kind of gift to loved ones who are, in some cases, eager to provide care at the end of life.  
One patient Byock describes is gently scolded by her children, “[l]et us be your children, 
let us love you.”303   But this kind of being loved is surely something we grow towards 
because most of us spend so much of our lives not needing to depend on others for the 
things in question here.  Thus, the virtues of acknowledged dependence, such as gratitude 
for care rendered or for a loved one’s presence during dying, become means for 
achieving the aims of those holding this conception.   
How might growth as a conception of a good death inform one’s use of practical 
wisdom?  If a patient has goals for her growth, the accomplishment of these tasks might 
inform how she makes use of, or forgoes, medical interventions.  Someone who is eager 
to see a relationship grow beyond some disharmony might opt for less pain medication 
than others in order to maintain a clearer head for conversation.  Likewise, when one’s 
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goals for growth are completed, this might indicate to a patient that this is an appropriate 
time to forgo new treatments and move toward receiving only palliative care.   
Unlike the virtues of forgetfulness, which would appear to be unique to 
“Avoiding Death” as a conception of a good death, the virtues discussed here under 
“Growth in Dying” are not unique to this conception.  Rather, the “Growth in Dying” as a 
conception of a good death informs how and to what end these virtues are relevant.  The 
virtues I’ve discussed enable the patient to be or become the kind of person who can 
grow during the dying period. 
Virtues and Simply Dying 
 To simply die is to have one’s death be no more than the end of one’s life.  Those 
who embrace this conception seek to live until they die.  In Chapter Two, “Conceptions 
of a Good Death,” I suggest that such a conception relies heavily on the concept of being 
a part of a community.  Sometimes extended families function as communities, though 
that is increasingly rare in the Western, industrial social context this study presumes.  
Daniel Callahan says of his own prospective death, “I do not want to be abandoned, 
psychologically ejected from the community, because of my impending death.”304  
Remaining a member of a community is a way of living until one dies, and this is what it 
is to simply die.  This conception does not necessarily advocate growth nor does it 
recommend avoidance of death.  In fact, an understanding of trans-generational 
community will allow one to make some sense of the fact of one’s dying.  However, a 
patient can, on this conception, simply continue with whatever tasks she is able to do, and 
when she can perform no further tasks, she can simply remain with those she has lived 
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with.  Such a person can be careless in a way about her dying, because, on this 
conception, death is simply the end of a life; it is no more than a part of a life. 
 On such a conception social virtues would seem to rank very highly.  Gratitude 
and generosity, a sense of justice within (and beyond) one’s community,305 and caring 
will all contribute to the fostering of a community in which the patient seeks to live and 
die.  Such a community might place a high premium on the virtues of acknowledged 
dependence as a way of embodying the acknowledgment that the members of the 
community live intertwined with others.  The judgments of practical wisdom will take 
into account the patient’s place in her community.  A proponent of simply dying might 
opt for treatments that allow him to remain as active as possible within his community.  
And, such a patient might forego treatments or even hospitalization if these become an 
impediment to remaining meaningfully connected to his community. 
 While “Avoiding Death” and, to a lesser extent, “Growth in Dying” are common 
conceptions today, “Simply Dying,” particularly the version of it that relies heavily on 
the patient’s being a member of a meaningful community, is less in evidence.  That may 
be one reason so many find it hard to die well in this culture.  That fact may also be a 
symptom of contemporary society, including contemporary medicine, both of which 
seem to presume the relevant unit of consideration is the individual.  Nevertheless, an 
example of simply dying can be found in the story “Fidelity” by Wendell Berry.306  
                                                 
305 David K. O’Connor, “Aristotelian Justice as a Personal Virtue” in French, Uehling, and Wettstein, eds., 
Midwest Studies in Philosophy Volume XIII, 417-27 argues that justice is a virtue embodied by persons as 
much as it is a virtue of institutions.  “Aristotelian justice is the virtue of a human being who is a good 
partner in the pursuit of some worthwhile goal, especially the goal of virtuous action within the context of a 
political community” (425-6). 
306 Wendell Berry, “Fidelity” in Fidelity: Five Stories (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992), 107-189.  The 
themes Berry develops here are also discussed in Wendell Berry, “Health is Membership” in Another Turn 
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“Fidelity” tells the story of the dying of 82 year old Burley Coulter of rural Kentucky.  
Coulter is a farmer who continues to work the farm with his extended family even when, 
by his own admission, he is no longer doing them any good.  As his disease worsens, his 
concerned family members take him to the hospital in Louisville.  There, however, they 
find their sense of community threatened by the fact that their visits to the hospital only 
“enact again a strange rite of offering themselves where they could not be received.”307  
The family members’ angst at this rupture of community is intensified by Coulter’s 
hallucinations that he is still with them on the farm: “Boys, why don’t you all wait for me 
yonder by the gate.  I’ve got just this one last round to make, and then we’ll all go in 
together.”308  When his angst gets severe enough Danny, who is Burley’s son, “kidnaps” 
his father from the hospital and takes him back to the farm so that Burley can die on his 
land and in his community.  Since Burley’s removal from the hospital was done at night 
and unofficially, a detective is assigned to find him.  Detective Bode says, “Here was an 
old guy resting easy in the best medical facility money could buy.  And what happened?  
This damned redneck, Danny … came and kidnapped him out of his hospital bed in the 
middle of the night.”309  One of the members of Burley’s community, in the midst of a 
long-winded explanation of what Danny has been up to, simply says, “Some of us think 
people belong to each other….”310  The contrast is with a notion that people belong to 
institutions, such as medicine.   
                                                                                                                                                 
of the Crank (Washington, D.C.: Counterpoint, 1995).  “Fidelity” is discussed in Joel James Shuman and 
Keith G. Meador, Heal Thyself: Spirituality, Medicine, and the Distortion of Christianity (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 133-135. 
307 Berry, “Fidelity,” 108. 
308 Ibid, 111. 
309 Ibid, 145. 
310 Ibid, 166. 
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Those who espouse “Simply Dying” seek to remain clear about the purpose of an 
institution such as medicine.  It ought to serve the ends of the community to which the 
patient is connected.311  Thus, patients will seek to embody virtues that help them to 
remain integral members of their community and that help them to discern the use of 
medical care as an aid to community.  Practical wisdom will be one of the relevant 
virtues here.  Temperance both in its own right and as an aid to practical wisdom will also 
be relevant.  Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma describe what they call “medical 
temperance” as a response to “technology gone amok [in the form of] life-prolonging 
technology.”312  Their discussion focuses mainly on medical temperance as a virtue for 
doctors.  However, the concerns they raise, combined with a social and legal climate in 
medicine that encourages doctors to do all they can until the patient declines, suggest that 
patients who want to simply die might do well to embody temperance.  In this case 
temperance would be an aid to practical wisdom concerning the use of medical 
technology.  As the story of Burley Coulter illustrates, temperance can be subversive of a 
social order.  Alasdair MacIntyre argues that “genuine virtues are dysfunctional to any 
but the best form of common life.”313  Because simply dying, as I have developed it here, 
depends heavily for its conception of a good death on being rooted in a community, this 
conception will require virtues such as temperance and practical wisdom to keep its 
common life from being disrupted by medical technology that no longer serves the needs 
                                                 
311 Shuman and Meador, Heal Thyself, 134. 
312 Edmund D. Pellegrino and David C. Thomasma, The Virtues in Medical Practice (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 120.  Their discussion of these issues takes place on pp. 120-4. 
313 Alasdair MacIntyre, “Sophrosune: How a Virtue Can Become Socially Disruptive,” in French, Uehling, 
Wettstein, eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy Volume XIII, 1-11, 4.  MacIntyre also argues for a 
connection, beginning with Aristotle, between temperance and practical wisdom (5-6).   
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of the community and its members, but rather subverts them.  This is what Berry aims to 
convey in the story “Fidelity.” 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have looked at virtues that I believe can facilitate a good death 
on any conception and under a broad variety of medical circumstances.  And, I have 
looked at three of the conceptions to see how particular virtues might play a role in 
pursuing a good death on the terms of the conception in question.  Some of these virtues 
are particular specifications of virtues I argued are relevant to a broad variety of 
conceptions of a good death.  And some of these virtues are unique to particular 
conceptions of a good death.  I have tried to show how such virtues enable their possessor 
to more successfully pursue her conception of a good death.  In particular, I have tried to 
show how each of these conceptions involves its adherent becoming a certain kind of 
person such that she could die well under that conception.  In the next chapter, I will give 
extended consideration to the final conception of a good death identified in Chapter Two.  
The “Good ‘Christian’ Death” as a representative of a variety of different ways that 














 Although any of the conceptions of a good death discussed earlier might be 
combined with religious convictions, these convictions often suggest particular 
conceptions of a good death that are unique to the religion in question.  In this chapter I 
will look at one way of conceiving of a good death from within the Christian moral 
tradition.  I do not claim this is the only legitimate religious conception of a good death; 
indeed, a claim of such legitimacy seems best judged from within the tradition in 
question.  Nor do I claim this is the only Christian conception of a good death.  While I 
will try to ground my claims about how to conceive of a good death in the Christian 
tradition in some of the most basic theological or metaphysical loci, I recognize that more 
than one conception of a good Christian death could be conceived from such starting 
points.  My aim is to depict one such conception.  I don’t argue here that this conception 
is superior to alternative conceptions of a good death, Christian or other.  Rather, I 
discuss this conception in greater detail out of personal interest and in order to give a 
more detailed picture of how a conception of a good death might be achieved by someone 
embodying a particular constellation and specification of virtues. 
Tradition-Based Inquiry and the Christian Moral Tradition 
 In 1979, Alasdair MacIntyre, assessing some contributions to a journal issue 
devoted to medicine and theology, offered a challenge to religious scholars doing 
bioethics.  He said, “[w]hat we ought to expect from contemporary theologians in the 
area of medical ethics: First—and without this everything else is uninteresting—we ought 
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to expect a clear statement of what difference it makes to be a Jew or a Christian or a 
Moslem, rather than a secular thinker, in morality generally.”314  MacIntyre, himself a 
proponent of the claim that thick moralities emerge from moral traditions, invites 
members of religious moral traditions to do work that self-consciously represents 
particular traditions.315  In this chapter, I am attempting to do that.  While individual 
Christians might be unconsciously drawn to or consciously find attractive aspects of other 
conceptions of a good death, they ought also, if the Christian moral tradition is relevant in 
the way that MacIntyre challenges it to be, show themselves to be interestingly different 
in how they approach dying and the notion of dying well.  This difference might be 
reflected in their conclusions.  However, even when Christians reach conclusions similar 
to those of non-Christians, their reasoning and the premises drawn on to carry out such 
reasoning will often be different.  Of course, in the pluralistic societies that characterize 
much of the West today, many individuals are formed by multiple traditions or fragments 
of traditions.  So, in some sense, what I attempt to do here is idealistic.  Many who claim 
the term ‘Christian’ in America today are not so thoroughly formed as to represent, and 
live out of, a coherent Christian moral tradition.  Nevertheless, this chapter seeks to 
articulate what that might look like.316   
                                                 
314 Alasdair MacIntyre, “Theology, ethics, and the ethics of medicine and health care: Commentary on 
papers by Novak, Mouw, Roach, Cahill, and Hartt,” The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 4 (1979): 
435-443, 435. 
315 By thick moralities, I mean sets of moral convictions that are characterized by substantial claims rooted 
in metaphysical convictions and not merely formal claims. 
316 In addition to MacIntyre, Stanley Hauerwas has long been an advocate of tradition-based approaches to 
ethics.  For an early statement of this approach, see Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character: Toward 
a Constructive Christian Social Ethic (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).  
MacIntyre’s main works include, Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1984); Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); and Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: 
Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990). 
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 I will seek to write out of a broad but orthodox understanding of the Christian 
tradition.  By broad, I mean that I do not intend to defend a particularly Roman Catholic, 
Eastern Orthodox, or Protestant view.  Rather, I will attempt to use theological claims 
with wide acceptance within the Christian tradition.  By orthodox, I mean that I intend to 
draw on some of the most fundamental and, historically, widely accepted Biblical and 
theological claims that have shaped the Christian tradition’s identity over time.  The 
Nicene Creed of the 4th century A.D. provides a brief, but important, statement of what 
the core of that orthodoxy might look like.  Christianity gains much of its identity from 
the canonical texts of the Old and New Testaments.  But those texts are not self-
interpreting.  Thus, the Christian tradition refers to and draws on what it takes to be its 
earliest and most widely held interpretations of those texts among Christians.317  The 
Nicene Creed represents one widely agreed upon summary of key theological 
interpretations of texts dealing with the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation.318 
 In focusing on a particular moral tradition, one inevitably invites questions about 
where the Christian tradition stands with respect to other traditions.  Must Christians 
believe that their tradition is demonstrably rationally superior to all others in order to 
confident in its truth?  Must Christians believe their tradition is incorrigible and immune 
to correction?  I will answer “no” to both questions.  These questions are, of course, 
                                                 
317 For one account of how the tradition has shaped Christians’ interpretation of scripture, among a branch 
of Christians least likely to admit that tradition informs their reading and identity, see D.H. Williams, 
Evangelicals and Tradition: The Formative Influence of the Early Church (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2005).  For an argument that the Christian scriptures have long been read within interpretive 
communities, see Stephen E. Fowl and L. Gregory Jones, Reading in Communion: Scripture and Ethics in 
Christian Life (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1991). 
318 For an example of a book that seeks to use a broad and orthodox understanding of the Christian moral 
tradition as I do here, see Joel James Shuman and Brian Volck, M.D., Reclaiming the Body: Christians and 
the Faithful Use of Modern Medicine (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2006).  For particular comment on 
this approach, see endnote 30 on p. 147. 
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related to questions about whether some conceptions of a well-lived life and a good death 
are superior to others.  My approach in examining these questions is informed by 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s notion of tradition-based inquiry.319  To approach moral issues from 
the perspective of particular traditions does not necessarily commit one to relativism or to 
a permanent pluralism of views.320  Traditions are ongoing inquiries concerning, above 
all else, the truth about what constitutes a well-lived human life.  In the words of 
Christopher Lutz, “[t]radition rejects both the once-for-all rationality of encyclopaedia, 
and the once-for-all relativism of genealogy.”321  A tradition-based approach can 
acknowledge serious disagreements concerning such questions as what constitute well-
lived lives and be somewhat hopeful that over time progress can be made in adjudicating 
disputes among traditions.  This is particularly so if the traditions in question are open to 
examination and self-examination of the underlying narratives that supply 
presuppositions to their adherents.322  Those presuppositions, of course, shape how their 
possessors view moral issues and the shape of life more generally.  MacIntyre argues that 
some traditions might be shown to be superior to others if they can point to 
                                                 
319 This is developed in MacIntyre’s Whose Justice? Which Rationality? and Three Rival Versions.  This 
subject was first discussed by Alasdair MacIntyre in “Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the 
Philosophy of Science,” The Monist 60:4 (Oct 1977): 453-72. 
320 MacIntyre believes that relativism and the Enlightenment goal of a univocal conception of rationality 
are historically related phenomena.  See MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 353. 
321 Christopher Stephen Lutz, Tradition in the Ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre: Relativism, Thomism, and 
Philosophy (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004), 54.  Lutz defends MacIntyre against some of the most 
common criticisms the latter has received concerning his notion of tradition-based inquiry.  See especially 
Lutz’s chapters on “Tradition-Constituted and Tradition-Constitutive Rationality” and “Is MacIntyre’s 
Theory of Tradition Relativistic?” for comprehensive defenses which MacIntyre has endorsed.  The notions 
of encyclopaedic rationality and genealogical relativism are derived from MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions. 
322 Lutz, Tradition, 45, 58.  Lutz comments: “Conflicts at the level of narrative are vexing because they are 
conflicts of presuppositions.  Presuppositions are inescapable.  One may come to modify one’s 
presuppositions over time, but one cannot avoid having them.  This is why MacIntyre finds that there can 
be no common set of standards by which to resolve radical conflicts between conflicting versions of the 
same practice. […] Moral conflicts between conflicting traditions are not really about the conclusions of 
arguments; they are about the premises of those arguments…” (45). 
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inconsistencies and incoherences in other traditions which those other traditions are 
unable to account for or correct on their own terms.323  Presumably the most powerful 
challenges by one tradition of another would be those aimed at the level of 
presuppositions.  MacIntyre draws on key figures in the philosophy of science reflecting 
on key events in the history of science to show how a disruption of one’s presuppositions 
can lead to the adoption of new ones, or at least a significant revision of old ones.324  
Thus, someone adopting MacIntyre’s approach need not be committed to the relativistic 
claim that all traditions are true only for their adherents.  Rather, until one’s tradition and 
its presuppositions have been put into serious question by another tradition offering a 
better account of the issues at hand, it seems that members of a tradition can be confident 
in it.  Thus, Christians could be confident that the Christian moral tradition will guide 
them to truth without also claiming that it has shown itself to be rationally superior to all 
its rivals.  Of course, their confidence would be qualified by the conviction that, while 
some issues are relatively more settled, others are not and that the Christian tradition 
should be open to new understandings as it has been at key points throughout its 
history.325 
 Can members of the Christian moral tradition claim to be so open?  Insofar as the 
Christian moral tradition represents an interpretation of its canonical texts, its members 
                                                 
323 MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, 388.  Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, in Divine Motivation 
Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), Chapter Nine, “Ideal observers, ideal agents, and 
moral diversity,” discusses the ways that moral exemplars of different traditions might be best situated to 
engage in the kind of cross-tradition dialogue that MacIntyre endorses here. 
324 This is a key theme of MacIntyre’s, “Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of 
Science.”  MacIntyre refers to Thomas Kuhn’s notion of paradigm changes and Imre Lakatos’s notion of 
revision of a scientific research program.  MacIntyre’s claims are discussed and defended in Lutz, 
Tradition, 47-52. 
325 The recognition of the Biblical canon and the formal articulation of key doctrines like the Trinity and the 
Incarnation, events which took place in the first few centuries of the Christian tradition, are examples of 
“new understandings” that occur within, and not outside of, the history of the tradition.  
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can and should acknowledge some fallibility in its interpretation.  Those who read widely 
in the history of the church and theology will have good evidence that the tradition has 
grown, and in some cases corrected itself, over time.  Some, of course, do not see such 
growth326.  Indeed, Thomas Hibbs argues that MacIntyre’s own Thomism is not so open 
to “radical revision” in the way MacIntyre suggests traditions are.327  However, to 
stipulate Thomistic Christianity as the final, authoritative expression of the Christian 
tradition would be to narrow the tradition in a way that I have sought to avoid doing.  
Further, if MacIntyre is committed to a Thomistic interpretation of Christianity he could 
respond to Hibbs’s criticism by pointing out that any claim of finality within Thomism 
ignores Thomism’s history, a history which ought to shape its claims about its future.328  
A concern of Hibbs’s that applies more generally to the Christian tradition is its 
movement towards an eschatological “consummation of all things in Christ.”329  
Christians are committed, I believe, to an end to history shaped by the consummation to 
which Hibbs refers.  Thus, the Christian moral tradition must be open to an end of inquiry 
at some point in the future, but this is on the conviction that the need for inquiry will have 
ended as well.   
 The Christian moral tradition need not see the interpretation of its growth and 
history I am proposing here as an intellectually alien conceptual apparatus imposed on it.  
On the contrary, Christians can see this as consistent with some of the theological claims 
                                                 
326 Often, their view presumes that some particular time period was more definitive than any other for the 
Christian moral tradition’s self-interpretation as well as its interpretation of its canonical texts.  But this 
ignores all that led to whatever historical moment, including our own, has been chosen. 
327 Thomas Hibbs, “MacIntyre, Tradition, and the Christian Philosopher,” Modern Schoolman, 68:3 (1991): 
211-23, 219. 
328 MacIntyre documents some of this history in Three Rival Versions, Chapter Three, “Too Many 
Thomisms?” 
329 Hibbs, “MacIntyre,” 219. 
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that shape their tradition.  The doctrine of sin, and particularly the claim that sin—as 
alienation from God—has noetic effects, is consistent with the conviction that our ability 
to perceive truth is at least partially marred by sin.  If this is the case, then Christians 
would expect that others—Christian or not—might be able to perceive truths to which 
Christians in any given era would be blind unless they were willing to see themselves as 
part of a tradition that can and should shape their understanding.  G.K. Chesterton has 
commented that a tradition is “democracy extended over time.”330  While that might not 
be an entirely accurate characterization of a normative moral tradition, it does contain an 
element of truth relevant here.  Presumably the ways that Christians in one era are blind 
to some aspect of truth could be corrected by those in another era who are not blind in the 
same way.   
The second theological claim that suggests an affinity between Christian 
conviction and tradition-based inquiry is the incarnation, particularly the claim that God 
entered time and is willing to work within time.  That God enters time in the person of 
Jesus and that Jesus sends his Spirit to continue the work of the Body of Christ (the 
church) over time suggest that Christians should be open to the idea that their 
understanding of God and themselves will require that they pay attention to how God has 
acted and revealed himself over the course of time.  Jesus and the church have histories 
that are crucial to their identities.  The theological doctrines of sin and incarnation 
suggest that thinking of itself as a tradition-based inquiry ought not be foreign to 
Christianity.  Before going on to look at how the Christian moral tradition shapes its 
                                                 
330 Shuman and Volck, Reclaiming the Body, 10.  They do not offer any reference for the quote. 
 168
adherents’ views of a good death, I will discuss some other theological claims that form 
the content of a broad but orthodox conception of the tradition. 
The Theological Background 
 Any religious conception of a good death will entail some theological or 
metaphysical claims about the nature of reality that inform the concepts of flourishing 
and dying well claimed by the tradition in question.  The Christian moral tradition is no 
different in this regard.  Its metaphysic can best be explained against the context of the 
broad narrative strokes depicted in the Bible, its canonical scriptures.  This narrative has 
four major themes in it: creation, fall, reconciliation and redemption, and eschatological 
consummation.  God creates the world and calls it good.  Sin enters the created order and 
mars, without completely destroying, the original goodness of creation.  This affects both 
humans and their relationship with God and others and the rest of the created order.331  
Sin is both a general condition of a creation alienated from God and an individual 
condition of rebellion against God.  God initiates the work of reconciling himself to 
humans who have been alienated and turned away from God.  Further, God sets out to 
restore and redeem the original goodness of creation, including people and their capacity 
to be friends with God.  The person and work of Jesus Christ are central to these 
activities, which are carried on by the Holy Spirit after Jesus’s departure from earth.  
Finally, God will complete the work of redemption and enact the consummation of 
friendship between God and humans and complete the restoration of the original 
goodness of the created order.  I will refer to this below as the Christian narrative. 
                                                 
331 Whether sin’s effect of marring the whole of the created order is a necessary condition or not, I cannot 
say.  For my purposes here, however, it is enough to take note of the claim of Christian theology that sin 
does in fact mar the whole created order to one degree or another. 
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 I will use theologian Karl Barth as a representative voice for the Christian moral 
tradition out of which emerges a Christian conception of dying well.  I am sympathetic to 
Barth’s approach to these matters.  My aim is not simply to interpret Barth but to think 
sympathetically with him and, where he falls silent, to push faithfully beyond his own 
thinking.  My approach in this chapter is to be consistent with his thinking, even as I go 
beyond his own explicit claims.  Barth presumes and draws on the narrative outline 
discussed above to articulate an ethic.332  The fall and the alienation from God that it 
introduces mean that humans are not properly related to God.  Sin introduces an element 
of corruption into our nature and separates us from God’s moral perfection.  Thus, 
reconciliation and redemption are key movements in the narrative outline above.  For 
Barth, God is the initiator in these actions and humans respond.  God invites people into 
covenant.  The human task, not taken up independently of God, is to become the kind of 
person who can faithfully respond to God’s acts of reconciliation and redemption.333  The 
Biblical theme Barth uses to characterize the human response to God is Sabbath rest.334  
Christians are called to learn to rest in God and in what God has initiated through 
reconciliation and redemption.  Sabbath-keeping is a practice Christians take up in order 
to remain mindful of the moral space they inhabit.  God claims the whole of time but 
designates a Sabbath rest in order that Christians can consciously pause from their own 
                                                 
332 Within his chief theological work, the multi-volume Church Dogmatics, Barth discusses the ethical 
implications of his theology mainly in two volumes: Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics II/2, G.W. Bromiley 
and T.F. Torrance, eds. (Edinburgh, Scotland: T&T Clark, Ltd., 1957) and Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics 
III/4, G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, eds. (Edinburgh, Scotland: T&T Clark, Ltd., 1961). 
333 Although Barth superficially appears to embrace a simple divine command ethic, the virtue ethical 
claims I discuss here are also deeply embedded in his theology and ethics.  This perspective on Barth’s 
ethics has been defended in William Werpehowski, “Narrative and Ethics in Barth,” Theology Today 43:3 
(1986): 334-53; John Webster, Barth’s Ethics of Reconciliation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1995); and John Webster, Barth’s Moral Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
1998). 
334 Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/4, 49-50. 
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efforts to participate in God’s redemption and be reminded that this is a redemption that 
comes from God and will be completed only by him.335  Sabbath rest serves as a sign that 
all of time, for Christians, belongs to God.336  When faithfully practiced, it orients 
Christians to understand their own activities in the light of what God has done and will 
do.  In doing this, it is a practice that serves the formation of practical wisdom in that it 
trains Christians to see their actions from the perspective of the wider scope of the 
Christian narrative.  The theme of Sabbath rest looks both forward and backward in the 
scriptural narrative.  The origin of Sabbath is God’s rest from the work of creation 
(discussed in Genesis 1-2).  Sabbath also points to the eschatological consummation of 
God’s reconciliatory and redemptive work when God calls his people to a completed 
rest.337   
 This narrative shapes the Christian’s understanding of death.  In some sense, a 
good death in the Christian tradition would be one in which the person embodies this 
narrative.338  Because humans beings are also a part of God’s creation called good 
(though marred by sin), life has a basic value.  God “loans” us our lives, in Barth’s terms; 
they are not our own to do with as we please.  Further, our lives are loaned to us for the 
purpose of service to God and others.339  Thus, “[t]hose who handle life as a divine loan 
                                                 
335 Ibid.  This account also draws on commentary by John Webster in Barth’s Moral Theology, particularly 
Chapter Eight “The Grammar of Doing: Luther and Barth on Human Agency.” 
336 Ibid, 67. 
337 Ibid, 55. 
338 John E. Colwell, Living the Christian Story: The Distinctiveness of Christian Ethics (New York: T&T 
Clark, Ltd., 2001) argues that Christian ethics involves finding identity and fulfillment through embodying, 
in one’s own life, the narrative that emerges from scripture.  Fowl and Jones, cited above, say, “[t]he 
vocation of Christians is to embody Scripture in the various contexts in which they find themselves” 
(Reading in Communion, 1).  Below I will discuss how embodying Christian virtues can dispose one to 
carry out this project. 
339 Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/4, 324. 
 171
will above all treat it with respect.”340  Barth excludes suicide on these grounds.  Suicide 
is inconsistent with an acknowledgement of the goodness of humans as a part of creation, 
a goodness which remains even amidst the marring effects of sin.  Suicide is also 
inconsistent with a grateful reception of God’s initiatives of reconciliation and 
redemption.341  To treat our lives with respect is to affirm, Barth claims, the goodness of 
creation and to look forward to God’s renewal of those aspects of creation that are marred 
by sin.  Such respect implies that we cannot subvert or attempt to shortcut God’s 
redemptive work.  Suicide, Barth claims, does this and is therefore excluded from moral 
legitimacy.  To put the matter in terms other than those Barth uses—but which he 
implies—suicide represents a failure to pursue the kind of moral development that would 
enable one to become the kind of person who can faithfully respond to God’s acts of 
reconciliation and redemption.342 
 However, Barth also points out that life is not a “second god” and that the 
reverence Christians owe God cannot be rivaled by an equal reverence for life itself.343  
Christians ought not seek to preserve their lives at all costs.  Martyrdom can be explained 
in these terms: the martyr will not seek to preserve her life at the expense of betraying 
convictions that are a fundamental part of her identity.  For martyrs, life is not a god to be 
                                                 
340 Ibid, 338-9. 
341 Ibid, 401-413. 
342 In his discussion of suicide Barth recognizes that how an act is described greatly affects the moral 
evaluation of it.  And, he recognizes that not all acts we sometimes call suicide should necessarily be 
morally excluded in the same way (ibid, 410).  Barth engages, as the larger Christian moral tradition has, in 
a kind of casuistry aimed at properly discerning the appropriate descriptions of our actions, including acts 
that result in life’s ending.  For a discussion of casuistry and description, see Stanley Hauerwas, 
“Reconciling the practice of reason: Casuistry in a Christian context,” in Baruch A. Brody, ed., Moral 
Theory and Moral Judgments in Medical Ethics (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1988): 135-55, 138.  That Barth’s conclusions are consistent with the larger Christian moral tradition can 
be confirmed in Nigel Biggar, Aiming to Kill: The Ethics of Suicide and Euthanasia (London: Darton, 
Longman, and Todd, Ltd., 2004). 
343 Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/4, 342. 
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worshipped and pursued in the same way that God is to be.344  God is worthy of 
wholehearted devotion, so the task of becoming the sort of person who can be friends 
with God is also worthy, on the Christian account, of wholehearted devotion.  However, 
this task will not, most Christians have believed, be completed prior to death.  Death need 
not be postponed to complete this task, and life need not be preserved indefinitely for this 
or any other reason.  Christians, then, have no obligation to preserve life at all costs.345  
Indeed, in certain situations where doing otherwise would constitute worshipping life as a 
second god, they have reasons not to.  Worshipping life as a second god, in Barth’s 
thinking, seems to involve any attempt by Christians to overvalue their lives as they 
know them now.  This could be done by overzealous efforts to preserve them in the face 
of death.346  One clear indication of such overzealousness might be when the preservation 
of the Christian’s life requires her to violate or ignore moral convictions that she claims 
shape her identity.  It could also be done by valuing the goods of this life above the goods 
of reconciliation and redemption offered by God. 
The chief task of Christians seeking to embody the scriptural narrative in their 
dying is, Barth suggests, to learn to rest in God and in God’s work in the world.  To rest 
in God is to find a kind of contentment in God and in the goods that God offers.  To 
pursue a Christian understanding of rest is to seek to allow the Christian narrative to 
define one’s identity and one’s character.  On this account, Christians are those people 
                                                 
344 Barth discusses martyrs as an exception to the moral prohibition on knowingly acting in a way that 
results in self-destruction (ibid, 411-13). 
345 Of course, saying that Christians do not have an obligation to preserve life at all costs does not mean 
that they have some kind of corresponding right to end lives.  Barth’s claims here are set within the context 
of his understanding that respect for life entails not taking it, as commanded in the seventh commandment 
of the Decalogue (ibid, 344). 
346 Of course, how to define ‘overzealous’ is difficult and contestable.  I will revisit this topic when 
discussing practical wisdom in the Christian tradition. 
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who are defined by their story and whose activities in response to the God who is the 
central actor in the story are an improvisation on the theme set by God.347   
The Christian Narrative, Suffering, and Dying 
 The Christian narrative entails some implications for the end of life.  Because the 
original created order has been marred by sin, suffering results.  For some, this raises the 
problem of evil: how could a good, loving, and all powerful god allow suffering?  For my 
purposes here, the challenge is not to explain suffering so much as it is to learn to go on 
in the face of our or others’ suffering at the end of life.348  Stanley Hauerwas argues that, 
“historically speaking, Christians have not had a ‘solution’ to the problem of evil.  
Rather, they have had a community of care that has made it possible for them to absorb 
the destructive terror of evil that constantly threatens to destroy all human relations.”349  
While I’m not sure Hauerwas keeps the promise he makes at the beginning of God, 
Medicine, and Suffering not to offer a theodicy, and I’m not sure he is right, as he 
implies, that no account should be offered for the origin of evil and suffering in the 
world, Hauerwas is right to insist that Christians be a community capable of responding 
                                                 
347 Samuel Wells, Improvisation: The Drama of Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2004). 
348 Stanley Hauerwas, God, Medicine, and Suffering (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
1990) argues that, “we cannot afford to give ourselves explanations of evil” if those become a replacement 
for “a community capable of absorbing our grief” (xi).  For a discussion of the importance, to Hauerwas, of 
the church as “a community capable of absorbing our grief,” see Samuel Wells, Transforming Fate into 
Destiny: The Theological Ethics of Stanley Hauerwas (Carlisle, U.K.: Paternoster Publishing, 1998), 
particularly Chapters Four and Five. 
349 Hauerwas, God, Medicine, and Suffering, 53.  Shuman and Volck, Reclaiming the Body, 66-7 discuss 
the same issues with a particular focus, throughout their book on the Body of Christ (which is the church, 
the body to be reclaimed in their title), on how the Christians can live out their calling to be such a 
community amidst suffering. 
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to the presence of suffering.350  Part of this response, as I will discuss more below, is for 
Christians, as individual members of the Body of Christ, to embody virtues that enable 
them to place their lives in the context of the larger Christian narrative that defines their 
identity and their destiny.  To do so is to understand that suffering is not an ultimate part 
of God’s purposes in the world.  The consummation of God’s redemption of the world 
will result in the elimination of suffering.  Theodicy, Hauerwas argues, attempts to 
validate the current status quo by offering “a legitimation for the way in which society is 
organized.”351  But Christians, if they are to situate their lives within the larger Christian 
narrative, must, even as they live in the present, look to a future in which God’s designs 
for his created order will be fully restored.  A number of Christian virtues are aimed at 
enabling their possessor to do precisely this. 
 To the degree that medicine suggests that all suffering is pointless and therefore 
ought to be eliminated, it challenges the Christian moral tradition.352  On the contrary, 
Hauerwas argues, some suffering “is impossible to avoid in the context of our moral 
convictions.”353  Hauerwas implies that Christians should prepared to embrace some 
suffering even as they seek relief for other forms of suffering.  The challenge from an 
overzealous medicine would be to see all suffering as needing to be eliminated.  
Hauerwas offers relatively little to help us understand how to discern which suffering fits 
                                                 
350 Hauerwas promises not to offer a theodicy in God, Medicine, and Suffering, ix-x.  In Chapter Two, 
“Theology, Theodicy, and Medicine,” he, at times, seems to partially endorse some historical accounts of 
the origin of evil and suffering in the world. 
351 Hauerwas, God, Medicine, and Suffering, 46.  He discusses this claim at length on pp. 46-48. 
352 Stanley Hauerwas, Suffering Presence: Theological Reflections on Medicine, the Mentally 
Handicapped, and the Church (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), 24. 
353 Ibid, 25.  “Our” refers here to Christians, but Hauerwas generalizes the point as well to suggest that any 
set of moral convictions worth having will entail our being willing to suffer rather than commit some act or 
allow some other set of conditions to result. He quotes Alasdair MacIntyre: “Any account of morality 
which does not allow for the fact that my death may be required of me at any moment is an inadequate 
account” (ibid, 24-5). 
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within our moral projects.354  However, he does suggest a way for Christians to think of 
the suffering they do endure as being something other than meaningless.  Consider, for 
instance, the Christian who retains the conviction that she ought not seek to take her life 
to avoid suffering at the end of life.  From the perspective of some, such suffering is 
meaningless.355  The patient will soon die anyway, so how can there be any meaning in 
enduring it?  The meaningfulness comes from the Christian’s being able to see her 
suffering in the context of the larger Christian narrative.  Christians need not 
inauthentically claim that suffering that appears to be bad is really good.  However, they 
can find meaning even in the presence of suffering if they see the suffering in the context 
of the larger Christian narrative.356  The degree to which Christians can see suffering in 
that larger context will be the degree to which they have identified with that larger 
narrative and, in a sense, grafted their own lives into it.  This is a project which can be 
achieved by embodying virtues that enable their possessors to see their lives and 
suffering in such terms.  Below, I will discuss a number of Christian virtues that are 
aimed at precisely this.  For example, hope and patience, in their Christian form, are 
virtues which dispose their possessor to see her life as being defined not just by the 
present realities she experiences but also by the future indicated in the Christian narrative, 
particularly the eschatological consummation of the narrative.  Hope is a disposition to 
                                                 
354 Ibid, 36. 
355 Even when that claim is not explicitly made, it forms the background for much discussion of end of life 
issues.  For an example, see Ray Frey, “Passive Death,” in Nafsika Athanassoulis, ed., Philosophical 
Reflections on Medical Ethics (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 198-207. 
356 Stan van Hooft, “The Meanings of Suffering,” Hastings Center Report 28:5 (Sept-Oct, 1998): 13-19, 15.  
Interestingly, Van Hooft, for different reasons, ends up endorsing Hauerwas’s claim above that suffering is 
to be borne and not explained away by “false consolations” (18-19).  Van Hooft seems to be especially 
concerned with a third party imposing a meaning on the sufferer’s experience.  This is different from the 
sufferer herself finding some meaning in her suffering.  Meaningfulness is a person-dependent notion, 
although the meaning I suggest Christians might find in their suffering is based on shared convictions.  
Thanks to Glenn Graber for his helpful comments concerning meaningfulness and suffering.     
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anticipate such a future.  Patience is a disposition to carry on in the present in the light of 
that future. 
One part of the body of thought known as “redemptive suffering” can be 
integrated here.357  If Christians seek to bear their suffering in a manner that imitates 
Jesus Christ’s manner of suffering, then they might grow in faith and in likeness to 
Christ.358  Christopher Vogt offers an account of Jesus’s dying: “What this suggests is 
that it was not toughness and indifference to pain and suffering that were crucial to Jesus’ 
practice of patience in dying.  Instead, it was a learned attentiveness to God’s call and 
presence, and a willingness to hand himself over to that calling and finally into the hands 
of others.”359  Patience, as Vogt suggests, and also hope characterize Jesus’s 
“attentiveness to God’s call and presence” in the midst of his own dying.  Christian 
virtues are, foremost, Christ’s virtues.  Thus, when Christians suffer with hope and 
patience, they imitate Christ.  While suffering is often more a test of character than a 
school of character, it gives Christians an opportunity to manifest virtues and to deepen 
their identification with such virtues.360 
 In Chapter Three, I discussed Stan van Hooft’s claim that giving suffering a 
meaning or purpose denigrates the sufferer “by making him a means to some purpose.”361  
The account given of how the suffering has meaning takes a privileged place over the 
                                                 
357 Eduardo J. Echeverria, “The Gospel of Redemptive Suffering: Reflections on John Paul II’s Salvifici 
Doloris,” in Peter van Inwagen, ed., Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 2004), 111-47.  Echeverria reflects here on the Roman Catholic tradition of 
redemptive suffering. 
358 Ibid, 139-41. 
359 Christopher P. Vogt, Patience, Compassion, Hope and the Christian Art of Dying Well (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 133. 
360 Hauerwas, Suffering Presence, 26 claims that suffering is more a test of, than a school for, character. 
361 Van Hooft, “Meanings of Suffering,” 16.  I discuss this in Chapter Three in the section on “Suffering.” 
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individual sufferer.  To the degree that the Christian moral tradition gives an account of 
how one’s suffering has meaning and purpose, I believe it is guilty of this charge.  
However, a key claim of the Christian moral tradition is that Christians’ individual lives 
are part of a larger, more comprehensive narrative that is the story of God’s activity in 
the world.  God is self-sufficient, so he did not need to create the world or its inhabitants.  
Rather, creating the world is a manifestation of God’s love.362  God did not create 
humans for any purpose beyond that of expressing God’s love.  Christians understand 
their lives to have value only within a context in which God is creator and humans are 
creations.  So, in a sense, Christians can embrace this objection; it is simply a fault line 
between the Christian moral tradition and those other traditions—van Hooft aligns 
himself with something he calls “postmodern authenticity”—which object to the idea of 
individual lives having a place, and only a place, within a larger scheme.363 
But if the meaning that the Christian moral tradition assigns to suffering is to 
show how it can be viewed from within the perspective of a larger story, which is a story 
chiefly of God’s overcoming sin, evil, and suffering through the work of Jesus and the 
ongoing Body of Christ, animated by Christ’s Spirit, then it is not clear that the Christian 
moral tradition, as I’ve discussed it here, gives suffering a purpose.364  Suffering need not 
exist for some other end.  Rather, the Christian tradition gives suffering meaning chiefly 
                                                 
362 Zagzebski, Divine Motivation Theory, 218. 
363 See Van Hooft, “Meanings of Suffering,” 19 for Van Hooft’s positive commendation of postmodern 
authenticity as encouraging us to see suffering as something which teaches us to care for others.  
Interestingly, this is a point Stanley Hauerwas made in Suffering Presence (25).  Van Hooft refers to that 
book in his essay and appears to draw on Hauerwas’s insights in a number of places. 
364 Rather than having a purpose itself, it may be that sin is a by-product or an epiphenomenon of other 
purposes of God.  For instance, the “free will” defense against the problem of evil sometimes argues that 
the possibility of rebellion against God is a result of God’s intention to make humans truly free to love God 
and others. 
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by contextualizing it.  So it may be that the Christian moral tradition’s account of 
suffering does not need to face the objection van Hooft raises.   
The Christian moral tradition is not wholly opposed to suffering in any form.  It 
recognizes that some of its moral convictions will entail that it be open to suffering that 
accompanies the living out of these convictions.  Christians can expect suffering to be a 
part of life as a result of the marring effect of sin on the created order.  However, 
Christians need not simply accept any suffering; they can happily accept the relief of 
some suffering when relief is available and its attainment is consistent with other 
Christian moral convictions. 
Christian Virtues and the Christian Narrative 
I have argued that for any conception of a good death, there are virtues that can 
enable one to pursue the goods associated with that conception.  In the Christian moral 
tradition’s understanding of a good death, one function of the virtues is to conform 
individuals to the narrative that provides them and the larger tradition with their identity.  
Christians believe that they are shaped as persons and as a community by the convictions 
contained in the narrative outline of scripture I have discussed above.  Virtues embraced 
by the Christian tradition will function, in part, to enable one to be the kind of person 
who inhabits this narrative.  That is, Christian virtues help their possessor to embody the 
convictions that she and the created order are part of God’s good creation, a creation 
which is marred by sin, but being redeemed and restored through God’s reconciliatory 
initiative in Jesus, and that God’s work of redemption, in which individuals seeking to be 
rightly related to God participate, will be completed at some point in the future.  The 
Christian virtues enable their possessor to see the world through the lens of such 
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convictions.  Speaking of how virtues function more generally, Bernard Williams says 
that “the dispositions help to form the character of the agent who has them, and they will 
do the job the theory has given them only if the agent does not see his character purely 
instrumentally, but sees the world from the point of view of that character.”365  Christians 
don’t embody these virtues for instrumental reasons—simply because they help one to 
live or die well.  Rather, they embody the virtues in question because such virtues enable 
their possessor to see the world through the eyes of the narrative which the virtues draw 
on to gain their moral content.  But to do so enables one to become the kind of person 
who can face the challenges of dying well.  To embody virtues that constitute a personal 
appropriation of the truths of the Christian narrative is to become the kind of person who 
seeks not to let the prospect of suffering and dying to be more determinative of one’s life 
than the Christian narrative. 
Robert Roberts argues that certain emotions function this way also.  As 
propositional attitudes, emotions are “ways in which propositions become part of a 
person’s ‘vision.’”366  After distinguishing normal Christian knowledge from mere 
Christian knowledge (what we might call “knowledge about”), Roberts says, “[j]ust as 
the normal access to the proposition, ‘These leaves are green,’ is to see the leaves with 
one’s own eyes, so the normal access to the proposition, ‘Jesus died for your sins,’ is to 
feel gratitude and peace and other emotions.”367  But emotions such as joy, hope, 
gratitude, and contrition (Roberts’s examples) are, when found in a dispositional form, 
                                                 
365 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1985), 108. 
366 Robert C. Roberts, “Emotions as Access to Religious Truths,” Faith and Philosophy 9:1 (January 1992): 
83-94, 83. 
367 Ibid, 84. 
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also virtues in the Christian life.368  These virtues enable one to be personally related to 
propositions derived from the Christian narrative.  They enable one to experience these 
theological claims in important ways that mitigate the possibility of being overcome by 
alternative perceptions of the world and one’s place in it.  For many, the experience of 
dying presents such alternative perceptions. 
Christian Virtues and Dying Well 
 In Chapter Four, I argued that most virtues contain an emotion-disposition 
component.  Agents who embody a virtue like patience have their perceptions shaped by 
concerns that constitute the grammar of patience.  They are disposed to perceive objects 
of emotion “patiently.”  Above I have argued that one way virtues can help a Christian to 
die well is by enabling her to perceive her own experience in terms of the Christian 
narrative that is central to individual and communal identity for Christians.  In this 
section, I look at particular virtues in an effort to draw connections between the virtues, 
the narrative, and the challenges of dying.  My aim is to show how Christian virtues 
enable their possessor to die well. 
 Hope 
 As with many other virtues, hope takes on a distinct character for Christians.  
Although secular accounts of hope can be offered, when it is given a particular kind of 
transcendent cast hope is a preeminently Christian virtue.369  It is one of the three 
                                                 
368 Robert C. Roberts, “Emotions Among the Virtues of the Christian Life,” Journal of Religious Ethics 
20:1 (1992): 37-68 discusses the place of emotions with the repertoire of Christian virtues.  There he says, 
in support of the point I am making above, “[b]ecause content from the Christian tradition can become 
ingredient in an emotion, we have the possibility of distinctively Christian emotions” (39). 
369 For a secular account of hope, see Jayne M. Waterworth, A Philosophical Analysis of Hope (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2004).  Waterworth believes that dying is easier “when done with some kind of hope 
rather than none” (141).  Of course, this presents a problem in that Waterworth presents “a secular human-
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theological virtues, along with faith and love.370  The aim of these virtues is to enable 
their possessor to be rightly related to God.  Hope is a future-looking virtue.  We don’t 
hope for what we already have or are about to get.  Hope involves aspiration on the part 
of the one who hopes.  We don’t hope for what we dread will come about.  Rather, we 
hope for what we take to be good for us in the future.  In Aquinas’s discussion of hope, 
he describes it, first, as a movement toward that which will perfect our nature.371  The 
notion of a perfected nature can be understood in terms of the Christian narrative.  God 
creates human beings with a nature, a telos, which sin mars.  We cannot “naturally” 
achieve the perfection of our nature, but when God intervenes to reconcile us to himself 
and initiate the work of redeeming us, this includes our nature.  Christians hope, at the 
time of the eschatalogical consummation, to have their nature perfected so that they can 
be rightly related to God.  Christians hope to become “again” the kind of people we were 
originally created to be, namely those who can be friends with God.  Thus, “hope is a 
preparation of man for the true love of God….”372  The kind of hope Aquinas discusses is 
an ultimate hope.  Of course, Christians, like others, will have more immediate hopes 
(e.g., that my kids stay healthy, that my students learn what I am attempting to teach, or 
that Americans will recognize the environmental consequences of their practices).  
Christians need not deny these, and they can account for their more immediate hopes in 
                                                                                                                                                 
centered view” of hope but wants to say how hope might contribute to dying well when the hope of 
survival is past (1).  Waterworth offers “expressive hope” as a solution; she defines it as a “symbolic act 
embodying meaning” (105).  Such expressive hope allows the patient to die “in the light of hope” without 
the negative emotions of despair or fear (141). 
370 Thomas Aquinas discusses faith, hope, and charity (love) in Part II of Part II (IIa IIae, qq. 1-46) of the 
Summa Theologiae.  He gets that list from I Corinthians 13:13 in the New Testament. 
371 Romanus Cessario, O.P., “The Theological Virtue of Hope (IIa IIae, qq. 17-22),” in Stephen J. Pope, 
ed., The Ethics of Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 232-243, 232. 
372 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles: Book III, Part II, trans. by Vernon J. Bourke (Notre Dame, 
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 238. 
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terms of God’s providence in the world.373  However, at the end of life, particularly when 
immediate hopes are diminishing, the ultimate hope that Christians cling to is especially 
relevant. 
When hope is understood as a Christian virtue, it designates that the virtuous 
agent is characterized by this confident expectation.374  Christians confidently expect 
what they do not yet see.  To expect some future event is “to ‘look out’ for it or to ‘await’ 
it.”375  Romanus Cessario comments that, “the virtues of hope shape the proper emotional 
response that a person should demonstrate when faced with some future, difficult, but 
attainable good.”376  On the account of emotions that I offer in Chapter Four, the 
emotions of hope will not just be passive responses but active perceptions based on 
convictions drawn from the Christian narrative.  The Christian narrative teaches 
Christians their past and their future.  Having hope in dying is embodying these 
convictions and having one’s experience shaped by perceptions based on those 
convictions.  Christians dying with hope embody a confidence that death is not the final 
word on their lives.  Rather, hopeful Christians can rest in the confidence that God will 
bring them to their final rest with himself. 
 
 
                                                 
373 This is not to say that Christians do or should believe that they can trust in God to provide whatever 
immediate hopes they have. 
374 Cessario, “The Theological Virtue of Hope,” 232. 
375 Waterworth, Hope, 9.  Waterworth argues that what we expect we do not hope for.  So she opts for 
anticipation, desire, and uncertainty (10).  This suggests a difference between Christian hope and the 
secular version of the same virtue.  The Christian narrative gives believers a fairly clear understanding of 
what they can expect in the future, where “ultimate” hope is concerned.  Secular hope, not relying on a 
narrative of this type, does not expect so much as it anticipates with desire and uncertainty. 
376 Cessario, “The Theological Virtue of Hope,” 234. 
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 Patience 
 Patience serves hope.377  Those who embody Christian hope await a future in 
which alienation from God and the destructive effects of sin will be bound up and finally 
destroyed.  But because Christians live before that time, they must be patient as well.378  
If hope directs Christians toward the completion of the narrative, patience allows them to 
fully participate in the narrative’s present.  Those who embody Christian patience are 
prepared to wait on God’s timing as they can discern it.379  Patience, like courage, 
preserves or sustains other virtues and convictions.  The Christian who believes that 
God’s story is the true story of the world will need to be patient because the conclusion of 
that story has not come and sometimes even the story’s plausibility is in question.  The 
dying are especially susceptible to the kind of despair that hope councils against and 
patience preserves against.  Christopher Vogt says, “[t]he true threat posed by pain and 
suffering is that it will transform a person from one who is marked by faith, hope, and 
charity (i.e., a good Christian) into one marked by infidelity or despair or resentment and 
hatred toward God.”380  Absent virtues like hope and patience—indeed even with them—
the terminally ill are, more than most of the rest of us, forced to confront their mortality 
and all that it entails.  Patience aims to preserve hope in the midst of precisely this kind of 
challenge.  If patience is to function in this way, it must be more than a transformed 
                                                 
377 Vogt, Christian Art of Dying Well, 5. 
378 This account draws on Stanley Hauerwas and Charles Pinches, “Practicing Patience: How Christians 
Should Be Sick,” Christian Bioethics 2:2 (1996): 202-21, 208-9. 
379 Hauerwas and Pinches briefly discuss how some early church theologians analyzed suicide as a failure 
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380 Vogt, Christian Art of Dying Well, 30.   
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perspective; it must be more than a different way of seeing things.381  It, like the rest of 
the Christian life, must be practiced if it will serve Christians when they are dying.  
Patience must be practiced in two related senses.  We learn patience by taking up 
activities that teach us to work steadily at something that will not have immediate results.  
Thus, growing food, making long-term athletic or artistic goals, or building something 
can teach us patience if we go about such activities with a proper appreciation for the 
long-term and for the process involved.382  Thus, we practice patience in the sense that 
we make an effort to learn this virtue, and we practice it in the sense that we learn the 
virtue by engaging in complex activities, by patiently practicing them.383  Christians also 
learn patience by practicing Sabbath rest.  To rest one day out of a week from our efforts 
to secure our lives—whether those efforts involve another day at the office for a 
businessperson or in the library for a student—is to practice trust in God and to see our 
own efforts as bounded by God’s ultimate provision.  In this practice, Christians learn to 
wait and to watch for God. 
 Christians who are dying will have myriad opportunities to practice patience.  An 
honest assessment of their decline will cause some sadness.  This ought not be 
suppressed.  But, they can also look ahead to a future in which their own lives will be 
restored and redeemed in the eschatalogical consummation that concludes the Christian 
narrative.  Patience enables them to be the kind of people who can hold this tension in 
                                                 
381 Hauerwas and Pinches, “Practicing Patience,” 217, endnote 18. 
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balance without letting either side overwhelm the other.384  Patience allows Christians to 
bear with the dying process.  They need not prolong it; to do so might be to make of life a 
second god, as Barth notes.  Indeed, they ought not prolong out of a conviction that they 
must not let go of the life they know now.  That would be a failure to embody hope.  But 
they must and need not seek to end it prematurely.  To do this would be to fail to embody 
patience with respect to God’s timing in the world and with respect to the Christian 
narrative that shapes Christians. 
 Gratitude and Humility 
 In Chapter Five I discussed gratitude and humility as virtues relevant to a broad 
variety of deaths and conceptions of a good death.  Gratitude I used as an example of a 
virtue disposing us to acknowledge—in a positive fashion—our dependence on others.  A 
grateful person is well-disposed to deal with an increasing level of dependence on others 
at the end of life.  Christians can, like others, take up such a virtue.  Additionally, 
Christians can be grateful to God as well.  While there is much about death for which one 
might not be inclined to be grateful, Christians can put the suffering they face at the end 
of life in the context of the larger narrative that defines them.  This, as I argued above, 
can enable them to find some meaning in their experience.  One particular response 
would be gratitude to God for God’s desire to initiate reconciliation and to bring the 
narrative to a redemptive conclusion.  Christians may also be grateful that God has not 
stayed distant but has entered the narrative, and suffered, in the person of Jesus.385  
Above all, Christians are in a position to see the whole of their lives as being dependent 
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on God’s continued goodness to them.  Christians can happily acknowledge the ways that 
the good of their lives are interwoven with that of God and others.386  Thus, Christian 
gratitude goes beyond its secular analogue in its specification of the object of gratitude. 
 Christians can also embrace humility as an other-centering virtue.  The Christian 
understanding of the common basic intrinsic worth of all human beings will be grounded 
in some aspect of the Christian narrative.  That humans are created in the image of God 
or that God’s love extends to all, might be the sources of such intrinsic worth.387  A 
mutual and equal basis for self-worth enables the humble to be glad for the successes of 
the other.  At the end of life, the humble can gladly celebrate others and their ongoing 
lives.  The humble can find reason to celebrate those others’ lives even if they have not 
personally contributed to them.  The humble need not see others as their (the humble’s) 
own legacy.  The other-centering effect of such a virtue preserves the humble against 
excessive self-focus which, for the dying, might lead to self-pity.  Humble Christians will 
understand that their own lives are part of a much bigger story.  They are fully a part of 
that story—and so have a basis for self-worth—but they are no more than a part of the 
story, so they can embrace and rejoice in others. 
 Peacefulness 
 Because many say they would like to die peacefully, it is worth looking at what 
stake Christians have in such an ambition.388  Robert Roberts analyzes Christian 
                                                 
386 Again, see Shuman and Volck, Reclaiming the Body, for an account of how Christians are to see 
themselves as a community, a body, much of whose good is shared in common. 
387 Genesis 9:6 suggests that the image of God is a basis for the commandment not to murder.  On this see, 
Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/4, 344.  On God’s universal love, see C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard’s Ethic 
of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
388 For an example of someone who aspires to die peacefully, see Daniel Callahan, The Troubled Dream of 
Life: In Search of a Peaceful Death (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2000), 187-219. 
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peacefulness in terms of five propositions.  These are: that the world and people in it are 
alienated from God; that God has reconciled himself to the world; that the alienation was 
“wretched;” that the peace God establishes is “glorious” and good; and an individual’s 
experience of God and the world in terms of the first four propositions is a result of 
God’s work in that individual.389  These suggest a confidence in God and one’s place in 
God’s economy.  Christian peacefulness would take these propositions as concerns in 
terms of which to construe the world and the place of individuals in it.  Roberts’s 
propositions draw on and presume the Christian narrative I have outlined above.  Because 
this is a narrative, it has a time element to it.  So, the peace that Christians will be 
interested in has the same kind of tension in it as is found in patience, as discussed above.  
Peaceful Christians are peaceful in light of the long view of the Christian narrative.  Like 
Jesus dying in Gethsemane, they may well be troubled in some sense as well.390  But the 
peace that Christians can know derives, as we have seen before, from their appreciation 
of the larger picture as captured in the claim of the Christian narrative that God will bring 
about his peace in the end.  Peacefulness, as a Christian virtue, might serve as a collective 
term for the Christian’s response to the psychological challenges of dying discussed in 
Chapter Three.  Elizabeth Kubler-Ross observes that denial, isolation, anger, desperation, 
and depression are common attitudes among the dying.391  Drawing on their moral 
                                                 
389 Roberts, “Emotions as Access to Religious Truths,” 87 and 92. 
390 See Chapter Four, “A Biblical Ars Moriendi: Dying Well According to Luke” of Christopher Vogt, 
Christian Art of Dying Well for a discussion of imitating Jesus, including Jesus’s troubled countenance, in 
dying. 
391 Elizabeth Kubler-Ross, On Death and Dying (New York: Scribner Classics, 1969/1997), Chapters 3-6.  
Kubler-Ross believes that such common psychological attitudes resolve themselves into acceptance, 
however, her notion of acceptance relies on detachment from the elements of this life in a way that does not 
correspond to four propositions Roberts uses to characterize Christian peacefulness  (see On Death and 
Dying, Chapter 7). 
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tradition, Christians can seek to respond with hope, patience, gratitude, humility, and, 
above all, peacefulness. 
 Practical Wisdom 
 Christian practical wisdom, like all forms of this virtue, will be ordered to the 
goods presumed by the conception of a well-lived life that it serves.  I have suggested in 
Chapter Four that at the end of life practical wisdom could enable its possessor to deal 
with the challenge of “technological brinkmanship.”  Because Christians are called to 
believe that, in Barth’s terms, life is not a “second god,” I believe they can be relatively 
less eager to “risk” technological brinkmanship in hopes of gaining more life or greater 
capacity.  That is, Christians can be more free to bear their illnesses, including their 
terminal ones, with relatively less intervention.  This is a judgment they can make by 
reflection on the value of their lives as they know them as compared with the place of 
those lives within the perspective of the broader Christian narrative.  Christian practical 
wisdom will help patients to discern the increasing desperate measures medicine goes to 
in order to be able to do something for the ill.392  Instead, Christian might simply seek to 
accept their deaths with comparatively little therapeutic intervention.  Of course, they will 
gratefully receive care at the end of life.  But as Paul Ramsey has argued, Christians 
might be happy to receive only care.393  This restful approach to dying contrasts with 
                                                 
392 Joel James Shuman, The Body of Compassion: Ethics, Medicine, and the Church (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1999) claims, “[p]atients need to cultivate certain virtues first of all as gestures of 
resistance” (131).  He is concerned that Christians will simply accept medicine’s tacit mandate to relieve 
any and all suffering. 
393 Paul Ramsey, The Patient as Person: Explorations in Medical Ethics (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1970).  See especially his chapter, “On (Only) Caring for the Dying.” 
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what Albert Borgmann has been described as calling “a kind of addiction to 
hyperactivity.”394 
Practical wisdom will be required because it is not always obvious when a patient 
needs only relatively simply treatment to restore a high degree of functioning and when 
the next medical step is the first step into the brink.  There are no rules to follow here, nor 
are there obvious roadmaps to guide decision making in this context.  But Christians can, 
because of virtues that enable them to embody the truths of the Christian narrative, be 
relatively more comfortable staying well away from the “technological brink,” where 
they discern it.  They understand that their lives in present form have only finite value as 
compared with their future in the eschatalogical consummation of the Christian narrative.  
Christians can die well with virtues because those virtues shape them to be the kinds of 
people who are becoming fit to live with God. 
Two issues seem to be especially pressing for Christians seeking to exercise 
practical wisdom at the end of life.  The first issue concerns the timing of one’s death.  
The second concerns which pain and suffering to accept and which to seek to alleviate.  
Each of these issues requires practical wisdom because neither allows for a formulaic 
answer.  Concerning the first issue, the timing of death, there are some extremes to avoid.  
As I’ve claimed above, seeking to end one’s life prematurely would go against the virtue 
of patience.  Patience serves practical wisdom here by disposing the agent to wait, as is 
necessary, for one’s life to take its full course.  Similarly, at some point, one’s efforts to 
zealously preserve life begin to amount to a valuation of one’s life as a second god.  Both 
                                                 
394 Borgmann is discussed in Hauerwas and Pinches, “Practicing Patience,” 210-11.  They draw on Albert 
Borgmann, Crossing the Postmodern Divide (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
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of these extremes are excluded in the understanding of the Christian tradition I have 
developed here.  In between those extremes, Christians might make their judgments on 
the basis of the kind of lives they want to pursue.  For instance, a Christian might well 
choose a shorter, but more active, form of life if this enables her to continue to serve and 
be a part of her church.  For example, one might choose an organ transplant, if available, 
over a dialysis schedule that made travel for missions or other purposes prohibitively 
complicated. 
The second issue calling for practical wisdom concerns which suffering to accept 
and which suffering to seek to alleviate.  Here also, some things are more clear than 
others.  Christians can relieve any suffering where the pursuit of that relief does not come 
into conflict with other moral convictions.  So, for instance, given my claims above that 
suicide is morally excluded within this tradition, Christians ought to be prepared to face 
any suffering that could only be relieved by suicide.  Beyond moral convictions, 
Christians—like non-Christians—will seek to make judgments consistent with their sense 
of identity.395  For Christians, that sense of identity may well be shaped by Christian 
convictions.  To the degree that a Christian identifies himself with his community and is 
eager to remain an active member in it, he might also accept a higher level of suffering in 
order to remain active.   
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have sought to give a fuller depiction of how, given a conception 
of a well-lived life and a good death, virtues could enable a moral agent to become the 
                                                 
395 Ruth Anna Putnam, “The Moral Life of a Pragmatist,” comments that “choosing what to do … is 
choosing who one is going to be,” quoted in Shuman, The Body of Compassion, 117. 
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sort of person who could achieve such a good death.  Christian virtues have the role of 
enabling their possessor to embody and see life from the perspective of the Christian 
narrative.  This narrative forms the metaphysical background for the Christian moral 
tradition in general and for this particular conception of a good death.  A large part of 
dying well on this conception is being able to take up and view one’s life from the 
perspective of God’s activity in the world.  The Christian virtues, as I’ve depicted them 
here, can serve that role.  To the degree that the Christian embodies them, they enable her 
to see the world from the point of view they entail.  To do this is to be able to put one’s 
dying into a perspective that mitigates the challenges of it.  Thus, these virtues enable 
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